Odeh v. United States

• Decision Date: 30 March 2015
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 3:04-CR-0240-P,Civ. No.3:13-CV-4303-P,Civ. No.3:13-CV-4302-P,Civ. No. 3:13-CV-4299-P,Civ. No. 3:13-CV-4301-P,Civ. No. 3:13-CV-4300-P
• Parties: ABDULRAHMAN ODEH, MUFID ABDULQADER, GHASSAN ELASHI, MOHAMMAD EL-MEZAIN, SHUKRI ABU BAKER, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

ABDULRAHMAN ODEH, MUFID ABDULQADER, GHASSAN ELASHI,MOHAMMAD EL-MEZAIN, SHUKRI ABU BAKER, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Civ. No. 3:13-CV-4299-P

Civ. No. 3:13-CV-4300-P

Civ. No. 3:13-CV-4301-P

Civ. No.3:13-CV-4302-P

Civ. No.3:13-CV-4303-P

Crim. No. 3:04-CR-0240-P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

March 30, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Petitioners' motions to vacate, set-aside, or correct sentence pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners' motions are denied.

I. Procedural Background

On July 26, 2004, a grand jury returned a multiple count indictment against Petitioners Abdulrahman Odeh, Mufid Abdulqader, Ghassan Elashi, Mohammad El-Mezain and Shukri Abu Baker. (See Indictment, ECF No. 1.)¹ The superceding indictment charged Petitioners with conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (i.e., Hamas), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Count 1); providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Counts 2-10); conspiracy to provide funds, goods, and services to a Specially Designated Terrorist (i.e., Hamas), in violation of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Count 11); providing funds, goods, and services to a Specially Designated Terrorist,in violation of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Counts 12-21); conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 22); substantive money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (Counts 23-32), and forfeiture of assets and certain other tax offenses not relevant to this petition. (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 233.) See generally United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 485-490 (5^th Cir. 2011) (setting forth detailed procedural and factual history of the case).

On July 24, 2007, the case went to a jury trial before the Honorable A. Joe Fish. The jury acquitted El-Mezain on all counts except Count 1 (conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization) and hung on all counts as to all other Petitioners. The case was then reassigned to this Court. On August 29, 2008, the government dismissed all charges against Odeh and Abdulqader except for the three conspiracy counts (Counts 1, 11 and 22) (ECF No. 1161.) On September 22, 2008 the case was tried before a jury. On November 24, 2008, the jury convicted all Petitioners on all applicable charges. (ECF No. 1250.) On May 27, 2009, the Court sentenced Baker and Elashi to 65 years in prison, Abdulqader to 20 years in prison, and Odeh and El-Mezain to 15 years in prison.

Each Petitioner filed a direct appeal. On December 27, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the convictions and sentences. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 484. On February 17, 2012, the Fifth Circuit denied Petitioners' petitions for rehearing en banc. On October 29, 2012, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

On October 25, 2013, Petitioners filed the instant § 2255 petitions. They argue:

1. They received ineffective assistance of trial counsel;

2. They received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel;3. They are actually innocent;

4. The government suppressed exculpatory evidence;

5. The Fifth Circuit engaged in an improper harm analysis resulting in a denial of due process; and

6. The prosecution was brought against Petitioners for improper purposes resulting in a denial of due process and equal protection.

Petitioner Odeh also filed separate additional grounds for relief. He argues:

1. He received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel provided incorrect advice regarding a plea offer;

2. He received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel cross-examined witnesses; and

3. He received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when counsel failed to argue the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the charges.

II. Factual Background

The following factual background is taken from the Fifth Circuit's opinion on direct appeal.

The charges arose after many years of widespread surveillance conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of several individuals and of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development ("HLF"). Until it was closed by the Government in 2001, HLF was a pro-Palestinian charitable organization based in Richardson, Texas. Individual defendants Shukri Abu Baker, Ghassan Elashi, and Mohammad El-Mezain served as officers and directors for HLF. Defendant Abdulrahman Odeh managed HLF's New Jersey office, and Defendant Mufid Abdulqader was a speaker and performer who appeared at HLF fundraising events.

