OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas

• Docket Number: 1:15-CV-679-RP
• Decision Date: 06 June 2022
• Parties: OCA GREATER HOUSTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

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OCA GREATER HOUSTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:15-CV-679-RP

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division

June 6, 2022

ORDER

ROBERT PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Plaintiff Organization of Chinese Americans-Greater Houston's (“OCA”) Motion for Modification of the 2018 Permanent Injunction, (Dkt. 96) Defendants State of Texas and Secretary of State John Scott's (“Defendants”) Response, (Dkt. 101) and OCA's Reply, (Dkt. 103). On April 18, 2022, the Court held a hearing at which it heard argument on the Motion from the parties. (Minute Entry, Dkt. 108). Having considered the parties' briefs and arguments at the hearing, the Court will grant in part and deny in part OCA's motion, as discussed below.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 12, 2016, the Court entered an order granting summary judgment against the State of Texas and Carlos Cascos, who was sued in his official capacity as the Texas Secretary of State^[1] (collectively, “Defendants”). (August 12th Order, Dkt. 60). On August 30, 2016, after considering the parties' filings, this Court entered another order clarifying the relief described in its August 12th Order. (August 30th Order, Dkt. 66). In that order, the Court found that Texas Election Code (“the Election Code” or “TEC”) Sections 61.032, ^[2] 61.033, ^[3] and 64.0321^[4] were inconsistent with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), (“Section 208”). (Id. at 2-3). The Court then enjoined “the Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office, and all persons acting in concert with them, from enforcement of those provisions.” (Id. at 3).

Defendants appealed the Court's grant of summary judgment and its injunction. See OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 607 (5th Cir. 2017). On August 16, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (“Court of Appeals”) upheld the Court's grant of summary judgment but found the injunction to be overbroad. Id. at 615-16. It then vacated the injunction and remanded the case to this Court for entry of a new remedy. Id. The Court of Appeals found that the injunction “exceeds the scope of the parties' presentation, which was limited to Tex. Elec. Code. § 61.033.” Id. The Court then entered a narrower injunction (the “2018 Injunction”) limited only to Tex. Elec. Code. §§ 61.033 and 64.0321. (Dkt. 84). Specifically, the Court reaffirmed that Section 61.033 was inconsistent with and preempted by Section 208, and therefore enjoined Defendants from enforcing this provision. (Summ. J. Order, Dkt. 60, at 20; Revised Injunction, Dkt. 84, at 7); OCA-Greater Houston, 867 F.3d at 615. Further, the Court held that Section 64.0321 was properly placed at issue by the parties and within the scope of the injunction, and thus enjoined enforcement of this provision as well. (Revised Injunction, Dkt. 84, at 7).

On September 7, 2021, Governor Greg Abbott signed into law S.B. 1, which contained provisions modifying many sections of the Election Code. At issue here are amended sections 64.031^[5], 64.034^[6], and 64.0322^[7], which OCA claims contravene the Court's 2018 Injunction. On January 31, 2022, OCA filed a Motion for Modification of the 2018 Permanent Injunction to cover the challenged provisions of S.B. 1. (Mot. Modify, Dkt. 96). The Court received briefing from the parties and held a hearing on April 18, 2022. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part that motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a party to request relief from an order such as an injunction if applying the injunction is no longer equitable or for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Rule 60 provides a means to alter an order based on either “a significant change in factual conditions or in law” which renders continued enforcement “detrimental to the public interest.” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)). The party seeking modification bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the order. See id; PNC Bank, N.A. v. 2013 Travis Oak Creek GP, LLC, 1:17-CV-560-RP, 2018 WL 6433312, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2018). A request to modify an injunction “may not be used to challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests.” Horne, 557 U.S. at 447; see Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[M]odification is not a means by which a losing litigant can attack the court's decree collaterally[.]”) (citing U.S. v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). The key question is whether the objective of the preliminary injunction is still being served. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 447.

