Obrecht-Lynch Corporation v. Clark

• Decision Date: 02 January 1929
• Docket Number: No. 1377.,1377.
• Citation: Obrecht-Lynch Corporation v. Clark, 30 F.2d 144 (D. Md. 1929)
• Parties: OBRECHT-LYNCH CORPORATION et al. v. CLARK.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

30 F.2d 144 (1929)

OBRECHT-LYNCH CORPORATION et al. v.CLARK.

No. 1377.

District Court, D. Maryland.

January 2, 1929.

Joseph T. England and Julius F. Sandrock, both of Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

J. Purdon Wright, of Baltimore, Md., for claimant.

O. N. Forrest, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Baltimore, Md., for commissioner.

WILLIAM C. COLEMAN, District Judge.

This is a proceeding for review of a compensation order under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.ActMarch 4, 1927, chapter 509(33 USCA § 901).Complainant, the Obrecht-Lynch Corporation, employed one Alonzo V. Kimbel as a repairman on the steamship City of Flint.While so engaged on December 22, 1927, he was injured by a heavy tank covering falling against his left leg, causing contusions above and below the knee.As a result, he required medical treatment and was confined to his bed for about one week.On January 6th, 14 days after the injury, while he was no longer confined to his bed, but had not yet returned to work, he became suddenly ill, complained of great difficulty in breathing, and died in 10 or 15 minutes, before medical aid could be summoned.The widow of Kimbel filed, in due course, a claim in the office of the deputy commissioner, Lindley D. Clark, for district No. 4 in Baltimore, for compensation pursuant to the provisions of the act.A hearing was had, much testimony was taken, and as a result the deputy commissioner found that Kimbel had died from a pulmonary embolism resulting from the injury to his leg, and awarded to the widow, in addition to compensation for temporary total disability and funeral expenses, the sum of $7,500, payable in semimonthly installments of $23.36.

The complainant, Obrecht-Lynch Corporation, and its insurer, Phœnix Indemnity Company, contest the claim on the ground that there was no causal connection between the injuries which the deceased employee suffered and his death, and have brought these injunction proceedings, praying that the Act be declared unconstitutional and invalid, that the award be set aside, and that, pending final decision of this court with respect thereto, a temporary stay of all payments under the award be allowed.

Section 921 (b) of the act provides as follows:

"If not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any party in interest against the deputy commissioner making the order, and instituted in the Federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury occurred (or in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia if the injury occurred in the District).The orders, writs, and processes of the court in such proceedings may run, be served, and be returnable anywhere in the United States.The payment of the amounts required by an award shall not be stayed pending final decision in any such proceeding unless upon application for an interlocutory injunctionthe court, on hearing, after not less than three days' notice to the parties in interest and the deputy commissioner, allows the stay of such payments, in whole or in part, where irreparable damage would otherwise ensue to the employer.The order of the court allowing any such stay shall contain a specific finding, based upon evidence submitted to the court and identified by reference thereto, that such irreparable damage would result to the employer, and specifying the nature of the damage."

It will be seen that a temporary stay of payments awarded can be ordered only where the court finds, after a consideration of the evidence, that irreparable damage would in fact result to the employer if such stay were not granted.At the hearing, the evidence submitted failed to satisfy the court in this respect and, therefore, an interlocutory injunction was denied.Claimant was shown to be financially responsible to the extent of the payments involved.Whether insolvency would of itself be sufficient cause for granting a stay, it becomes unnecessary to decide.SeeWillis v. O'Connell (D. C.)231 F. 1004.

The act in question, having been in force less than two years, has, as yet, not been subject to extensive judicial review, and the reported cases construing the act are few in number.For this reason, and also because of the fact that the language of section 921b is not entirely free from ambiguity, complainants have contended that, when an employer invokes the remedy thereby provided, such employer is entitled to have the proceedings reopened and the matter tried de novo.It is to be noted that section 921 (b) provides: "If not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any party in interest against the deputy commissioner making the order," etc. (Italics inserted.)What do the words "if not in accordance with law" mean?The court has been referred to no Workmen's Compensation Act, state or federal, which uses this precise language.However, it is well settled that compensation laws of this general character, which establish administrative machinery for applying statutory measures to the facts of each particular case, and which provide for a hearing before an administrative tribunal, may limit the judicial review to fundamental and jurisdictional questions.In short, administrative bodies, with authority not essentially different from that vested by the act now under consideration in the deputy commissioner, are recognized governmental institutions.State industrial accident commissions and state public service commissions are familiar examples.Powers and discretions of this character may be delegated to administrative bodies, or even to a single individual.Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 34 S. Ct. 359, 58 L. Ed. 713;Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 67 L. Ed. 678, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637, and cases cited.The proper construction of the language in question seems to the court to be that, as long as there is some competent evidence to support the finding of fact of the commissioner, such finding is final; that is, where the finding is supported by rational and natural inferences from proved facts, the court will not disturb such finding.

This being true, it follows that hearings provided by section 921 (b) should be confined to a review of the testimony presented to the deputy commissioner.In the instant case, however, because of the very recent enactment of this statute and the consequent lack of authorities construing its language, the court gave the complainants the benefit of the doubt which it had at the inception of the hearing respecting the proper construction to be placed upon section 921 (b), and heard the matter de novo.This departure from what the court now believes to be the proper procedure, after an opportunity for more careful examination of the statute and pertinent authorities, has, in fact, proved to be immaterial, because, as hereinafter explained, the court finds that its conclusion is not affected by the additional evidence heard, but may be rested solely upon the testimony taken before the deputy commissioner.

The constitutionality of the act having been questioned, it is necessary first to answer that argument.The act not being elective, but mandatory upon complainants, they cannot be said to have waived their right to question the constitutionality of the act by accepting its insurance provisions, etc. See Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 67 L. Ed. 678, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637;Booth Fisheries v. Industrial Commission, 271 U. S. 208, 46 S. Ct. 491, 70 L. Ed. 908.Complainants assert three grounds on which the act is claimed to be unconstitutional: First, that it violates the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, by failure to provide for trial by jury; second, that it seeks to limit the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts; and, third, that no adequate provision for appeal is made, and that, therefore, due process of law is denied them, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.

The present act is modeled upon the New York Workmen's Compensation Law(Laws 1913, c. 816;Laws 1914, cc.41, 316;Consol. Laws, c. 67).In fact, its provisions are largely identical, substituting for the employer and employee in certain employments classed as hazardous the employer and employee engaged in maritime pursuits in whole or in part upon navigable waters of the United States.In short, it provides for a compulsory system governing liabilities of employers and the rights of employees and their dependents in respect to compensation for disabling injuries and death, in cases where recovery through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law.Colonna's Shipyard v. Lowe (D. C.)22 F.(2d) 843.The so-called Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920(46 USCA § 688), is not repealed by this more recent enactment.The former still embraces employees that the latter does not, as witness the language of section 902 (3) of the latter, which excludes "a master or member of a crew of any vessel," and "any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net."Parenthetically, it may be added that, although the Supreme Court in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 47 S. Ct. 19, 71 L. Ed. 157, has declared that the word "seamen," as used in the Merchant Marine Act, includes longshoremen employed by stevedores while on a vessel, under the Longshoremen's Act, Congress has apparently expressed an intention to remove such persons from the operation of the earlier act, as thus construed by the Supreme Court, and to place them under the later act.

In New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the...