Oakes v. United States

• Decision Date: 28 July 2021
• Docket Number: 4:20-CV-00124-CDL-MSH,4:13-CR-00003-CDL-MSH
• Parties: CHARLES OAKES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

CHARLES OAKES, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Nos. 4:13-CR-00003-CDL-MSH, 4:20-CV-00124-CDL-MSH

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division

July 28, 2021

28 U.S.C. § 2255

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court are pro se Petitioner Charles Oakes's motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 38) and motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 39). For the hereinbelow reasons, the Court recommends that Petitioner's motion to vacate be denied. His motion to appoint counsel is denied.

BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2013, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against Petitioner, charging him with (1) two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (e)(1), (2) two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (3) one count of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and (4) two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c). Indictment 1-6, ECF No. 1. Following his arrest pursuant to this indictment, Petitioner appeared for an initial appearance on October 28, 2013, and, through

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counsel, pled not guilty. Minute Entry 1, ECF No. 12; 1st Plea Sheet 1, ECF No. 13. On December 18, 2013, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute-counts five and seven of the indictment-and the remaining charges were dismissed. Plea Agreement 2-3, 6-7, ECF No. 21; 2d Plea Sheet 1, ECF No. 22; Plea Tr. 17:24-18:24, ECF No. 49; Judgment 1, ECF No. 32.

Petitioner agreed that the Government could prove at trial that on the morning of May 23, 2012, bounty hunters searched for Petitioner because he had missed an Alabama court date, and they located him at a Columbus, Georgia residence. Plea Agreement 8; Plea Tr. 19:12-19:17. The bounty hunters subdued Petitioner outside the residence after he dropped a loaded .223 caliber rifle. Plea Agreement 8; Plea Tr. 19:17-19:19. Muscogee County, Georgia Sheriff's deputies arrived at the scene and took Petitioner into temporary custody. Plea Agreement 8; Plea Tr. 19:20-19:22. Petitioner was immediately transferred to Russell County, Alabama due to outstanding warrants. Plea Agreement 8-9; Plea Tr. 19:22-19:24. Muscogee County Sheriff's deputies searched the residence and discovered two bags and two eyeglass cases containing suspected narcotics, glass smoking pipes, plastic baggies, straws, digital scales, and another bag containing seven smaller bags of suspected methamphetamine. Plea Agreement 9; Plea Tr. 19:25-20:06. The contents of the bags tested positive for methamphetamine. Plea Agreement 9; Plea Tr. 20:06-20:11. A Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives agent interviewed Petitioner at the Russell County, Alabama Jail. Plea Agreement 9; Plea Tr. 20:12-20:14. After he was advised of his rights, Petitioner signed a written waiver of his rights and voluntarily gave

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a statement. Plea Agreement 9; Plea Tr. 20:15-20:17. He stated that he purchased the rifle from another individual, claimed possession of the bag of drugs, and stated that it contained mostly methamphetamine. Plea Agreement 9; Plea Tr. 20:18-20:21. Petitioner also stated that he did not exit the residence with the rifle, but he threw the rifle down before he exited because he did not intend to harm anyone. Plea Agreement 9; Plea Tr. 20:21-21:01. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner stipulated that he had previously been convicted of three felonies. Plea Agreement 10; Plea Tr. 21:15-21:25.

The Court sentenced Petitioner to 211 months imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to any state sentence, four years supervised release, and a $200 mandatory assessment. Sen'g Tr. 24:04-26:18, ECF No. 50; Judgment 2-6. Judgment was entered against him on March 25, 2014. Judgment 1. The Court received Petitioner's motion to vacate (ECF No. 38) on June 10, 2020. Respondent responded (ECF No. 41) on July 21, 2020. The Court received Petitioner's first motion for extension of time (ECF No. 42) on August 6, 2020, wherein he requested an additional sixty days to file a reply. 1st Mot. for Extension of Time 1, ECF No. 42. On August 24, 2020, the Court granted in part Petitioner's motion and ordered him to file a reply within thirty days. Order 1, ECF No. 43.

The Court received Petitioner's second motion for extension of time (ECF No. 44) on September 29, 2020, requesting an additional extension of thirty days to file his reply. 2d Mot. for Extension of Time 1, ECF No. 44. On September 30, 2020, the Court granted Petitioner's motion. Text-only Order, ECF No. 46. The Court received Petitioner's third motion for extension of time (ECF No. 47) on November 6, 2020, requesting an extension

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of sixty days. 3d Mot. for Extension of Time 1, ECF No. 47. On the same day, the Court granted in part Petitioner's motion and ordered him to file a reply within thirty days. Text-only Order, ECF No. 48. Petitioner's reply was due on December 7, 2020-over four months after Respondent filed a response. Petitioner, however, failed to file a reply. His motion to vacate is ripe for review.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Appoint Counsel

The Clerk separately docketed Petitioner's motion to vacate (ECF No. 38) as a motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 39) on June 10, 2020. Therein, he requests appointed counsel and an evidentiary hearing, but he offers no reasons in support. Mot. to Appoint Counsel 1, 3, ECF No. 39.

Criminal defendants are not generally entitled to appointment of counsel for collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (“In most federal courts, it is the practice to appoint counsel in post-conviction proceedings only after a petition for post-conviction relief passes initial judicial evaluation and the court has determined that issues are presented calling for an evidentiary hearing.”). Under Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, “[i]f an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent a moving party who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.” According to that code section, a movant seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be provided counsel if they are financially eligible and “the United States magistrate judge or the court determines that the interests of justice so require[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2).

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), a petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing where “the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” An evidentiary hearing is not required “every time a section 2255 petitioner simply asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: ‘A hearing is not required on patently frivolous claims or those which are based upon unsupported generalizations. Nor is a hearing required where the petitioner's allegations are affirmatively contradicted by the record.'” Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Guerra v. United States, 588 F.2d 519, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1979)).

Here, as explained more thoroughly below, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. The facts stated in Petitioner's motion to vacate are not unusually complicated, and the law governing his claims is neither novel nor complex. The Court finds that the interests of justice do not require Petitioner be appointed counsel. Accordingly, Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel (ECF Nos. 39) is DENIED.

II. Motion to Vacate

Petitioner moves to vacate his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, arguing the Government failed to allege or prove that he knew he qualified as a person prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mot. to Vacate 1-3, ECF No. 38. Respondent contends Petitioner's motion should be denied because (1) Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim, and (2) Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits. Resp. to Mot. to Vacate 5-13, ECF No. 41. The Court recommends that Petitioner's claim be denied for procedural default and, in the alternative, that his claim be denied on the merits.

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A. Rehaif v. United States

In support of his motion, Petitioner relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, -- U.S. --, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). See Mot. to Vacate 1-3. In Rehaif, petitioner challenged his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2194-95. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person [who qualifies as a person who falls within a category listed at § 922(g)(1) to (9)] to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Rehaif, in order to convict a defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Government was required to prove (1) the defendant qualified as a person prohibited from possessing a firearm among the categories listed in § 922(g), (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, and (3) the firearm or ammunition was transported in interstate commerce. United States v. Rehaif, 888 F.3d 1138, 1143-1147 (11th Cir. 2018), rev'd, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019); see also United States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that in order to convict a defendant charged with possession of a firearm in...