Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Com.

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SIMS
• Citation: Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Com., 133 Cal.Rptr. 664, 63 Cal.App.3d 57 (Cal. App. 1976)
• Decision Date: 27 October 1976
• Parties: OCEANIC CALIFORNIA, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant and Respondent, v. The NORTH CENTRAL COAST REGIONAL COMMISSION and the California Coastal ZoneConservation Commission, Defendants, Respondents and Appellants, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and California Coastal Alliance,Inc., Intervenors and Respondents. Civ. 37893.

Page 664

133 Cal.Rptr. 664

63 Cal.App.3d 57

OCEANIC CALIFORNIA, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant and Respondent, v. The NORTH CENTRAL COAST REGIONAL COMMISSION and the California Coastal ZoneConservation Commission, Defendants, Respondents and Appellants Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and California Coastal Alliance,Inc., Intervenors and Respondents.

Civ. 37893.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 27, 1976.

Hearing Denied Dec. 22, 1976.

Howard N. Ellman, Susan J. Passovoy, Ellman & Passovoy, San Francisco, for Oceanic.

John Roger Beers, Ballard Jamieson, Jr., Palo Alto, for intervenors-respondents.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Carl Boronkay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roderick E. Walston, Wm. M. Chamberlain, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondents.

SIMS, Acting Presiding Justice.

Appellant, a land developer, has appealed from a judgment that denied its petition for a writ of administrative mandamus in which it sought, among other relief, a judgment that it was entitled to an exemption from the provisions of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 (Pub.Resources Code, § 27000 et seq.) to the full extent requested in its application (see 14 Cal.Admin.Code, §§ 13700--13707; and State of California v. Superior Court (Veta Company) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 249--250, 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281) that had been denied by each of respondent commissions. The respondent commissions have filed a cross-appeal in which they seek review of rulings of the court with respect to the admission of evidence and settlement of the findings.

Petitioner concedes that it has not secured a building permit, as required by the provisions of section 27404 of the Public Resources Code. ¹ It contends that under the particular circumstances of this case, a sequence of approvals and actions taken pursuant to a planned unit development zoning approval, it acquired a vested right to complete the development; and that, therefore, section 27404 should be construed in a manner which would recognize the developer's vested right, or it should be disregarded on the grounds that it is not the exclusive statutory measure of rights under the Coastal Act, or it should be voided on the grounds it is unconstitutional as applied to this development. As is noted below the principle predicates upon which the developer's contentions must rest have been advanced and refuted in the recent decision in Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, as modified 18 Cal.3d at p. ---, 132 Cal.Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546. There are some factual differences in the two cases, and further arguments have been advanced in this case. Nevertheless, we do not find them controlling. The judgment must be affirmed.

The affirmance of the judgment renders it unnecessary to consider the commissions' protective appeal. We, therefore, do not determine the delicate question of whether the determination of whether a vested interest exists, as distinguished from the question of the rights appertaining to such an interest, requires the exercise of independent judgment by a court reviewing an administrative decision, or merely a determination that there is substantial evidence in the light of the whole record to sustain the administrative finding. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c). Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (Air Pollution Control District of San Diego County) (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 293, 304--305, 130 Cal.Rptr. 814 (hg. den. Sept. 8, 1976), with Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State of California (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 835, 844, 116 Cal.Rptr. 487; and note Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 796, fn. 7, 132 Cal.Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546; and Aries Dev. Co. v. Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 534, 545, 122 Cal.Rptr. 315.) Nor do we determine whether the trial court erred in receiving testimony which was not presented to the commissions. (See § 1094.5, subd. (d).) As noted below, the conclusions of law and the judgment of the trial court are consistent with or control the adverse findings attacked by the commissions. The affirmance also renders it unnecessary to consider whether or not the developer in fact complied with the zoning ordinance, or, if not, whether the 'P--C District' zoning may be attacked at this late date.

