Odom v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 30 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 8:13-cv-02878-TMC-JDA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Maurice Anthony Odom, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1 Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI").2 For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In March 2010, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning November 16, 2009. [R. 218-31.] The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 68-82, 108-12, 118-21.] On June 3, 2011, an attorney advisor issued a fully favorable decision on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 83-90.] On August 31, 2011, the Appeals Council decided to review the decision sua sponte and gave Plaintiff an opportunity to submit additional evidence and arguments. [R. 138-42.] On September 21, 2011, the Appeals Council reversed and remanded the matter, finding that the attorney advisor had not resolved significant evidentiary conflicts, assessed Plaintiff's work-related abilities, or addressed evidence indicating possible fraud, and further ordering consideration of additional medical and earnings-related evidence on remand. [R. 96-101.] On October 3, 2011, the Appeals Council issued an amended remand order, addressing additional evidentiary submissions from Plaintiff. [R. 103-07.]
It appears Plaintiff filed a request for hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on February 22, 2011, [R. 137], and the hearing was scheduled for March 22, 2012. On March 20, 2012, it appears that Plaintiff's caregiver and Plaintiff sent a letter3 by facsimile to an SSA hearing officer, and Plaintiff's caregiver spoke to the SSA hearing officer by telephone, to request that Plaintiff's hearing be postponed to another date because he did not have proper representation due to his lawyer withdrawing from the case at the last minute because he could not practice law in Augusta, Georgia, the site of thehearing.4 [R. 67, 363.] Additionally, Plaintiff indicated he did not have transportation to the hearing. [R. 67.] The letter also asked whether the judge could make a decision based on the medical records he already had. [Id.] On March 20, 2012, the SSA hearing officer told Plaintiff's caregiver that it would be better to appear at the hearing and then request a postponement. [R. 363.] On March 21, 2012, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for a postponement because the case had been in the system long enough and medical expert had been scheduled for the hearing. [R. 66.] On March 21, 2012, the SSA hearing officer left a voicemail for Plaintiff's caregiver that the judge had denied the request for postponement and she and Plaintiff should be present at the hearing set for the next day. [R. 364.] On March 22, 2012, the SSA hearing officer spoke with Plaintiff's caregiver on the telephone, and Plaintiff's caregiver stated that "her car was wrecked and she couldn't find transportation for either she or Mr. Odom and she just wanted Judge Northington to base her decision on the records already submitted." [R. 365.] On March 22, 2012, the ALJ held a hearing at which a medical expert appeared in person and a vocational expert testified via telephone. [R. 40-64.] The ALJ explained at the hearing on the record that his staff had contacted the claimant and his spouse to determine whether Plaintiff wanted a continuance to obtain counsel or requested a decision based on the evidence of record; and, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff and his spouse had communicated they were having car problems and "have requested that I adjudicate the matter on the record." [R. 42-43.]
On June 14, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. [R. 16-32.] At Step 15, the ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act ("the Act") on June 30, 2013, and had not6 engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 16, 2009, the alleged onset date. [R. 18, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairment of paranoid schizophrenia. [R. 19, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found Plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments: a history of hemorrhoids and genital herpes. [Id.] At Step 3, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's impairments or combination of impairments do not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments, considering specifically Listing 12.03. [R. 19-21, Finding 4.]
Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of work at all exertional levels, which implicitly includes the performance of medium, light, and sedentary work as defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the Regulations. He has no identifiable limitations for sitting, standing and/or walking in an eight-hour workday. In addition, the claimant does not have any postural limitations. Secondary to his mental impairments, he retains the capacity to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; and perform simple, routine tasks as consistent with unskilled work. In the course of work, the claimant is to have no contact with the general public and only occasional contact with coworkers. The claimant is able to perform sustained work activity on a regular and continuous basis for eight hours per day, forty hours per week.
[R. 21, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work as a Fabric Inspector. [R. 30, Finding 6.] However, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform. [R. 30, Finding 10.] Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from November 16, 2009, through the date of the decision. [R. 31, Finding 11.]
Plaintiff, represented by his "caregiver," Tometrius Williams7, appealed the decision administratively [R. 8], and on September 5, 2013, the Appeals Council denied the request for review, making the ALJ's decision final for purposes of judicial review. [R. 1-5.] Plaintiff, now acting pro se, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, contends he is entitled to disability benefits due to his mental illness. [See generally Doc. 42; Doc. 47.] Giving liberal construction to the pro se briefs as it is required to do, the Court gleans the following grounds of appeal. Plaintiff's legal rights to attend and testify at the hearing before the ALJ, and to be represented by counsel at the hearing, were violated by the ALJ's refusal to postpone the hearing. [Doc.42 at 4-5.] He also argues his hearing should have been held in Aiken, South Carolina, where his case was filed; because his hearing was held in Augusta, Georgia, his attorney could not represent him as he was not licensed to practice there. [Id.; Doc. 47 at 2-3.] Plaintiff alleges "[t]he hearing officer acted corruptly and unprofessional in that manner knowing we were right but chose to do nothing." [Doc. 42 at 4.] Plaintiff also contends the favorable decision finding him disabled by the Attorney Advisor should have been upheld. [Id. at 4-5.] Plaintiff also appears to argue the ALJ failed to consider the fact that he was in special education classes in school, was a remedial student, and was considered mentally impaired.8 [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff contends that there is no way a person can function on a daily basis or hold down a daily job with the amount of medication he is required to take, and the Administration should have adopted the opinions of his doctors who found "agree with is mental disorder in his favor." [Doc. 47 at 1-2.] Plaintiff also contends his work history has nothing to do with the level of his disability and that "as time goes by the years or he losing his mind later." [Id. at 3.] Ultimately, Plaintiff argues there is no work for a patient with his criteria considering his diagnosis, his medication, and his criminal record. [Id. at 4.]
The Commissioner contends the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because it is legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. [Doc. 53.]
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (...
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