Obergefell v. Wymyslo
| Decision Date | 01 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13–cv–501. |
| Citation | 980 F.Supp.2d 907 |
| Parties | James OBERGEFELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Theodore E. WYMYSLO, M.D., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alphonse Adam Gerhardstein, Jacklyn Gonzales Martin, Jennifer Lynn Branch, Gerhardstein & Branch Co. LPA, Lisa Talmadge Meeks, Newman & Meeks Co. LPA, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiffs.
Aaron Mark Herzig, Terrance A. Nestor, City of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, Bridget C. Coontz, Zachery Paul Keller, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.
ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT DR. THEODORE WYMYSLO
As fully anticipated by all parties, Plaintiff John Arthur died very recently on October 22, 2013. The question now arises whether this lawsuit dies with him. Believing that courts are designed to be places of recourse, and that judges are not to duck legal questions simply because they are difficult or because the initial status quo has changed, this Court determines that this lawsuit is not amenable to dismissal but instead shall proceed to a full and final disposition, in the trial court, before the new year.
On July 19, 2013, James Obergefell and John Arthur, a same-sex couple legally married under the laws of Maryland, filed this civil lawsuit challenging Ohio's prohibitions against same sex marriages. (Doc. 1). They sought emergency relief from the Court, relating to Mr. Arthur's future death certificate, on the basis that he was terminally ill with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and his death was imminent. ( Id. at 6). Specifically, they sought a ruling from the Court that the Ohio Department of Vital Statistics be required to accept a death certificate which identified Mr. Arthur as “married” at the time of his death and listed Mr. Obergefell as his surviving “spouse.” Upon complete briefing and careful analysis, the Court accepted Plaintiffs' position and entered its Order requiring that Mr. Arthur's death certificate reflect that truth that he was “married” at the time of his death. The Court found that Ohio's discrimination against recognizing same sex marriages served no legitimate state purpose, other than to discriminate against gay citizens because of their status, and therefore likely violated the promise of the federal Constitution that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The Court found especially compelling Ohio's long-standing history of recognizing any and all out-of-state marriages, as long as they were lawful in the state where the marriage was celebrated. The Court pointed out, as examples, Ohio's willingness to recognize out of state marriages of first cousins and those of minors, even though those unions are not authorized to be performed in Ohio under its marriage laws.
About a month later, on September 3, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a first Amended Complaint, adding the claims of Plaintiff David Michener. (Doc. 24). Mr. Michener raised a similar as-applied challenge concerning the death certificate of his husband, William Ives, who died unexpectedly on August 27, 2013. ( Id. at ¶¶ 17, 33). While Mr. Ives awaited cremation, this Court issued its second order requiring Ohio to recognize on his death certificate his same sex marriage, legally performed out of state.
On September 26, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, this time adding as a plaintiff Robert Grunn, a licensed funeral director in the State of Ohio.1 (Doc. 33). Mr. Grunn seeks to brings claims challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's same sex marriage prohibitions, both on his own behalf, and on behalf of future clients, who are surviving spouses of deceased same-sex married partners. ( Id.)
Shortly after the death of John Arthur, the state Defendant has moved to dismiss the claims against him. The state argues that Plaintiff Grunn lacks authority to pursue this lawsuit, either on his own behalf or on behalf of future same sex marriage widows or widowers. The legal attack raises hard questions regarding sophisticated legal concepts like standing and ripeness. In simplified sum, Defendant argues that now that Messers. Arthur and Ives have died, there exists no live controversy for the Court to adjudicate and that Mr. Grunn's attempt to take up the challenge is without legal basis. Upon close review and careful analysis, the Court disagrees.
A plaintiff cannot sue based on “a generalized grievance against [assertedly] illegal government conduct[.]” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995). “The rule against generalized grievances applies with as much force in the equal protection context as in any other.” Id. at 743–44, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (); see also Parker v. Ohio, 263 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1103 (S.D.Ohio 2003).
Therefore, to properly plead a first-party claim on his own behalf, Mr. Grunn must allege that he himself has actually suffered the deprivation of constitutional rights alleged in the Complaint. See, e.g., LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 950 (6th Cir.2013); Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir.2012).
On the record before this Court, Mr. Grunn has not met these requirements as he fails to plead a violation of his own right to equal protection of law, or any other claim based on a violation of his own constitutional rights. The only claim brought in the Second Amended Complaint is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of same-sex couples married in other jurisdictions. Mr. Grunn is not asking for relief that will remedy any alleged unconstitutional treatment that he himself has suffered at the hands of anyone acting under color of state law.
Consequently, Mr. Grunn has failed to meet pleading requirements to state a claim on his own behalf, and his attempt to do so must be dismissed.
But Mr. Grunn also seeks to bring claims on behalf of his clients and future clients, whose rights to equal protection of law (and to due process of law) are allegedly violated by Ohio's prohibitions against recognition of same sex marriages.
“The doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). The doctrine is an evolving body of law with its “core component” being “the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,” but “some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). As Justice Scalia explained in Lujan:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Mr. Grunn satisfies all three of these elements.
Mr. Grunn alleges that the injury he endures is a well-founded fear of criminal prosecution.
Fear of criminal prosecution is one category of injury recognized under the standing doctrine, and “one does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventative relief.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (internal citation omitted). More specifically, according to the Supreme Court, “[i]t is not necessary that the plaintiff first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge the statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Instead, to state a claim based on fear of criminal prosecution, Mr. Grunn must show that he was or is threatened by prosecution, or that a prosecution is likely, or that it is at least remotely possible. Id. at 298–99, 99 S.Ct. 2301.
In Babbitt, the Supreme Court determined that the farm worker plaintiffs had standing to challenge a state statute criminalizing the use of false statements to dissuade consumers from buying products, even though the plaintiffs had no intention of making false statements, but had engaged in consumer publicity campaigns in the past and intended to continue boycott activities in the future. Id. at 301–02, 99 S.Ct. 2301. The Court found standing on the theory that the potential for prosecution impeded the full exercise of the workers' First Amendment rights—despite the government's insistence that the “criminal penalty provision ha[d] not yet been applied and may never be.” Id. at 302, 99 S.Ct. 2301. The Court found that the threat of criminal prosecution was “not imaginary or wholly speculative” and that “the State ha[d] not disavowed any intention of invoking the criminal penalty provision.” Id.
The same is true here. Mr. Grunn fears prosecution under a statute that the State of Ohio has declined to disavow the intention to enforce against him. The statute giving rise to the injury specifically targets funeral directors, Mr. Grunn has submitted evidence showing perceptible harm, his prosecution is possible, and he has expressed the intent to...
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