Oden v. Gates, (No. 1149-5446.)

• Decision Date: 19 February 1930
• Docket Number: (No. 1149-5446.)
• Citation: 24 S.W.2d 381
• Parties: ODEN v. GATES.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 381

24 S.W.2d 381

ODEN v. GATES.

(No. 1149-5446.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

February 19, 1930.

Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of Seventh Supreme Judicial District.

Action between C. L. Oden and J. W. Gates. From an adverse judgment, the former appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certified questions to the Supreme Court. Questions answered.

Walsh & Smith, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Dibrell & Starnes, of Coleman, for appellee.

LEDDY, J.

The Court of Civil Appeals for the Seventh Supreme Judicial District presents certified questions. We will recite such facts from the certificate as is deemed essential to properly answer the questions propounded.

On September 3, 1924, appellant Oden purchased a section of school land, which had theretofore been forfeited by the land commissioner for nonpayment of interest. The sale to him was admittedly void under the ruling of our Supreme Court in approving the opinion of the Commission of Appeals in Weaver v. Robison, 114 Tex. 272, 268 S. W. 133. Such sale, however, was validated by the Act of the 39th Legislature, c. 130, § 4 (R. S. art. 5311b), effective March 28, 1925, unless the owner of the section at the time of the forfeiture had legally reinstated the same under the proviso contained in such act. Such proviso reads as follows: "Provided, in cases where the sale award of the land advertised as aforesaid has not stood one year the owner of said land at date of forfeiture shall have the right to apply to the General Land Office for a re-instatement of said former sale upon the payment of all past due interest at any time within six months after the taking effect of this Act."

On September 1, 1925, the commissioner of the general land office received an application for reinstatement of the land sold to Oden from appellee Gates, who was the owner at the time of the forfeiture, accompanied by a remittance sufficient in amount to pay the interest due the state to November 1, 1924.

Appellant contends that the attempted re-instatement by the owner was ineffectual, as he was required under the proviso of the validating act to pay the interest accrued to the date of reinstatement, while appellee's view is that on September 1, 1925, there was but one year's interest past due, as under the contract sought to be reinstated annual interest installments were due on the 1st day of November of each year.

It is further recited in the certificate that at the time Gates filed his application for reinstatement of the forfeited section of land he inclosed deeds for filing with the land commissioner, showing him to be the owner of said survey, but that the commissioner returned the deeds on account of a correction necessary to be made in the description of other lands not here involved, and that later, before the award was reinstated under his application, proper deeds were filed with the land commissioner, which showed that he was the owner of the section at the time the same was forfeited.

Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court of Civil Appeals seeks an answer to the following questions:

"(1) Did the failure of Gates to remit an amount sufficient to pay the interest up to the date of re-instatement, deprive him of the right under the statutes to have the original sale re-instated?"

"(2) Did the failure of Gates to file with the Commissioner conveyances showing a complete title in him on September 1st, 1925, authorize the Commissioner to re-instate the claim later on Jan. 5th, 1926, when title was shown to be complete?"

Did the Legislature, in requiring payment of all past-due interest as a requisite for the reinstatement of forfeited lands intend that applicants should be required to pay all accrued interest to the date of reinstatement, or only interest actually due under the terms of the contract sought to be reinstated? We think the latter view is the more reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose.

It must be borne in mind that the Legislature was not authorizing the making of a new contract, but was making provision for the reinstatement of an existing one which had been forfeited for failure to comply with its terms. The requirements made by the statute must be viewed in the light of the provisions of the forfeited contract. That contract obligated the purchaser to pay interest installments annually on November 1st during the life thereof. When Gates, as the owner of the land, sought to reinstate the former contract of purchase, the only interest due under the obligation assumed by him was that payable on November 1, 1924. When he remitted on September 1, 1925, a sufficient amount to pay that installment, the original contract, according to its terms, was in good standing, as the next installment of interest would not be due until November 1, 1925.

But, it is urged that the...