HLF held itself out to be the largest Muslim charity in the United States, ostensibly with the mission of providing humanitarian assistance to needy Palestiniansliving in the Israeli-occupied territory of the West Bank and Gaza. The Government charged that in reality HLF's mission was to act as a fundraising arm for Hamas, also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, and to assist Hamas's social wing in support of Hamas's goal to secure a Palestinian Islamic state in what is now Israel. The indictment charged the defendants with assisting Hamas by funneling money to certain "zakat" committees located in the West Bank. Zakat committees are charitable organizations to which practicing Muslims may donate a portion of their income pursuant to their religious beliefs, but the Government charged that the committees to which the defendants gave money were part of Hamas's social network.

. . . .

The defendants raised money through HLF by conducting nationwide fundraising events, conferences, and seminars where HLF sponsored speakers and solicited donations. . . . Prior to 1995, the individual defendants and HLF more or less openly supported Hamas. Then, after Hamas was designated as a terrorist organization, the defendants' support became less obvious. Speakers and performers at HLF fundraising events no longer openly referred to Hamas even though HLF continued to support the same zakat committees that Hamas controlled.

From 1992 to 2001, HLF raised approximately $56 million in donations. The Government charged that from 1995 to 2001, HLF sent approximately $12.4 million outside of the United States with the intent to willfully contribute funds, goods, and services to Hamas.

. . . In September 1993, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO"), and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed what became known as the Oslo Accords. These accords established mutual recognition between the Israeli government and the Palestinians, known as the Palestinian Authority ("PA"). As a political rival of Arafat and his Fatah political party, Hamas opposed the Oslo Accords. One month after the Oslo Accords were signed, Defendants Baker and Elashi, and possibly Abudlqader, participated in a meeting at a Philadelphia hotel ("the Philadelphia meeting") that was secretly recorded by the FBI. The meeting participants . . . discussed their opposition to the Oslo Accords, their desire to derail the peace process, and their continued support of Hamas. Statements from Baker suggested an aura of deception and an intent to hide a connection to Hamas. . . .

Beginning in approximately 1994, Government surveillance on the defendants included wiretaps on the telephones and facsimile machines of HLF, Baker, El-Mezain, and Abdulqader. In addition to the wiretaps, the Government conducted searches at the homes of two unindicted co-conspirators, Ismail Elbarasse and Abdelhaleen Masan Ashquar, who had also participated in the Philadelphia meeting. The searches yielded numerous documents corroborating the creation of the Palestine Committee and itsoversight of HLF as a fundraising arm for Hamas. . . .

In January 1995 the President issued Executive Order 12947, designating Hamas as a Specially Designated Terrorist ("SDT"). The designation prohibited financial transactions with or for the benefit of Hamas and authorized the Treasury Department to block assets within the jurisdiction of the United States in which Hamas had an interest. . . . Hamas was further designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO") by the State Department in 1997. . . .

On December 3, 2001, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. ("IEEPA"), the United States designated HLF as a SDT. The next day, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") issued a blocking order on HLF's assets. On that same day, OFAC entered HLF's offices in Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, and California, and seized physical property. The seizure was conducted pursuant to the authority of IEEPA; no judicial warrant was obtained. In April 2002 the FBI sought, and was granted, a warrant from a magistrate judge to search the property that OFAC had seized. Evidence from that search was used at trial. A search was also conducted at Infocom, where the FBI seized more of HLF's documents and records.

At trial, the Government's evidence was voluminous and came from a variety of sources, including the above seizures, wiretaps, and financial documents. It also included evidence seized by the Israeli military from the zakat committees and from the PA's headquarters in Ramallah. The key issues addressed by the evidence were the connection between the defendants and Hamas, and Hamas's control of the zakat committees. . . .

. . . .

The defendants' theory at trial largely was that they did not support Hamas or terrorism, but rather shared a sympathy for the plight of the Palestinian people through support of the zakat committees and the charitable work the committees performed. Their view was that the Government never designated as a terrorist organization any of the zakat committees or anyone connected to the committees. They argue that the Treasury Department had to designate a zakat committee before contributions to it would be unlawful, suggesting that

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