Oaks v. District Court of State of RI

• Decision Date: 01 April 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-0190-S.
• Parties: Yvette OAKS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT COURT OF the STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Chief Clerk of the District Court of the State of Rhode Island, Chief Clerk of the Superior Court of the State of Rhode Island, and Steven Van Eyk, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

631 F. Supp. 538

Yvette OAKS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT COURT OF the STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Chief Clerk of the District Court of the State of Rhode Island, Chief Clerk of the Superior Court of the State of Rhode Island, and Steven Van Eyk, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 83-0190-S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

April 1, 1986.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., John W. Dineen, Michael V. Milito, Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.

Arlene Violet, Atty. Gen., Linda MacDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., Timothy Mullaney, Amelia I. Jestings, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Providence, R.I., for defendants.

Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Netti S. Vogel, Providence, R.I., for defendant Van Eyk.

OPINION AND ORDER

SELYA, District Judge.

This civil action was filed in this court on March 21, 1986. The plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. At issue is the constitutionality of R.I.G.L. § 9-12-12 (quoted post n. 3), a state statute which necessitates the posting of an appeal bond in an action for possession of tenements let. (The state statutory scheme is described post Part II.) The court turns without further ado to the stipulated facts and to the travel of this peregrine litigation.

I.

Plaintiff Yvette Oaks (Oaks) and her two minor children are tenants at 277 Main Street in the Fiskeville section of Cranston, Rhode Island. Oaks is admittedly a person of insubstantial means: her gross income is $500.00 monthly, which she receives under the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program. Defendant Steven Van Eyk (Van Eyk) is the plaintiff's landlord. Van Eyk took title to the subject real estate on June 3, 1985. When he did so, he "inherited" Oaks as a tenant.

There is a written lease. The agreement provides for a monthly rent of $220. The tenant pays for all utilities (except water). The length of the tenancy remains in dispute (Van Eyk asserts that it runs from month to month, the plaintiff claims that she is entitled to a longer tenure). This issue is beside the point: the litigation between the parties in the state courts will ultimately resolve the terms and duration of the tenancy and the rights and obligations of the parties vis-a-vis the subject real estate. Such questions are not cognizable in this federal court proceeding. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1742, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).

Van Eyk, whatever may have been his reason, served Oaks with a notice to quit on December 5, 1985. Finding his impoverished tenant unwilling to vacate the premises, Van Eyk resorted to the judicial process. He commenced an eviction action in the Rhode Island District Court (Eighth Division) (Van Eyk v. Oaks, C.A. No. 86-22). At trial in the Eighth District Court, Judge Chaharyn rejected Oaks's merits defense and granted Van Eyk the relief which he sought (possession and a few days' back rent). A judgment to that effect was entered on March 19, 1986.

Oaks desired to prosecute an appeal of this ruling to the state superior court. In order to facilitate this course of action, she moved the district court for, and was granted, a waiver of the filing fee. Coincidentally, she moved that the statutory appeal bond, see R.I.G.L. § 9-12-12, consist solely of a requirement that she remain current in her rent payments. That motion was summarily denied and the court set the bond at $2000. Oaks was financially unable to meet the state district court's bond requirement.

The plaintiff, threatened by the prospect of an immediate execution of the state district court judgment against her, turned to a federal forum. (Under R.I.G.L. § 9-12-12, the appeal bond must be filed with the court or no notice of appeal will be processed; absent a valid appeal, the eviction judgment will become final; and, unless an appeal stays its effect, the lessor may execute upon the district court judgment.) An emergency hearing was held on March 21, 1986. This court, in order to preserve the status quo, entered a limited restraining order (i) requiring that rent be paid on a current basis, (ii) enjoining Van Eyk from executing upon the state district court judgment, and (iii) mandating that the clerk of the state district court take no action either to reject or to process plaintiff's notice of appeal pending the entry of a further (federal) order. This court announced its intention to schedule a hearing on preliminary injunction within one week.

The need for such a session was, however, averted. The parties stipulated to the critical facts, acquiesced in the merger of preliminary injunction with merits adjudication, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2), and waived their rights to present further evidence or arguments. The complete state court docket was made part of the instant record. The court invited the filing of briefs on or before the close of business on March 25 (later extended to March 26) and determined that priority attention should be given to the rendition of a decision.

