Oates v. United States

• Decision Date: 02 May 1916
• Docket Number: 1417-1420.
• Citation: 233 F. 201
• Parties: OATES v. UNITED STATES, and three other cases.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

233 F. 201

OATES v. UNITED STATES, and three other cases.

Nos. 1417-1420.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

May 2, 1916

John C Palmer, Jr., and Joseph R. Curl, both of Wheeling, W. Va for plaintiffs in error.

Stuart W. Walker, U.S. Atty., of Martinsburg, W. Va., and John A Howard, of Wheeling, W. Va., for the United States.

Before KNAPP and WOODS, Circuit Judges, and BOYD, District Judge.

WOODS Circuit Judge.

In these contempt proceedings the plaintiffs in error defendants below, were found guilty of violation of a temporary restraining order of September 29, 1913, made in the case of West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company v. John White et al. The tenor of the order was to enjoin interference with plaintiff's business by using threats, force, intimidation, or persuasion to induce its employes to break their contracts or leave their work, or by using like means to induce any person to refuse to accept employment with plaintiff, and to enjoin trespassing on plaintiff's premises for the purposes above indicated. The District Judge made specific findings of a number of acts of disobedience of the order by each of the parties charged, and the sentence imposed on each defendant was the payment of costs and imprisonment for six months.

This court reversed the judgment for the following reasons: First. Incompetent evidence was received; although the District Judge recited in his decree that his findings were based on 'the legal evidence produced at the trial, rejecting all improper and irrelevant parts thereof,' it was impossible for this court to say what testimony the District Court ultimately rejected, and whether any of the incompetent testimony influenced his findings as to the extent of the punishment inflicted. Second. The District Judge, as one of the grounds of his findings, took judicial notice of certain propositions of law laid down by the District Court in the case of Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell et al., 202 F. 512, which were afterwards held by this court to be erroneous. Third. The District Court imposed a general sentence for the separate acts of contempt alleged and found against the defendants, whereas, under the rule laid down in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 Sup.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 874, the punishment for the different offenses should have been so separated that this court could analyze the evidence and determine which, if any, of the charges were sustained. It was accordingly adjudged that:

'The judgment of the District Court must be reversed, and the causes remanded, so that the District Judge may reconsider them, indicating in his findings the evidence rejected as hearsay, announcing his conclusions of fact in view of the judgment of this court in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell et al., supra, and imposing sentence in accordance with the view of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Company, supra.'

At a subsequent hearing the District Court indicated plainly the testimony struck out as incompetent, and on the remaining evidence made the following definite findings of violations of the order of injunction against the plaintiffs in error:

'That the defendant James Oates did, by establishing and maintaining a camp near the West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company's Locust Grove mine, occupied by turbulent, disorderly men, intimidate the said company employes at said mine, in violation of the injunction and restraining order, with full knowledge of said injunction.

'That the defendant James Oates did, at the strikers' headquarters at Wellsburg, advise and incite the strikers there assembled to prevent the employes of the West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company from working at the La Belle mine, by assaulting and beating them, and he did thereby incite the said strikers to acts of violence in violation of the injunction and the restraining order, with full knowledge of said injunction.

'That the defendant Hiram Stephens did, in company with the other strikers, follow a number of the employes of the West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company's employes to the ferryboat at Wellsburg, when they were returning from work at the said company's mine, and attempted to intimidate them, in violation of the injunction, and that he then knew of the said injunction.

'That the defendant Hiram Stephens did also participate in a procession of 150 or more men and women carrying a flag and singing ribald songs, who marched from Wellsburg to the West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company's mines at Colliers, known as its Locust Grove mine, for the purpose of intimidating said company's employes employed at the said mine, in violation of the injunction, and that he then knew of the injunction.

'That the defendant Frank Ledvinski did, at the strikers' headquarters at Wellsburg, advise the strikers there assembled to prevent the employes of the West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company from working at its La Belle mine, by assaulting and beating them, and he did thereby incite the said strikers to acts of violence in violation of the injunction and restraining order, and with full knowledge thereof.

'That the defendant Fanny Sullens led a mob of about 150 men to a road leading to the mine of the West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Company, known as the Gilchrist mine No. 3, for the purpose of intercepting said company's employes and assaulting them, in violation of the injunction, and that she then knew of said injunction.'

Fanny Sullens was found guilty of the following charge also:

'The said Fanny Sullens has, during nearly all of the time the said restraining order and the said temporary injunction has been in force, with full knowledge of the said restraining order and of said temporary injunction, resorted to the camp maintained by James Oates and others near your petitioner's Locust Grove mine at Colliers, Brooke county, W. Va., and has aided in inciting of force in the camp there, to force, violence, threats, intimidation, and assaults against your petitioner's employes at its said mine, and against other mine workers desiring to enter your petitioner's service at its said mine. The said Fanny Sullens has also been during nearly all of the said time with James Oates and others, aiding him, and has aided and assisted them, in inciting a force of men at Wellsburg, W. Va., to resort to force, threats, violence, intimidation, and actual assaults against your petitioner's employes at its two mines near Wellsburg, W. Va., and against other mine workers desiring to enter the service of your petitioner at its said two mines near Wellsburg.'

The court then sentenced each of the defendants to imprisonment for six months and payment of costs; a separate sentence being imposed for each offense found. The marshal was directed in the execution of the sentences to allow credit for the time which each of the defendants had been imprisoned under the sentences passed on April 25, 1914, set aside on writ of error.

By the first assignment of error the point is made that, this court having found when the cases were here before that incompetent evidence was admitted, the error could be corrected only by a new trial, and that the judgment of this court should have been construed as requiring a new trial. It is established by authority from which there is no dissent that even in a jury trial admission of incompetent evidence will generally be regarded harmless error, if the jury are instructed to disregard it. N.Y. & W.R. Co. v. Madison, 123 U.S. 524, 8 Sup.Ct. 246, 31 L.Ed. 258; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 7 Sup.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708; Turner v. Am. S. Co., 213 U.S. 257, 29 Sup.Ct. 420, 53 L.Ed. 788. The exception to this rule is that the incompetent evidence will be regarded harmful, notwithstanding its subsequent withdrawal from the jury, if it was so impressive that it probably remained on the mind of the jury and influenced their finding.

Hopt v. Utah, supra; Armour v. Kollmeyer, 161 F. 78, 88 C.C.A. 242, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1110; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Newsome, 174 F. 394, 98 C.C.A. 1; Knickerbocker T. Co. v. Evans, 188 F. 549, 110 C.C.A. 347. For a greater reason, when a case is tried without a jury, the error of admitting incompetent evidence will be regarded harmless, if it is rejected and excluded by the judge before the decision is made. The only valid ground of complaint was the failure of the District Judge to indicate the particular testimony rejected. A new trial was not necessary to correct that error, for the only purpose of the correction was to enable this court to review the findings of the District Court more intelligently.

Indeed had the admission of incompetent testimony been the only matter involved when the cases were here before, this court would not have been justified in sending the cases back for the correction of that error; it would have been our duty to review the record and decide whether there was sufficient competent testimony to support the judgments. When a judge hears a case without a jury, he is supposed to act only on proper evidence, and if on review it is found that the evidence properly admitted justifies the decree it ought to be affirmed, and if not it ought to be reversed. Weems v. George, 13 How. 196, 14 L.Ed. 108; Mammoth Min. Co. v. Salt Lake Machine Co., 151 U.S. 447, 14 Sup.Ct. 384, 38 L.Ed. 229; West v. East Coast Cedar Co. (C.C.) 110 F. 725; Streeter v. Sanitary Dist. of...