Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys.
| Decision Date | 11 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11-cv-05836 RBL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | LARRY C. OCKLETREE, Plaintiff, v. FRANCISCAN HEALTH SYSTEM, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Franciscan Health System ("FHS")'s Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. #40). Plaintiff Larry Ockletree was terminated from his job as a security guard at FHS in September, 2010. Ockletree sued, alleging that his termination reflected discrimination based on his disability or his race.
FHS moves to dismiss counts I, II, IV, and V of Ockletree's Second Amended Complaint. Ockletree's first and second causes of action allege that FHS unlawfully terminated his employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). His fourth cause of action asserts a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and the fifth alleges a violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination ("WLAD").
FHS contends that Ockletree's failure to file a timely administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission forecloses both federal claims. It argues that Ockletree's public policy claim fails because a statutory remedy exists which supplants the equitable claim. FHS seeks dismissal of Ockletree's WLAD claim, claiming that as a religious organization it is broadly exempt from that statute.
Ockletree argues that he timely submitted an intake questionnaire to the EEOC (despite the absence of any such record in the EEOC file) and that as a result his Title VII and ADA claims are timely. Ockletree also argues the WLAD's blanket exemption of religious non-profits is unconstitutional.
FHS employed Ockletree as a Security Officer at St. Joseph's Hospital when he suffered a stroke on March 10, 2010. Pl.'s Opp. at 2 (Dkt. # 43). The stroke impaired Ockletree's use of his left arm. FHS determined that he could not perform the essential functions of his job, with or without accommodation, and it terminated Ockletree's employment on September 10, 2010. Defs.' Memo in Support at 2 (Dkt. # 40). On August 25, 2011, Ockletree sued, claiming that his termination was the result of discrimination based on race or disability. He claims he should have been re-employed in his prior position, or provided reasonable accommodations. Pl.'s Opp. at 2.
It is undisputed that Ockletree initially contacted the EEOC in mid-October, 2010. Defs.' Memo in Support at 7; Pl.'s Opp. at 2. The EEOC file notes reflect that it sent Ockletree an intake questionnaire and referred him to the Department of Labor. Decl. of Sirinek, Ex. B, EEOC 010 (Dkt. # 41). Ockletree claims that he mailed the EEOC a signed intake questionnaire around November 5, 2010, although there is no record that the EEOC received a completed intake questionnaire in that time frame. Decl. of Ockletree at Ex. A (Dkt. # 17). The EEOC closed Ockletree's file in January, 2011. Decl. of Sirinek at Ex. B, EEOC 010.
On March 19, 2011 Ockletree's attorney submitted a completed intake questionnaire to the EEOC. Decl. of Ockletree. It reflected Ockletree's intention to file a charge of discrimination, and authorized the EEOC to investigate. Decl. of Sirinek at Ex. B, EEOC 028. Ockletree submitted a formal Charge of Discrimination on April 22, 2011. Id. at EEOC 018. Ockletree filed a similar charge with the Tacoma Human Rights and Human Services Department the same day. Defs.' Memo in Support at 5, n. 5. On June 3, 2011, the EEOC issued Ockletree a "Notice of Right to Sue." Decl. of Sirinek at Ex. B, EEOC 006. Ockletree filed his complaint in state court on August 25, 2011. The case was timely removed to this Court. (Dkts. # 1, 1-2).
FHS now moves to dismiss four of Ockletree's claims: (1) discrimination in violation of the American with Disabilities Act; (2) discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (3) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (4) violation of Washington's Law Against Discrimination. Defs.' Memo in Support. at 1.
FHS argues that Ockletree did not properly file anything with the EEOC until March 19, 2011—189 days after his termination. It claims that Ockletree's failure to file an intake questionnaire or charge of discrimination within the 180 day statutory timeframe deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Ockletree's ADA and Title VII claims. Id. FHS further contends that Ockletree's wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim should be dismissed because a statutory remedy was available, thereby foreclosing this common law claim for relief. Id. at 10. Finally, FHS asserts that as a non-profit religious hospital, it is facially exempt from WLAD. Id. at 5.
Ockletree maintains that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because he timely filed his intake questionnaire in November, 2010, and that that document is a sufficient charge ofdiscrimination under Title VII. Pl.'s Opp. at 1. He also suggests that if the Court determines that his filing was untimely, equitable tolling should apply. Id. at 15.
Ockletree also argues that because a state agency has jurisdiction over his claim, the filing deadline for his federal claims is 300 days, not 180. He can succeed on this argument only if WLAD applies to FHS, despite the statute's broad exemption for religious non-profits like FHS. Ockletree asks the Court to subject FHS to WLAD in two ways. First, he contends that FHS is estopped from asserting the WLAD exemption because its EEO policy guarantees and assures employees that it will comply with applicable anti-discrimination laws. Id. at 4.
Ockletree's second argument is better but more complicated: he claims that WLAD's blanket religious exemption is unconstitutional, under both the Washington and the United States Constitutions. Id. at 6. Because WLAD's viability under the Washington Constitution is best answered by the Washington Supreme Court, and because that Court has not done so in the context of this case, the issue is certified to the Washington Supreme Court. Because the outcome of Defendants' Motion with respect to Ockletree's federal and state law discrimination claims depends on the answer, the Motion to Dismiss those claims is DENIED without prejudice, and the case is STAYED pending the Washington Supreme Court's input.
FHS moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted under Fed. R .Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff's complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A claim has "facial plausibility" when the party seeking relief "pleadsfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although the Court must accept as true the Complaint's well-pled facts, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a Rule 12(c) motion. Vazquez v. L. A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3f 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnotes omitted). This requires a plaintiff to plead "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly).
A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) if, considering the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the action: (1) does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or does not fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution; (2) is not a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution; or (3) is not one described by any jurisdictional statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); D.G. Rung Indus., Inc. v. Tinnerman, 626 F.Supp. 1062, 1063 (W.D. Wash. 1986); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 1346 (United States as a defendant). When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1983). A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction until plaintiff establishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Stock West, 873 F.2d at 1225; Thornhill Publishing Co., Inc. v. Gen'l Tel & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).
FHS argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Ockletree's Title VII and ADA claims, because the EEOC file demonstrates that Ockletree's intake questionnaire was not filed until March 19, 2011—189 days after his termination, and nine days too late. Defs.' Memo in Support at 4. Ockletree argues that a charge was timely filed. Pl.'s Opp. ...
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