Oakley v. Connecticut Com'n on Human Rights and Opportunities
| Decision Date | 28 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 12900,12900 |
| Citation | 662 A.2d 137,38 Conn.App. 506 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Barbara OAKLEY v. CONNECTICUT COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES. |
Charles Krich, Staff Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Philip A. Murphy, Jr., Commission Counsel, for the appellant (named defendant).
A. Susan Peck, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn K. Querijero, Asst. Atty. Gen., filed a brief for the named defendant as amicus curiae.
Before DUPONT, C.J., and HEIMAN and HENNESSY, JJ.
The defendant state commission on human rights and opportunities appeals from the trial court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to General Statutes § 4-184a. The commission claims that (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's motion because it was filed nearly five months after the final judgment was rendered, (2) the plaintiff is barred from recovering attorney's fees and expenses because she failed to request them in her appeal petition, and (3) the amount requested by the plaintiff and granted by the trial court was unreasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case. The attorney general has submitted a brief as amicus curiae. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Certain facts are relevant to this appeal. The underlying action is a sex discrimination case filed with the commission by the plaintiff against her employer, the defendant state judicial branch. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was hired in December, 1989, as a "Maintenance Administrator," and discovered shortly thereafter that she had been given the title "Associate Maintenance Administrator," that two males had been hired at about the same time with the title "Maintenance Administrator," and that the two males with the superior title were compensated at a salary higher than that of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged that all three positions require the same knowledge, skill and abilities, and that, therefore, the judicial branch had discriminated against her on the basis of sex and had denied her equal pay for equal work in violation of General Statutes §§ 46a-58(a), 46a-60(a)(1), 46a-70(a) and 31-75, and in violation of title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963.
Upon receipt of the plaintiff's complaint, the commission commenced its investigation. In early February, 1991, a commission investigator concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice had occurred and prepared a draft finding to that effect. In his draft finding, the investigator recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence. The investigator gave the draft finding to his supervisor, who forwarded it to the plaintiff with a cover letter advising the plaintiff that she had fourteen days to comment on the draft finding.
Upon receipt of the draft finding, the plaintiff requested that the commission give her copies of all evidence produced in connection with her case. The commission investigator sent the plaintiff copies of that evidence. The plaintiff then submitted her comments on the draft finding to the commission. The commission supervisor notified the plaintiff that her comments had been received and would be reviewed to determine if additional investigation or a change in the draft finding would be warranted.
After reviewing the plaintiff's comments, the commission investigator telephoned the plaintiff's supervisor at the judicial branch to discuss the plaintiff's comments. The plaintiff's supervisor asked the investigator to fax him a copy of the comments. Upon reviewing the plaintiff's comments, the plaintiff's supervisor faxed the investigator a memorandum in which he set forth his responses to the plaintiff's comments on the draft finding. The plaintiff's supervisor claimed in this memorandum that the plaintiff refused to follow department procedure for handling maintenance jobs and that maintenance problems had developed "because of [the plaintiff's] continual overextension of her authority...." The memorandum also discussed the plaintiff's job title as printed on business cards, in the judicial branch directory, and on monthly report forms, and that the plaintiff's personnel file would be "marked to reflect" her "being insubordinate." Finally, the plaintiff's supervisor questioned the impartiality of the plaintiff's witnesses. 1
After faxing his memorandum to the commission investigator, the plaintiff's supervisor telephoned him and requested that the substance of his memorandum not be included in any response that the investigator might make to the plaintiff's comments because the statements in the memorandum were "subjective."
The investigator placed the memorandum in the commission case file, but did not tell the plaintiff about it or about his telephone conversations with the plaintiff's supervisor. Instead, he wrote his own memorandum to the commission supervisor rebutting the plaintiff's comments on the draft finding.
A few days later, the commission supervisor wrote to the plaintiff's attorney to acknowledge receipt of the plaintiff's comments and to advise the attorney that the commission supervisor and the investigator had determined that further investigation was not warranted. She further advised the plaintiff's attorney that she would endorse and forward to the commission the investigator's recommendation that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. She did not mention the memorandum from the plaintiff's supervisor.
Shortly thereafter, the commission issued its "Finding of No Cause and Summary," which is almost identical to the draft finding and which recommends dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint for lack of evidence. By letter dated March 28, 1991, the chairperson of the commission notified the plaintiff that she had accepted the recommendation to dismiss the complaint for lack of sufficient evidence and that the plaintiff could apply for reconsideration of the disposition.