The findings furnish the following general outline of the facts. The developer 'Oceanic' purchased approximately 5,200 acres on the northern Sonoma County coast in 1963 'to develop the property as an integrated whole under a planned community concept, offering for sale to the public a choice of condominium units, residential cluster development constructed by Oceanic or by third parties, and subdivided lots which Oceanic would prepare for construction of single-family dwellings by the purchasers under a restrictive and particularized plan of architectural control.'

In 1964 the developer applied for planned community zoning for the southerly 1,800 acres and prepared and presented to county authorities analyses of soil conditions, of patterns of vegetation, of wind, of weather and of precipitation, a program of forest management, and a series of development constraints embodied in 'The Sea Ranch Restrictions,' requiring all man-made improvements to preserve the environmental considerations. These studies, analyses and exhibits in many cases pertained to and affected the entire 5,200 acres and were not in every case restricted to the 1,800 acres involved in the application. The county planning commission and the board of supervisors approved the planned community zoning for the 1,800 acres with knowledge that the developer intended to develop the entire 5,200 acres in accordance with the concept as approved.

Thereafter, the developer commenced actual development on an incremental basis, applying to the county for subdivision map approval for single family residential lot developments, and for use permit approvals for condominiums and other types of developments.

In 1968 the developer applied for 'P--C' zoning for the remaining 3,400 acres of its holdings, and its application was approved by the planning commission and board of supervisors. In 1969 after negotiations and hearings the developer secured a resolution of the board of supervisors that it would accept a dedication of 120 acres of parkland at the northerly end of The Sea Ranch for use as a county regional park in lieu of further access corridors through The Sea Ranch, unless the developer submitted changes to plans already approved.

In 1971 legislation was adopted which required that there be a specific plan covering the area to be included within any land project for which a subdivision map was to be approved, and requiring that any tentative or final subdivision map and the provisions for its design and improvement be consistent with existing applicable general and specific plans. (Stats.1971, ch. 1446, §§ 4 and 7, pp. 2853 and 2855, adding §§ 11526.1 and 11549.5 to the Bus. & Prof.Code. See present Gov.Code, §§ 66474.5 and 66474.) Thereafter the developer paid the fees and costs of an independent consultant who prepared such general and specific plans under the direction of the county authorities, and such plans were adopted in 1972.

During the eight-year period prior to the adoption of the coastal initiative on November 7, 1972, the county issued various developmental approvals regarding The Sea Ranch, including not only the zoning approvals in 1964 and 1968 and the specific plan adopted in 1972, but also numerous subdivision map approvals for particular subdivision increments, use permit approvals for condominiums, sewage treatment plants and other projects, grading permit approvals where necessary to carry out development plans, and building permit approvals for structures. The developer performed substantial work and it incurred substantial expenditures in developing its land. In that respect the trial court found that over 2,000 subdivided lots have been created of which approximately 1,500 have been sold to the public. Approximately 350 single family residences and 14 condominium units have been constructed. The developer has also constructed a lodge, store facility, various recreational facilities, and other improvements of various kinds and character. It has secured a permit to appropriate water from an adjacent river to accommodate a projected over-all build out of 5,200 units. It has obtained use permits to construct three waste water treatment plants and has undertaken construction of two of the plants. It has arranged for utility services to serve the units of the development as they have been developed. The developer had expended, prior to November 8, 1972, $26,900,000 in direct project expenditures in connection with The Sea Ranch of which $9,250,000 represented hard development costs, exclusive of engineering, architectural drawings and planning.

The property involved in the developer's application for exemption which was filed with the regional commission on May 14, 1974, varies from unsubdivided portions of The Sea Ranch designed on the specific plan map as 'P C Map Use, Subject to Future Detailed Planning,' to a condominium unit for which tentative map and use permits had been obtained but had expired before final approval or construction had occurred. These categories are reviewed below.

On July 11, 1974, the regional commission denied the developer's application in its entirety, and on August 14, 1974, the state commission rejected the developer's appeal. This action ensued. Other findings bearing on appellant's contentions are discussed below.

I

The trial court generally concluded, 'The State of California has constitutional power to impose the permit provisions of the Coastal Zone Conservation Act upon all developers who do not meet the vested rights standard in Section 27404 of the Public Resources Code.'...