II.

The district court is the first tier of the state's trial court system and sits in eight divisions throughout the state. R.I.G.L. § 8-2-2. The tribunal is not a court of record and no jury trials are available. An appeal, in the nature of a trial de novo, is provided to the parties in the state superior court, as long as certain litigation costs are prepaid by the appellant. R.I.G.L. § 9-12-10.¹ A procedure exists to claim a jury trial in the superior court proceedings. R.I.R.Civ.P. 38.

The district court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment actions. R.I.G.L. § 8-8-3(a)(2).² Any defendant who desires to appeal the judgment in such an action must pay the aforementioned litigation costs required by R.I. G.L. § 9-10-10, and must also post bond "to pay all monies due, or which may become due pending the action under the tenancy, and such damages and costs as may be awarded against him...." R.I. G.L. § 9-12-12.³ The amount of the bond is fixed by the district court on a case-by-case basis. The state district judge is not at liberty to waive the bond requirement. Jones v. Aciz, 109 R.I. 612, 289 A.2d 44, 52 (1972), appeal dismissed sub nom, Phillips v. Housing Authority of the City of Providence, 409 U.S. 1094, 93 S.Ct. 704, 34 L.Ed.2d 678 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of § 9-12-12). See also Walka v. Bestwick, 115 R.I. 38, 340 A.2d 115, 117 (1975) (language of § 9-12-12 "clear and unambiguous"). Cf. Raptakis v. Chase, 120 R.I. 1009, 392 A.2d 932 (1978) (dismissing appeal for failure to post bond). Section 9-12-12 is, in one sense, in aid of other statutory provisions which command that a tenant who continues in occupancy during the pendency of an appeal pay the rent as it becomes due. See R.I.G.L. §§ 34-20-7, 34-20-8. Failure to do so entitles the landlord to judgment and execution. Bove v. Kates Properties, Inc., 444 A.2d 193, 195 (R.I.1982).

III.

Oaks claims that the necessity of an appeal bond as a condition precedent to her access to the superior court abridges her constitutional right to a jury trial under the Due Process Clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. She further alleges that the bond requirement infringes her right to equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.⁴ Both arguments hinge on her impecunious financial status. She therefore sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, invoking this court's federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Oaks seeks a declaration that the appeal bond requirement is unconstitutional, coupled with injunctive relief affording her the right to prosecute her state court appeal. In effect, she beseeches the federal courts, as the ultimate arbiters of the reach of the federal Constitution, to vitiate the state supreme court's endorsement of § 9-12-12 announced in Jones v. Aciz, supra.

IV.

As noted, the plaintiff asserts that the state's requirement of an appeal bond in her case violates, first, her right to a jury trial and second, her right to appeal, all as guaranteed (in her view) pursuant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal Constitution. See ante Part III. The matrix for decision thus contains four quadrants: each claim must be analyzed separately and within that analysis, each must be subjected to both due process and equal protection scrutiny.

A. Trial By Jury

Oaks claims that the operation of R.I.G.L. § 9-12-12 transgresses due process in her circumstances, thereby giving rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One of the essential elements required in order to maintain a § 1983 claim, however, is that a litigant must allege and show deprivation of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). It is well established that the federal right to a jury trial in civil cases, provided by the seventh amendment to the federal Constitution, is not applicable to the states. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164, 1171 n. 12 (5th Cir.1979); Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Division County Court, Milwaukee County, State of Wisconsin, 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir.1975).

Though couching her claims in bold declarations and perfervid rhetoric, Oaks offers not a shred of respectable authority for the proposition that the right to a jury trial in civil cases is safeguarded by federal due process precepts. The plaintiff's flagship precedent in this regard, Lucky Ned Pepper's Ltd. v. Columbia Park and Recreation Association, 64 Md.App. 222, 494 A.2d 947 (1985), is inapposite. The court in Lucky Ned held that a state summary eviction proceeding requiring past-due accrued rents to be paid into escrow was unconstitutional under a provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which provided for the right...