The plaintiff requested reconsideration of the dismissal of her complaint. After reviewing the request, a commission staff attorney recommended dismissal of the complaint. The chairperson approved this recommendation and dismissed the complaint.
On July 23, 1991, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes In a memorandum of decision dated September 3, 1992, the court ruled that the commission had violated General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 46a-83(b) 4 in investigating the plaintiff's complaint and that the violation had substantially prejudiced the plaintiff's right to a fair investigation and resolution of her complaint. The court sustained the plaintiff's appeal and remanded the case pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183(j) 5 for a new investigation of the plaintiff's complaint. 6
§ 4-183 on several grounds 2 and requested that her case be remanded to the commission. 3 The plaintiff's petition further requested "[s]uch other relief as the court may deem fair and equitable." After her appeal was filed, the plaintiff learned of the ex parte communication between the commission investigator and the plaintiff's supervisor, and on December 11, 1991, moved to supplement the agency record by showing that there were procedural irregularities in the commission's handling of her complaint. The motion was granted and a hearing was [38 Conn.App. 511] held at which the plaintiff produced evidence concerning the commission investigator's ex parte communication with the plaintiff's supervisor
On February 3, 1993, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs under General Statutes § 4-184a, claiming that she was entitled to compensation for 96.2 hours of work billed at the rate of $150 an hour, plus costs of $473.20, for a total of $14,903.37. The plaintiff requested $7500, the maximum amount allowed by § 4-184a. The commission filed an objection, challenging the plaintiff's right to recover fees and expenses on several grounds. 7 The defendant judicial branch also filed an objection. 8 On September 20, 1993, the Superior Court ruled for the plaintiff and found the requested amount of $14,903.37 to be reasonable, but reduced The commission thereafter filed this appeal.
the award to $7500, the maximum amount allowed by § 4-184a.
Our standard of review differs for the commission's three claims. Because the issues of whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's motion five months after the final judgment was rendered, and whether a party may waive fees under § 4-184a by not expressly requesting them in the petition to the Superior Court raise questions of law rather than fact, those issues are subject to our plenary review. Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 229, 654 A.2d 342 (1995); Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn.App. 105, 112, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). With regard to the commission's claim that the amount the trial court awarded the plaintiff was unreasonable, this court has in other contexts held that the assessment of attorney's fees is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Stamford v. Kovac, 36 Conn.App. 270, 279, 650 A.2d 626 (1994). The plain language of § 4-184a(2) provides that a court may award reasonable attorney's fees "not in excess of seven thousand five hundred dollars ... reasonably incurred in opposing the agency action...." " 'In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, an appellate court should entertain every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's decision.' " Id., at 277, 650 A.2d 626. The commission's third claim, therefore, will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
We first address the commission's argument that because the plaintiff filed her motion for attorney's fees nearly five...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Meadowbrook Ctr., Inc. v. Buchman
...held that a five month delay in filing a motion for attorney's fees was reasonable ...." See Oakley v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 38 Conn. App. 506, 516–18, 662 A.2d 137 (1995), aff'd, 237 Conn. 28, 675 A.2d 851 (1996). The plaintiff argues that the Appellate Court imprope......
-
Doyle Grp. v. Alaskans for Cuddy
...for attorney's fees “does not open, modify, or in any way affect the judgment.” Oakley v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 38 Conn.App. 506, 517, 662 A.2d 137 (1995), aff'd, 237 Conn. 28, 675 A.2d 851 (1996).Although we recognize that the procedural postures of Neiditz and Oakley......
-
Traystman, Coric and Keramidas v. Daigle
...adopted in 1999, apparently in response to concerns raised by the Appellate Court's decision in Oakley v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 38 Conn. App. 506, 662 A.2d 137 (1995), aff'd, 237 Conn. 28, 675 A.2d 851 (1996). See Practice Book, 1999, § 11-21, commentary; Oakley v. Com......
-
Lindo v. Lindo
...decision of entitlement to attorney's fees requires inquiry separate from decision on merits); Oakley v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 38 Conn.App. 506, 517, 662 A.2d 137 (1995), aff'd, 237 Conn. 28, 675 A.2d 851 (1996) (same). We conclude, therefore, that because the trial co......