Obasi v. Department of Professional Regulation

• Decision Date: 19 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 1-92-1430,1-92-1430
• Citation: 203 Ill.Dec. 499,266 Ill.App.3d 693,639 N.E.2d 1318
• Parties: , 203 Ill.Dec. 499 Inno U. OBASI, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION of the State of Illinois and Kevin Wright, Director, Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1318

639 N.E.2d 1318

266 Ill.App.3d 693, 203 Ill.Dec. 499

Inno U. OBASI, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION of the State of Illinois and Kevin Wright, Director, Illinois Department of Professional Regulation Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-92-1430.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fifth Division.

Aug. 19, 1994.

[203 Ill.Dec. 501] [266 Ill.App.3d 694] James K. Leven, Northfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Roland Burris, Atty. Gen., Rosealyn B. Kaplan, Sol. Gen., Jerald S. Post, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel; Chicago, IL, for defendants-appellees.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

This administrative review action was brought by the Plaintiff, Inno U. Obasi, M.D., against the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (the Department) and its Director to contest the revocation of the Plaintiff's medical license, without opportunity to apply for reinstatement for five years. The circuit court affirmed the revocation and the Plaintiff appealed.

The issues presented for review are: whether the trial court applied the correct review standards when it affirmed the Department's findings and conclusions; whether the Plaintiff's due process rights were violated when television cameras were permitted at the hearing; whether the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (the Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111, par. 4400-1 et seq.; now codified at 225 ILCS 60/1 et seq. (West 1992)) was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers doctrine; and whether the sanction imposed on the Plaintiff should have been reduced by the trial court because it was overly harsh.

BACKGROUND

The Department Director summarily suspended the Plaintiff's medical license on October 25, 1989 and charged in a five-count complaint that the Plaintiff had violated various provisions of the Medical Practice Act of 1987. The first two counts of the complaint alleged that on June 6, 1989 the Plaintiff, a licensed physician and surgeon performed a pregnancy termination procedure, a dilatation and evacuation, on Krystal S. and perforated her uterus during the procedure. The charges stated that the Plaintiff had failed to provide post-operative care and monitoring and that his actions constituted patient abandonment and gross negligence in violation of sections 22(A)(16) and 22(A)(4) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111, pars. 4400-22(A)(16), 4400-22(A)(4); now codified at 225 ILCS 60/22(A)(16), 60/22(A)(4) (West 1992)).

The third count of the complaint alleged that the Plaintiff violated section 22(A)(4) of the Act and committed gross negligence on September 7, 1989 when he performed a dilatation and curettage and tubal ligation on Synthia D. According to the allegations, the Plaintiff failed to differentiate between the fallopian tube and the uterine vein, or artery, or their branches; severed the vein, artery or branch and failed to repair it; and carelessly, negligently, and/or recklessly cared for and treated Synthia D. who, as a direct and proximate result of these acts, died. The fourth count of the complaint alleged that the Plaintiff committed a third act of gross negligence on September 21, 1989 when he performed a pregnancy termination procedure, a dilatation and evacuation, on Michelle P. During this procedure, the patient's uterus was perforated requiring emergency surgery and a total abdominal hysterectomy. The final count of the complaint incorporated counts one, three and four and alleged that the acts recited constituted a pattern of practice which demonstrated incapacity or incompetence to practice medicine in violation of section 22(A)(26) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111, par. 4400-22(A)(26); now codified at 225 ILCS 60/22(A)(26) (West 1992)).

On April 10, 1990, following a hearing before the Illinois State Medical Disciplinary Board, the hearing officer concluded that the Department had proved by clear and convincing evidence the charges in count I (patient abandonment), count III (gross negligence) and count V (pattern of practice demonstrating incompetence to practice). The hearing officer recommended revocation of the Plaintiff's medical license; and the Medical Disciplinary Board adopted the report and recommendations of the hearing officer. The Board recommended to the Department Director that the Plaintiff not petition for restoration of his license for a minimum period of five years and that the Plaintiff complete two hundred fifty hours of continuing medical education and pass a clinical competency examination. The Director adopted the Board's recommendations on June 12, 1990.

The Plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review; and on February 22, 1991, at the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court affirmed the Plaintiff's license revocation but reduced the period of revocation to thirty months. On March 8, 1991, the court reversed its oral ruling of February 22, 1991 and found that it was without authority to lessen the sanction imposed by the Department. On June 14, 1991, pursuant to the Plaintiff's motion to reconsider, the trial court remanded the case to the Department for reconsideration of the sanction imposed finding that the sanction was excessive and oppressive. On remand, the Department adopted the Board's findings, conclusions and recommendations; reaffirmed the five-year revocation period; and eliminated the educational and competency examination requirements. Pursuant to administrative review of that order, the circuit court affirmed the Department and subsequently denied the Plaintiff's motion to reconsider.

While a number of findings were made by the hearing officer for the Medical Disciplinary Board, those that need to be repeated in order to understand the rationale of this court concern the evidence presented on the charge of abandonment. As to this charge, the hearing officer's findings included the following:

"4. Approximately one hour after the procedure, Dr. Obasi discharged Krystal S[.] and left the facility. At the time of the discharge Krystal S[.] was exhibiting no symptoms of a perforated uterus or internal bleeding.

"5. Dr. Obasi had lunch and then went grocery shopping. While shopping he was paged on his beeper and returned to the Paulina Surgi-Center after talking to a nurse, Caroline Banjo.

"6. Dr. Obasi ordered Nurse Banjo to start an I.V. of Pitocin to help S[.]'s uterus contract and to call for an ambulance.

"7. A Chicago Fire Department ambulance arrived and transported Krystal S[.] to St. Francis Hospital. Dr. Obasi did not accompany the patient to St. Francis Hospital.

"8. Dr. Obasi did not have any staff privileges at St. Francis Hospital.

"9. No records were sent to St. Francis Hospital with Krystal S[.].

"10. Dr. Obasi did not attempt to contact St. Francis Hospital until two hours after the ambulance left the Paulina Surgi-Center.

"11. Dr. Obasi finally spoke with Dr. Sella, S[.]'s attending physician at St. Francis Hospital, on June 7, 1989 at approximately 4:00 p.m."

The evidence to support the hearing officer's findings enumerated above came from the testimony of the Plaintiff, Doctor Obasi. During the course of his testimony, Doctor Obasi stated that on June 6, 1989 he performed a dilatation and evacuation on Krystal S. and that she had tolerated the procedure well except that she had moved while he was using a suctioning cup. Doctor Obasi examined her in the recovery room and found that she was not experiencing any unusual problems. He testified that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her blood pressure, respiration or other vital signs. He wrote "discharge home," assuming the normal recovery period of one hour to forty-five minutes, on her progress note and left the clinic to have lunch and shop at a grocery store several blocks away.

The Plaintiff further testified that, while shopping, his beeper sounded and he telephoned the clinic. He learned that Krystal had developed symptoms of a perforated uterus just before changing into her clothes. Doctor Obasi told the nurse to start intravenous medication, to massage the uterus and to call an ambulance. He immediately returned to the center, conducted a pelvic examination upon Krystal, massaged the uterus and again asked the nurse to call an ambulance. When the ambulance crew arrived, he assisted in transferring Krystal on to the ambulance stretcher. Doctor Obasi stated that he did not accompany Krystal to the hospital because he did not have staff privileges there and would not be allowed to participate in any form of treatment there.

Doctor Obasi testified that as part of standard procedure he usually would make a note to inform the medical staff at the hospital to which one of his patients is transferred. He stated that he made such a note with respect to Krystal, that he gave the note to his nurse to make a copy, and that the note he gave to the nurse was to be given to the ambulance crew. He did not know whether the original note or a copy of the note was given to any of the ambulance personnel.

Doctor Obasi waited for about two hours before calling the hospital so that the hospital would have time to stabilize the patient. He spoke with a telephone operator at the hospital, learned the identity of her attending physician, and spoke to someone in the emergency room. Doctor Obasi stated he had the attending physician paged several times and also left a message at her office for her to call him back. The attending physician called him back the next day.

The only other testimony at the hearing regarding the Plaintiff's care of Krystal S. was given by Doctor Allan Charles, the Department's expert. Doctor Charles' testimony concerned the cause, likelihood, and symptoms of a perforated uterus. He stated that a patient who was in stable condition and not experiencing unusual pain could be discharged after one hour in the recovery room. He stated that such a patient could exhibit signs of a perforated...