Ochoa v. City of West Haven
| Decision Date | 29 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:08cv00024 (DJS),3:08cv00024 (DJS) |
| Parties | OSCAR E. OCHOA, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN, ET AL., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
The plaintiffs Oscar E. Ochoa ("Ochoa"), Fabriciano Falcon ("Falcon"), Ana B. Falcon ("Ana Falcon") and Lorenzo Lauria ("Lauria")(collectively "the Plaintiffs") bring this action against the City of West Haven ("the City"), Officer William Conlan ("Conlan"), and Officer Jeffrey Gabianelli ("Gabianelli")(collectively "the Defendants"). Ochoa and Falcon allege pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Defendants violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by conducting an unlawful search and seizure, falsely imprisoning them, and using excessive force against them. These plaintiffs allege that the City is liable for the actions of the defendant Officers by virtue of having created within the West Haven Police Department an atmosphere of lawlessness in which police officers employ excessive force in the belief that such action will be condoned by their superiors. Ochoa and Falcon also allege the following state common law claims againstthe Defendants: assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The plaintiffs Ana Falcon and Lauria, who are the ex-wife and son of the plaintiff Falcon, allege a state common law claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against the Defendants.
The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons that hereafter follow, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 54) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On July 19, 2006, at approximately 7:25 p.m., the plaintiff Ochoa drove into the parking lot of a Burger King restaurant located at the intersection of Elm Street and Campbell Avenue in West Haven, Connecticut ("Burger King"). Defendants Conlan and Gabianelli, who at all times relevant to this case were members of the City's Police Department, were working as plain clothes officers doing surveillance in their unmarked police car in the vicinity of the Burger King parking lot at that time. Conlan and Gabianelli observed that Ochoa did not go into Burger King and buy any food or drink but was using his cell phone as he waited in his car. Approximately five minutes after Ochoa was observed using his cell phone, the plaintiff Falcon drove into the BurgerKing parking lot and parked one space away from Ochoa's vehicle. The plaintiffs Ana Falcon and Lauria were also in Falcon's vehicle and remained in the vehicle at all times relevant to this case. Ochoa opened the passenger side door of his vehicle and he and Falcon stood between the two vehicles and were looking into a paper bag. Ochoa and Falcon were both dental technicians who had arranged to meet at the Burger King restaurant to exchange dental products.
Having observed Ochoa and Falcon looking into the paper bag, Conlan and Gabianelli drove into the Burger King parking lot and parked their vehicle behind Ochoa's and Falcon's vehicles. The two Officers exited their vehicle, approached Ochoa and Falcon and physically restrained them. Conlan and Gabianelli then searched Ochoa and Falcon and also searched Ochoa's vehicle. At some point, Conlan and Gabianelli told Ochoa and Falcon that the area was a known drug trafficking area. The defendant Police Officers did not handcuff or arrest either Ochoa or Falcon and ultimately told them that they were free to go. The entire incident lasted no more than twenty minutes.
While the parties are in agreement that Conlan and Gabianelli stopped, detained, and searched Ochoa and Falcon, the parties do not agree as to the manner in which those activities were conducted. Ochoa and Falcon both allege that Conlan and Gabianelli restrained and searched them with such force that theysustained wrist and neck injuries, although neither plaintiff sought medical treatment in connection with any physical injuries. Both also allege emotional distress resulting from the force applied by Conlan and Gabianelli. Ochoa alleges that the defendant Conlan touched Ochoa's genitals at least twice while conducting the search.
The Defendants maintain that Conlan and Gabianelli conducted a justified pat down search of Ochoa and Falcon, as well as a search of Ochoa's vehicle, and that what happened to the plaintiffs Ochoa and Falcon does not rise to the level of excessive force so as to constitute a constitutional violation. The Defendants contend that one of them may have touched Ochoa's genitals, outside of his clothing, while conducting the pat down search as an incident to determining whether Ochoa was carrying something on his person. Because the Court must "view[] the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought," In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, 611 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2010), the Court accepts as true the facts presented by the Plaintiffs for purposes of determining the pending motion.
Ochoa and Falcon further allege that during the course of the search conducted by Conlan and Gabianelli, dental products belonging to each of the two plaintiffs were damaged or destroyed, and that both of these plaintiffs incurred businesslosses as a result of the actions of the defendant Police Officers. The Defendants do not deny that dental products were damaged or destroyed during the course of the search conducted by Conlan and Gabianelli, but contend that damage to property is not relevant for purposes of claims asserted pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In determining a summary judgment motion, "[t]he Court is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004)(internal quotation marks omitted). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Mafffucci, 92 3 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991).
"The burden is on the moving party 'to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.'" American International Group, Inc. v. London American International Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Heyman v. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975)). "A fact is 'material' for these purposes if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute concerning a material fact is genuine "'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District, 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
While the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials to defeat a summary judgment motion, "[s]ummary judgment is inappropriate when the admissible materials produced in opposition to the summary judgment motion make it arguable that the claim has merit." In re Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129, 151 (2d Cir. 2009)(internal quotation marks omitted). In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).
The plaintiffs Ochoa and Falcon allege in their amended complaint that the defendant Police Officers seized them in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A "seizure" occurs when police detain an individual under circumstances where a reasonable person would believe that he or she is not at liberty to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
The parties in this case are in agreement that a seizure did occur. For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has recognized three types of police-citizen encounters: "(1) a full-scale arrest, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) a brief investigatory detention, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) a brief police-citizen encounter, which requires no justification." Polk v. District of Columbia, 121 F. Supp.2d 56, 64 (D.D.C. 2000)(citations omitted). The third type of encounter clearly is not what occurred in thiscase and can be ruled out. As to the first type, a full-scale arrest, the defendant Police Officers contend no arrest was made and the Plaintiffs admit in their Local Rule 56 (a)(2) Statement that no arrest occurred. The Court concludes that Conlan and Gabianelli carried out an investigative detention the evening of July 19, 2000. The briefness of the seizure in question, approximately twenty minutes, is consistent with it being an investigatory detention. The facts do not indicate any unnecessary delays on the part of the defendant Police Officers. "In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions...
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