Odogba v. Wis. Dep't of Justice
| Citation | 22 F.Supp.3d 895 |
| Decision Date | 19 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13–C–573. |
| Parties | Susie J. ODOGBA, Plaintiff, v. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; State Crime Laboratory–Milwaukee; and J.B. Van Hollen, Kevin M. St. John, Bonnie L. Cyganek, Brian R. O'Keefe, David B. Zibolski, Kevin E. Jones, Mary K. Casey, Jana L. Champion, and Eva M. Lewis, Individually and in their Official Capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Martin C. Kuhn, Jeffrey S. Hynes & Associates SC, Wauwatosa, WI, for Plaintiff.
Anne M. Bensky, Steven C. Kilpatrick, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
For about a dozen years, Plaintiff Susie J. Odogba (“Odogba”), a black African–American1 female, worked as an analyst at the Defendant State Crime Laboratory–Milwaukee (“Lab”). The events that led to this action took place beginning in 2009 and ending with the July 20, 2012, termination of her employment.
On May 23, 2013, Odogba commenced this action against the Wisconsin Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), the Lab, and nine individuals in their official and individual capacities (collectively the “Individual Defendants”), alleging that they engaged in unlawful employment practices by suspending, discharging and otherwise intentionally discriminating against her with respect to terms, conditions, and privileges of employment because of her race, and that their actions interfered with her work performance and created an intimidating, hostile and offensive work environment.
Odogba's Complaint sets forth five causes of action: race discrimination and retaliation claims against the Defendants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.2 (); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq. (); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 et seq. (); and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 et seq. (). Odogba requests declaratory judgment; injunctive relief including reinstatement to her prior position, with promotions and the purging of adverse information from her employment file; compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants jointly and severally; and costs and attorney fees.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Odogba's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' multi-faceted motion to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. The motion is fully briefed and is addressed herein.
For a complaint to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a claimant provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The pleading must include more than mere legal conclusions or a recitation of the cause of action elements, but does not require detailed factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The pleading must meet a plausibility threshold; mere possibility is not enough. Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Plausibility means there are enough facts in the complaint for a reviewing court to draw a reasonable inference that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). However, the Court need not accept as true its legal conclusions; “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
Even after Twombly, courts must still approach motions under Rule 12(b)(6) by “constru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible inferences in her favor.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.2008). This threshold requires a court to utilize its judicial experience and common sense within the context of the facts to determine whether the pleading meets the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
The Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed that there is a “minimal pleading standard” for race and sex discrimination. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084. Although such a complaint must contain more than “a general recitation of the elements of the claim,” it need not be detailed or contain evidence. Id. A complaint must allege “ ‘some specific facts' to support the legal claims asserted.’ ” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). “The degree of specificity required ... rises with the complexity of the claim.” Id. at 616–17 ; see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir.2010) (). “[A] complaint alleging [race] discrimination need only aver that the employer instituted a (specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the basis of her [race].” Luevano v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir.2013) (quoting Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084 ).
Furthermore, the fact that allegations begin with the statement “on information and belief” will not automatically render them insufficient. Factual allegations made in a complaint must not be pled with absolute certainty so long as they are sufficient to make a claim plausible. See Intravisual Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics Am. Inc., 2:10–CV–90–TJW, 2011 WL 1004873, at *5 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 18, 2011) ().3
For the approximately twelve years Odogba was employed at the Lab as a Forensic Scientist/DNA Analyst—Senior, through the July 20, 2012, date that her employment was terminated, she was the first and only African–American in that position. For the period 2000 to 2011, Odogba received satisfactory performance evaluations, with rankings of at least “meets expectation.” (Compl. ¶ 94.)
Odogba did not report to work on December 9, 2009, because then—Governor James Doyle closed state offices due to inclement weather. On information and belief, Defendant Jana L. Champion (“Champion”), the Lab manager, who is white, also did not report to work that day. In February 2010, Champion issued a pre-disciplinary letter to Odogba because she had not reported for work on December 9, 2009. On information and belief, similarly situated white employees were not issued pre-disciplinary letters for not reporting to work on December 9, 2009, when state offices were closed.
In 2010 Odogba was assigned 6664 as a user identification number for the Lab's Qualtrax system. Based on this number assignment, two white co-workers, forensic scientists Reginald Templin and Anthony Spadafora, followed Odogba around the workplace and called her “Devil.” Odogba requested a different number, but her request was denied by Defendant Bonnie Cyganek (“Cyganek”), who is white and was the Human Resources Manager and Administrator for the Division of Management Services.
On May 31, 2011, Odogba spoke to Defendant Eva M. Lewis (“Lewis”), who is African–American, about the assignment of DNA analysts because it appeared that teams were assigned based on race. Odogba further conveyed her concern about race-based team assignments via a June 7, 2011, email to Defendants Cindy L. O'Donnell (“O'Donnell”),5 the Administrator for the Division of Management Services; Cyganek; Brian R. O'Keefe (O'Keefe), the Administrator for Law Enforcement Services (“LES”), who is white; Kevin E. Jones (“Jones”), the Lab director, who is white; Champion; and Lewis; and Nicole L. Casper (“Casper”), who is white.
In August 2011, Odogba met with Champion, Jones, and O'Keefe. At the meeting, O'Keefe issued a letter of direction to Odogba that threatened her with disciplinary action for raising concerns about the race-based assignments of DNA analysts and threatened her continued employment with the State. After giving Odogba the letter, O'Keefe “denigrated” her by stating that he didn't know what type of relationship she had with the former Division Administrator, Gary Hamblin (Compl. ¶ 39.) Addressing Odogba, O'Keefe also made statements to the effect that by the time he was done with anyone who filed a complaint, the complaint was dropped; and that she was “playing the race card.” (Id. at ¶ 41.) Odogba filed a formal complaint against O'Keefe regarding the letter of direction and his treatment of her during the meeting. She filed the complaint with Cyganek and copied O'Donnell.
Odogba met with O'Donnell during September 2011 regarding the complaint against O'Keefe. Upon information and belief, O'Donnell reported to the Wisconsin Attorney General's office after the meeting. Defendant Kevin St. John (“St. John”), Wisconsin Deputy Attorney General, who is white, met with O'Keefe, who agreed to withdraw the letter of direction.6
On March 8, 2012, Odogba received Discretionary Merit Compensation (“DMC”) from Wisconsin Attorney General, Defendant J.B. Van Hollen (“Van Hollen”), who is white. Employees who have been disciplined or whose job performance has been rated below satisfactory in the previous fiscal year or 12 months, whichever is greater, are not eligible for DMC.
On March 23, 2012, Odogba filed a complaint against Lewis, her immediate supervisor, with Champion. The subject of the complaint was Lewis's behavior towards Odogba.
On April 26, 2012, Odogba was served with an investigatory letter from Defendant David L. Zibolski (“Zibolski”), the Deputy Administrator of LES, who is white, directing her to attend an investigatory meeting on April 27, 2012, regarding allegations that Odogba had violated a work rule, and to answer questions regarding the March 23, 2012, complaint against Lewis. Prior to the meeting, Odogba...
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