Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa

• Decision Date: 04 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. A055707,A055707
• Citation: 11 Cal.App.4th 535,15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182
• Parties: Bruce OBERLANDER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 182

15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182

11 Cal.App.4th 535

Bruce OBERLANDER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. A055707.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Dec. 4, 1992.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 30, 1992.

Review Denied Feb. 25, 1993.

Victor J. Westman, County Counsel, Contra Costa County, Arthur W. Walenta, Asst. County Counsel, Martinez, for defendants and appellants.

Ralph Murphy, Philip J. Bertenthal, and Jodie Berger, Contra Costa Legal Services Foundation, Richmond, for plaintiffs and appellants.

POCHE, Associate Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal by both parties from a judgment granting in part and denying in part a petition for a writ of mandate and from a postjudgment order enforcing that writ. Plaintiffs are a group of individuals who receive general assistance from defendant Contra Costa County (county).

The issues before us are related to provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code governing permissible standards of general assistance aid which a county may establish. As the issues were originally framed we were required to decide whether the county could reduce aid to general assistance recipients sharing housing with nonrelated individuals and still comply with Welfare and Institutions Code section We have granted rehearing because, although this case is an appeal from the grant of a writ of mandamus, the trial court effectively granted injunctive relief. Appeals of injunctions are governed by the law in effect at the time the appellate court renders its opinion. (Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489, 529, 45 P.2d 972.) The rationale of this rule is that it would be an idle act for this court to determine what the county must do in the future under the law as it used to be but no longer is.

                17000.5. 1  We rendered an opinion on September 1, 1992, but some fifteen days later and before we lost jurisdiction the Legislature enacted urgency legislation which has changed the statutory scheme by amending section 17000.5 and adding section 17001.5.  (Assem.Bill No. 1012 (1991-1992 Reg.Sess.) §§ 13, 14, 17.)   After granting rehearing we now address the case in light of those legislative changes
                

Background

The duty to relieve and support the indigent and disabled is one imposed by the state upon each county. ( § 17000.) To that end the county board of supervisors is directed to adopt standards of aid and care. ( § 17001.) Consistent with those standards of aid the county then administers its program of general assistance. The counties have broad discretion to set eligibility standards for, and conditions upon, its general assistance aid. (Clay v. Tryk (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 119, 124, 222 Cal.Rptr. 729.) However, " ' "[i]n administering general assistance relief the county acts as an agent of the state. [Citation.] When a statute confers upon a state agency the authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out its provisions, the agency's regulations must be consistent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose. [Citation.]" ' " (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985), 38 Cal.3d 199, 211, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695, quoting Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 679, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279.)

In 1991 the Legislature enacted section 17000.5 which took effect June 30 and provides in pertinent part: "(a) The board of supervisors in any county may adopt a general assistance standard of aid that is 62 percent of a guideline that is equal to the 1991 federal official poverty line and may annually adjust that guideline in an amount equal to any adjustment provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 [Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) ] for establishing a maximum aid level in the county. [p] (b) The adoption of a standard of aid pursuant to this section shall constitute a sufficient standard of aid. [p] (d) For purposes of this section, 'federal official poverty line' means the same as it is defined in subsection (2) of Section 9902 of Title 42 of the United States Code." ²

The official poverty guideline for 1991 was set at varying dollar amounts based upon the size of the family unit. Thus for a family of one the figure was set at $6,620, for a family of two $8,880, for a family of three $11,140 and so forth. (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (HHS) Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Income Guidelines, 56 Fed.Reg. 6859 (Feb. 20, 1991).)

In response to the enactment of section 17000.5, the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors adopted Resolution No. 91/606 on September 17, 1991, setting "standards of aid that are 62 percent of the 1991 federal official poverty guidelines." Paralleling the federal use of scaled aid for a family unit, the county adopted a scale of aid for "budget unit" which it defined "as one or more persons residing in a single housing unit, whether or not all such persons are related and whether or not all such persons are eligible for general assistance."

³ The standard of general assistance aid for each person in a budget unit exceeding 1 shall be an amount equal to the multiple person budget unit standard divided by the number of persons in the budget unit." ⁴

The standard of aid for homeless individuals eligible for general assistance was set at a one-person budget unit. However, if the homeless person was residing at a public or private shelter, he or she was credited with $10 per day income for the value of the food and shelter received. A homeless person who refused to stay in a shelter or who was ejected by a shelter because of his or her failure to observe shelter rules was also to be credited with income of $10 per day.

By Resolution No. 91/607, also adopted on September 17, 1991, the board adopted what it characterized as a discretionary program for meeting the special needs of those eligible for general assistance. Special need allowances were provided for costs incident to a job search or to taking a job (union dues or uniforms), costs caused by health problems (special diets, eyeglasses, etc.), costs for clothing and a supplement for individuals living in board and care homes.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and a writ of mandate. The superior court elected to grant relief by writ after concluding that the county had exceeded the authority granted by section 17000.5 by adopting the definition of a budget unit "which will result in drastic cuts where two or more unrelated persons live in the same housing unit." Likewise, it found that the reduction of $10 per day for in-kind benefits received by shelter residents, or those who refuse or are ejected from shelter living, was "not facially permitted" by the statute. The superior court concluded that such changes could not be adopted without a study showing that, despite such reductions, general assistance aid would still provide minimum subsistence needs. (Boehm v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 494, 502, 223 Cal.Rptr. 716.) Defendants appeal from these portions of the judgment and from the order of enforcement.

The superior court, however, rejected plaintiffs' contention that a standard of aid equivalent to 62 percent of the poverty guideline did not also put a cap on the county's liability for special needs or emergency grants, but only upon the standard monthly allotment. Thus the court concluded that a standard of aid which met the 62 percent level "caps the County's total responsibility." It is from this aspect of the judgment that plaintiffs appeal.

DISCUSSION

There are four issues of statutory interpretation before us. First, do section 17000.5 and newly enacted section 17001.5 permit a county to adopt as a sufficient general assistance standard of aid one which reduces benefits to individual recipients who share housing with unrelated individuals? Second, under the new legislation can the county lawfully impose the standard of aid it enacted but which the trial court ordered it not to apply? Third, under section 17000.5 may the county reduce grants for in-kind benefits without a factual finding that the reduced amounts provide minimum subsistence? Fourth, does section 17000.5's level of sufficiency for general assistance aid include special needs grants?

1. Appeal

a. Sufficient Standard of Aid Under Section 17000.5

The study to which the trial court alludes in its memorandum of decision is often called a Boehm study after the case which first held that the level of general assistance payments must be set with reference to a factual study of what amount is needed for minimum subsistence. (Boehm v. County of Merced (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 447, 452, 209 Cal.Rptr. 530.) In a subsequent decision after remand the appellate court held that a general assistance grant must include monies for basic necessities which it defined as food, clothing, housing (including utilities), transportation and medical care. (Boehm v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 494, 502, 223 Cal.Rptr. 716 (Boehm II ).) Deleting an allocation for any of those needs is permissible only if the county can show by a study that the need will be met by another program available to recipients of general assistance. (Ibid.)

In Boehm II the court expressly found that its holding was compelled by both section 10000 which declares the purpose of the statutory scheme to be the provision of "appropriate aid and services to all of [the state's] needy and distressed," and by sections 17000 and 17001 which impose upon the county the duty to relieve and support the indigent and delegate to the county board of supervisors the duty of adopting "standards of aid and care" for the poor and indigent. (Boehm, II, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 500-502, 223 Cal.Rptr. 716.)

Immediately prior to the enactment of section 17000.5 in January of 1991, another panel in this...