Oakley v. Willians

• Decision Date: 28 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-cv-01763-CMA-NYW
• Parties: JACOB D. OAKLEY, Plaintiff, v. DEAN WILLIANS, INMATE BANKING - DEFENDANTS TO BE DETERMINED, OFFENDER ACCOUNTS - DEFENDANTS TO BE DETERMINED, and BRADLEY DUCA, [1] Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

JACOB D. OAKLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
DEAN WILLIANS, INMATE BANKING - DEFENDANTS

TO BE DETERMINED, OFFENDER ACCOUNTS - DEFENDANTS TO BE DETERMINED, and BRADLEY DUCA, ^[1] Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-01763-CMA-NYW

United States District Court, D. Colorado

January 28, 2022

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NINA Y. WANG, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter comes before this court on the Motion to Dismiss Complaint Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (the “Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”) filed by Defendants Dean Williams, Inmate Banking, Offender Accounts, and Bradley Duca^[2] (collectively, “Defendants”) on September 14, 2021. [Doc. 18].^[3] The undersigned considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case dated

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July 29, 2021 [Doc. 8], and the Memorandum dated September 16, 2021. [Doc. 20]. Upon review of the Motion and the applicable case law, this court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The court draws the following facts from the Prisoner Complaint (the “Complaint”) [Doc. 1] and presumes they are true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Jacob D. Oakley (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Oakley”) is an inmate currently incarcerated within the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”). See [Doc. 1 at 1, 4]. Mr. Oakley alleges generally that Defendants have made or authorized charges to his prison financial account, without notice to Plaintiff and without Plaintiff's permission, which have caused Plaintiff's account to have an increased deficit balance. [Id. at 5, ¶¶ 3-4]. Mr. Oakley alleges that every time he receives a deposit into his prison account, his bank statement reflects that the deposits are “subtracted in whole and applied towards the Negative Balance for the entire amount of the deposit.” [Id. at ¶ 7]. In addition, he suggests that Defendants have used state funds to pay court costs related to Plaintiff's “court cases” and have “loan[ed] [Plaintiff] money” to purchase canteen items, which have created further debt transactions without Plaintiff's permission. [Id. at 5-6, ¶ 7].

As to specific instances of wrongful conduct, Mr. Oakley asserts that the CDOC billed him twice for the “same payment transaction on . . . app-case 260530” [sic]. [Id. at 6, ¶ 9]. He states that on an unspecified date, he received his “1 eip”^[4] of $1, 200, and that “payment reflects being made [sic] in the amount of 1200/1400, ” but that “that case [was]

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already part of the Negative Balance total.” [Id.]. Thus, Mr. Oakley alleges that, even though he paid this debt, the CDOC “added the debt amount back.” [Id.].

Mr. Oakley also appears to allege that, as of September 13, 2012, he had a maximum debt balance of “no more than -3783.81 or -2720.49” and that, aside from the estimated maximum total charges for hygiene products, legal and personal mail, and photocopies of legal documents, which would amount to $325, he “acquired no more debt to CDOC.” [Id. at 7, ¶ 11]. Mr. Oakley states that he received “at a minimum” $6, 500 in deposits from 2005 to 2021 and that the CDOC took 90 to 100 percent of his total deposits and applied the money towards the negative balance in his account. [Id.]. Plaintiff appears to suggest that, based on his deposits, he should no longer have a negative balance in his prison account. [Id.].^[5] Plaintiff alleges that he disputed the discrepancies in his account to CDOC officials and was ignored. [Id. at 6, ¶ 10].

Finally, Mr. Oakley alleges that the conduct alleged in the Complaint is contrary to CDOC policy. According to Plaintiff, pursuant to CDOC Administrative Regulations 200-02 and 150-01, “there are only two situations in which [the] CDOC may charge an [inmate's] account” in a manner which results in a debt obligation: the CDOS may cause an inmate may go into a deficient balance in his or her prison account only (1) to cover the cost of legal or personal mail; and (2) if the inmate has been convicted of a Class II misdemeanor for damage to state property. [Id. at 4, ¶ 1]. Plaintiff alleges that, aside from these two specific situations, there are no other circumstances which allow the CDOC to indebt an inmate's account. [Id. at 5, ¶ 2].

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Mr. Oakley initiated this action on June 28, 2021, see generally [id.], and the Honorable Gordon P. Gallagher granted Mr. Oakley leave to proceed in this case in forma pauperis. [Doc. 4]. In his Complaint, Mr. Oakley primarily alleges a violation of his due process rights, [Doc. 1 at 4], asserting that he has a fundamental right to, and a protected liberty interest in, paying off his own debts with his own money, [id. at 7, ¶¶ 5-6], and a fundamental right and a protected liberty interest “to not rely on the state to pay off [his] debts for [him].” [Id. at 8, ¶ 7]. In addition, Mr. Oakley requests that the court “liberally construe” his Complaint to state any claim for relief under:

1. Due process

2. substantive due process,

3. Violations of the Tucker/little Tucker Act,

4. [various] statutes of fraud(s)/species of frauds under the UCC provisions as well as [Title] 11, 12, 31 U.S.C. and their state counterparts, I assert fraud is attached to all claim(s).

5. violations of state and Federal Banking codes, and codes that regulate Financial transactions under title 11, 12, 31 U.S.C.

6. claims against any and all Negotiable Instruments under the UCC that I did not personally sign and authorize, [and]

7. violation(s) of [various] antitrust laws, [Sherman] Act, and all related statutes and codes, in the interest of justice and Fundamental fairness.

[Id. at 12, ¶ 18]. Mr. Oakley seeks injunctive relief as well as compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. [Id. at 10, 12].

Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on September 14, 2021. [Doc. 18]. Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's claims in their entirety, arguing that (1) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion; (3) Plaintiff's due process claims under the Fourteenth

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Amendment fail to state a claim; (4) Plaintiff has failed to allege the personal participation of Defendants; and (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See generally [id.]. On September 17, 2021, this court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Motion to Dismiss by October 18, 2021. [Doc. 21]. After Plaintiff requested an extension of time to respond, see [Doc. 24], the court extended Plaintiff's response deadline to December 2, 2021. [Doc. 26]. Despite this extension, Mr. Oakley did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss, and the time for filing a response has elapsed. Because the Motion to Dismiss is ripe for recommendation, I now turn to Defendants' arguments.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that pro se litigants cannot rely on conclusory, unsubstantiated allegations to survive a 12(b)(6) motion). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that plausibility refers “to the scope of

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the allegations in a complaint, ” and that the allegations must be sufficient to nudge a plaintiff's claim(s) “across the line from conceivable to plausible”). The ultimate duty of the court is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).

II. Pro Se Pleadings

In applying the above principles, this court is mindful that Mr. Oakley proceeds pro se and the court thus affords his papers and filings a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). But the court cannot and does not act as his advocate, Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to Plaintiff as to a represented party. See Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008); Dodson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 878 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiff's Claims

As set forth above, Plaintiff seeks to raise claims under a number of various legal sources. [Doc. 1 at 12, ¶ 18]. Liberal construction of pro se pleadings “means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For purposes of clarity, the court first parses the exact contours of Plaintiff's claims before turning to Defendants' arguments advocating for dismissal of those claims.

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Construing the Complaint liberally, Mr. Oakley seeks relief based on: (1) due process; (2) substantive due process; (3) violations of the Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act; (4) the statute of frauds; (5) Titles 11, 12, and...