Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset

• Decision Date: 20 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–1336.,13–1336.
• Citation: 777 F.3d 1
• Parties: Carmen M. OCASIO–HERNÁNDEZ, Gerardo Pizarro–Pizarro, Jorge L. Rodríguez–Figueroa, Ángel L. Figueroa–Rolón, Héctor G. Guerrero–Frau, Diana D. Rodríguez–Vicente, Nydia Díaz–Francisco, Carlos Santos–Rivera, Juan Carrasquillo–López, Felícita Rivera–Báez, Iván Rivera–Canales, William Burgos–Castellanos, Víctor M. Camacho–Pizarro, Ángel Báez–Torres, John Doe–01, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Ocasio, Jane Doe–01, Conjugal Partnership Pizarro–Doe, Jane Doe–02, Conjugal Partnership Rodríguez–Doe, Jane Doe–03, Conjugal Partnership Figueroa–Doe, Jane Doe–04, Conjugal Partnership Guerrero–Doe, John Doe–02, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Rodríguez, John Doe–03, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Díaz, Jane Doe–05, Conjugal Partnership Santos–Doe, Jane Doe–06, Conjugal Partnership Carrasquillo–Doe, Jane Doe–07, Conjugal Partnership Rivera–Doe, John Doe–04, Conjugal Partnership Carrasquillo–Doe, Conjugal Partnership Rivera–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Doe–Rivera, Jane Doe–08, Conjugal Partnership Burgos–Doe, Jane Doe–09, Conjugal Partnership Camacho–Doe, Jane Doe–10, Conjugal Partnership Báez–Doe, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Luis G. FORTUÑO–BURSET, in his personal capacity and as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Lucé Vela, in her individual and official capacity as First Lady, Velmarie Berlingeri–Marín, in her individual and official capacity as Administrator of the Governor's Mansion, Juan Carlos Blanco, in his individual and official capacity as Chief of Staff, Conjugal Partnership Fortuño–Vela, John Doe, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Berlingeri, Jane Doe, Conjugal Partnership Blanco–Doe, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

777 F.3d 1

Carmen M. OCASIO–HERNÁNDEZ, Gerardo Pizarro–Pizarro, Jorge L. Rodríguez–Figueroa, Ángel L. Figueroa–Rolón, Héctor G. Guerrero–Frau, Diana D. Rodríguez–Vicente, Nydia Díaz–Francisco, Carlos Santos–Rivera, Juan Carrasquillo–López, Felícita Rivera–Báez, Iván Rivera–Canales, William Burgos–Castellanos, Víctor M. Camacho–Pizarro, Ángel Báez–Torres, John Doe–01, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Ocasio, Jane Doe–01, Conjugal Partnership Pizarro–Doe, Jane Doe–02, Conjugal Partnership Rodríguez–Doe, Jane Doe–03, Conjugal Partnership Figueroa–Doe, Jane Doe–04, Conjugal Partnership Guerrero–Doe, John Doe–02, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Rodríguez, John Doe–03, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Díaz, Jane Doe–05, Conjugal Partnership Santos–Doe, Jane Doe–06, Conjugal Partnership Carrasquillo–Doe, Jane Doe–07, Conjugal Partnership Rivera–Doe, John Doe–04, Conjugal Partnership Carrasquillo–Doe, Conjugal Partnership Rivera–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Doe–Rivera, Jane Doe–08, Conjugal Partnership Burgos–Doe, Jane Doe–09, Conjugal Partnership Camacho–Doe, Jane Doe–10, Conjugal Partnership Báez–Doe, Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.Luis G. FORTUÑO–BURSET, in his personal capacity and as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Lucé Vela, in her individual and official capacity as First Lady, Velmarie Berlingeri–Marín, in her individual and official capacity as Administrator of the Governor's Mansion, Juan Carlos Blanco, in his individual and official capacity as Chief of Staff, Conjugal Partnership Fortuño–Vela, John Doe, Conjugal Partnership Doe–Berlingeri, Jane Doe, Conjugal Partnership Blanco–Doe, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 13–1336.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

Jan. 20, 2015.

Carlos Antonio Del Valle Cruz, with whom Eileen Landrón Guardiola, Eduardo Vera Ramírez, Luis A. Rodríguez Muñoz, and Landrón & Vera, LLP were on brief, for appellants.

Margarita Mercado–Echegaray, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, THOMPSON, and BARRON, Circuit Judges.

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

In 2009, the plaintiffs—fourteen maintenance, domestic, and warehouse workers—embarked on a quest to seek some relief after being abruptly fired from the Puerto Rico executive mansion shortly after a newly elected governor took the helm.¹ The plaintiffs—to whom we'll refer as “the workers”—sued then-Governor Luis Fortuño–Burset (“Fortuño”), his wife, and two executive staffers, alleging that they were terminated solely because they affiliated with Fortuño's rival political parties. The firings, the workers have maintained, amounted to political discrimination prohibited by the First Amendment.