B. Discussion

The Court here limits its consideration to the text of the 2018 Injunction, focusing on whether the challenged provisions of S.B. 1 directly conflict with that order. Defendants raise defenses related to enforcement power, other pending litigation, and the timing of challenges to election laws.^[8] (Resp., Dkt. 101, at 5-8). None of those concerns is relevant here, as the Court confines itself to the narrow language of its own prior order.^[9] Just as it did previously, the Court finds Defendants to be proper parties to this action in light of the Secretary of State's obligations in enforcing and administering election laws.^[10] S.B. 1 undisputedly changed the Election Code, and so the Court is within its power to modify its injunction if it finds the new provisions inconsistent with that order. Based on a comparison between the language of the 2018 Injunction and the challenged S.B. 1 provisions, the Court is convinced that some of the provisions do violate the injunction. These provisions constitute conduct already enjoined by the Court that violates Section 208 in the same manner as the previously-enjoined conduct. As such, the Court will modify the injunction only to maintain its original effect.

The invalidities in the amended portions of the Election Code revolve around the Court's prior holding with regard to Section 64.0321. As explained in the Court's 2018 Injunction Order, that Section “limits [the] right to assistance to conduct that occurs in the voting booth, ” contrary to what is “permitted by Section 208.” (2018 Injunction, Dkt. 84, at 7). The undersigned enjoined enforcement of Section 64.0321 as, “because it limits voters' right to assistance, Section 64.0321 causes the injury articulated by OCA throughout this litigation.” (Id.). Similarly here, the Court will modify the injunction only to the extent that the amended provisions “limit [the] right to assistance to conduct that occurs in the voting booth, ” as is consistent with its previous order.

1. Section 64.031

OCA first seeks to enjoin Section 64.031, which sets out the criteria for eligibility for voter assistance. The provision specifies that assistance pertains only to “marking or reading the ballot.” Tex. Elec. Code § 64.031. As discussed above, the Court's 2018 Injunction specifically prohibited enforcement of limitations on the type of voting activity eligible for assistance. Indeed, in its 2016 Summary Judgment Order, the Court found that “'voting' as referenced in Section 208 includes not only the mechanical reading and marking of a ballot, but all other activities required of voters at a polling place to meaningfully and effectively exercise their right to vote.” (Summ. J. Order, Dkt. 60, at 19); see OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 615 (5th Cir. 2017) (“To vote, therefore, plainly contemplates more than the mechanical act of filling out the ballot sheet. It includes steps in the voting process before entering the ballot box, ‘registration,' and it includes steps in the voting process after leaving the ballot box.”). By limiting the activities eligible for assistance to “marking or reading the ballot, ” Section 64.031 creates impermissible restrictions on assistance inconsistent with the Court's prior injunction and orders, the Fifth Circuit's opinion, and Section 208. Therefore, the Court will modify its injunction to prohibit Defendants from enforcing Section 64.031 as amended by S.B. 1.

2. Section 64.034

OCA next seeks to enjoin enforcement of the amended Section 64.034, which imposes on assistors a requirement to take an oath as part of their assistance. OCA's challenge to this provision has two parts. First, it claims the amended language of the oath is identical to the language in Section 64.0321 that the Court previously enjoined in 2018. Second, OCA claims the newly added requirements that assistors attest to voter eligibility and refrain from communicating how the assisted voter voted extend beyond the requirements of Section 208 and are therefore invalid. On the first score, the Court agrees with OCA; on the second, without expressing any opinion as to the merits of the argument, the Court must disagree.

As to the first ground, OCA notes that a portion of the amended oath now reads exactly as did the enjoined language in Section 64.0321. A portion of the oath now requires the assistor to attest to confining their assistance to “reading the ballot to the voter, directing the voter to read the ballot, marking the voter's ballot, or directing the voter to mark the ballot.” Tex. Elec Code § 64.034. The enjoined language permits assistance in “(1) reading the ballot to the voter; (2) directing the voter to read the ballot; (3) marking the voter's ballot; or (4) directing the voter to mark the ballot.” Tex. Elec. Code § 64.0321. Aside from changes in punctuation, the language is indistinguishable. Thus, the Court's reasoning in enjoining Section 64.0321...