After six years and two appeals, this voyage has reached its end—for the reasons discussed below, we affirm the districtcourt's summary judgment disposal of the workers' political discrimination claim.²

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Factual Skeleton

Because we are reviewing a summary judgment motion, we recite the facts “in a light as favorable to [the workers] as the record will reasonably allow.” Velázquez–Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 267 (1st Cir.2014).

In November 2008, Fortuño, of Puerto Rico's New Progressive political party (“NPP”), defeated the incumbent, a member of the NPP's primary rival, to become Puerto Rico's newly elected governor. Fortuño took office on January 2, 2009, bringing on board a chief of staff, Juan Carlos Blanco–Urrutia (“Blanco”), and an administrator, Velmarie Berlingeri–Marín (“Berlingeri”). Through an executive order, Fortuño authorized Berlingeri to “take any necessary actions and sign any necessary official documents related to the administration of the Office of the Governor,” which included administering the executive mansion, where the governor lived and worked.

A few days after taking office, Fortuño issued another executive order declaring a statewide fiscal emergency, authorizing a hiring freeze across state agencies, and requiring certain spending cuts. The executive order required each state agency to eliminate thirty percent of “all authorized trust service positions.” Relevant to this case, “trust service” employees—one of several categories of employment types within the Puerto Rico government—could be “freely remove[d],” or, in other words, terminated without cause.

Shortly after the executive order was issued, each of the plaintiffs (all of whom were trust employees) ³ was let go either in February or March 2009, by way of written termination letters signed by Berlingeri. The termination letters (which were all identical in substance) did not provide a specific reason for the firings, citing only to the regulations allowing for “trust service” employees to be “freely selected and freely dismissed.” Berlingeri has since asserted that some of the workers were fired—based on the recommendation of their immediate supervisors—because of their poor work performance; others, she claimed, were fired due to the budget cuts.

B. The (Long) Procedural History

Wasting no time, in March 2009, the workers sued Fortuño, his chief of staff (Blanco), his administrator (Berlingeri), and his wife, First Lady Luz E. Vela–Gutiérrez (“Vela”), asserting that each of the defendants had a role in their allegedly unlawful terminations and claiming they were fired because they affiliated with non-NPP political parties. The workers' complaint brought § 1983 claims,⁴ alleging violation of their due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and their right to free speech under the First Amendment.⁵They also sought relief under numerous Puerto Rico laws and the Puerto Rico constitution.

In July 2009, the defendants moved to dismiss the workers' claims, arguing that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The district court allowed that motion and dismissed all of the federal and state claims against all of the defendants.

Apparently abandoning their due process claim, the employees appealed only the dismissal of their First Amendment and state law causes of action; ⁶ we vacated the dismissal of those claims and remanded them to the district court. See OcasioHernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir.2011).

With the case back before the trial court, discovery ensued. At its close, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining political discrimination claim, arguing that the workers could not show that the defendants knew of their political views or that politics was a reason for the terminations. In a written order, the court allowed the motion as to Fortuño, Vela, and Blanco on the grounds that there was no evidence that these defendants were aware of the workers' political affiliations or that they were personally involved in the terminations. The court held off on Berlingeri because it wanted to engage in “additional and deeper analysis” and hear oral argument before deciding whether to dismiss the claim against her. The court later ended up dismissing Berlingeri from the case as well, in a separate written decision concluding that there was insufficient evidence that political affiliation was the reason for the dismissals.⁷ The workers then moved the district court to reconsider its judgment, which the court denied.

The workers now bring the case to us once again; on resurgence, they ask us to reverse the district court's summary judgment disposal of their First Amendment claim, as well as the court's subsequent denial of their motion to amend the judgment.

We address both rulings in turn.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Velázquez–Pérez, 753 F.3d at 270. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We consider a dispute genuine if “a reasonable jury, drawing favorable inferences, could resolve it in favor of the nonmoving party.” Velázquez–Pérez, 753 F.3d at 270 (citation and quotations omitted). But “[c]onclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation[ ] are insufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).

To succeed in showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the moving party must direct us to specific evidence in the record that would be admissible at trial. That is, it must “affirmatively produce evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim,” or, using “evidentiary materialsalready on file ... demonstrate that the non-moving party will be unable to carry its burden of persuasion at trial.” Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir.2000) (citations omitted). “[I]f the summary judgment record satisfactorily demonstrates that the plaintiff's case is, and may be expected to remain, deficient in vital evidentiary support, this may suffice to show that the movant has met its initial burden.” Id. at 133.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment

The dispute before us arises from the well established constitutional mandate prohibiting government officials from firing public employees on the basis of their political affiliations.⁸ To prove political discrimination, the workers must show that: (1) they and the defendants have “opposing political affiliations,” (2) the defendants were aware of the workers' political affiliations, (3) an “adverse employment action” (e.g., an employment termination) occurred, and (4) “political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action.” ⁹Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13.

Here, the district court held in a written ruling that the workers “failed to come up with any evidence to the effect that [Fortuño, Vela, and Blanco] were aware of their adverse political affiliation, and as such, that partisan politics played a substantial or motivating role” in the terminations. ¹⁰ Later, in a separate written ruling...