Odom v. Helms

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PARKER, Chief Justice.
• Citation: Odom v. Helms, 314 So.3d 220 (Ala. 2020)
• Decision Date: 26 June 2020
• Docket Number: 1180749
• Parties: Bernadine V. ODOM v. Jimmy HELMS et al.

314 So.3d 220

Bernadine V. ODOM

v.Jimmy HELMS et al.

1180749

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 26, 2020

Margaret M. Miller, Mobile; Christ N. Coumanis of Coumanis & York, P.C., Daphne; and Paul M. Harden, Jr., of Harden & Harden, P.C., Monroeville, for appellant.

F. Tim McCollum of Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, Montgomery, for appellees.

PARKER, Chief Justice.

Bernadine V. Odom appeals a summary judgment entered by the Butler Circuit Court in favor of several supervisory officers in the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol Division, in a lawsuit based on the misconduct of a state trooper. Because Odom has not overcome the officers’ State-agent immunity, we affirm.

I. Facts

On the evening of December 6, 2015, Odom was involved in an automobile accident on I-65 in Butler County. State Trooper Samuel Houston McHenry II responded to the scene. Odom's vehicle was inoperable, so after McHenry investigated the accident, he gave her a ride, ostensibly to a safe location. At 12:12 a.m., he radioed his post dispatcher that he was en route with Odom to an exit about 10 miles from the accident scene. He did not mention his vehicle's mileage as of the time he left the accident scene. Instead of taking Odom directly to the exit, McHenry took her to a wooded area and sexually assaulted her. At 12:21 a.m., he radioed that he was dropping Odom off at the exit, and at 12:25 he radioed that he had completed the drop-off. Within two days, McHenry's employment was terminated based on his misconduct.

McHenry was charged with first-degree rape, and he pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct. Odom then filed this civil lawsuit in the Butler Circuit Court against McHenry; Spencer Collier, the secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency; and Sgt. Jimmy Helms, the post commander of the post to which McHenry was assigned. Odom later added as defendants Cpl. Glenn Furukawa, McHenry's immediate supervisor; Cpl. Jason Burch, another supervisor; Cpl. James Woodard, another supervisor; Sgt. Brian Simerly, the acting post commander at the time of the incident (Helms was on medical leave); Lt. Dale Cobb, the assistant troop commander of McHenry's troop; and Capt. Charles DeVinner, the troop commander (all defendants other than McHenry and Collier are hereinafter referred to collectively as "supervisory defendants"). Odom's suit eventually included claims against the supervisory defendants for failure to properly train and supervise McHenry and for violating various law-enforcement policies and procedures. In support of these claims, Odom relied on a provision in the Highway Patrol Division Procedure Manual ("Highway Patrol Manual"), known as the "relay" procedure, that requires a trooper who transports a motorist to notify the post of the trooper's starting and ending mileage. Odom also relied on various provisions in the Highway Patrol Manual regarding the supervisory defendants’ duties relating to McHenry.

The supervisory defendants moved for a summary judgment, arguing that they were protected from liability by State-agent immunity. The trial court granted the motion and, with Odom's claims against McHenry still pending,¹ certified the partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Odom appeals.

II. Standard of review

"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952–53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce ‘substantial evidence’ as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797–98 (Ala. 1989) ; Ala. Code 1975, § 12–21–12."

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004).

III. Analysis

In the supervisory defendants’ summary-judgment motions, they argued that they were entitled to State-agent immunity because they were engaged in a function that involved exercising judgment -- supervising McHenry. On appeal, Odom contends that the supervisory defendants were not entitled to a summary judgment on the basis of State-agent immunity because she provided evidence that they acted willfully or beyond the scope of their authority.

To be entitled to State-agent immunity, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing that, at the time of the conduct giving rise to the claim, he was an agent of the State. Cf. Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) ;² Ex parte Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). It is undisputed that the supervisory defendants met this requirement. Second, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the claim is based on one or more of certain categories of conduct by the agent, which include "[e]xercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including ... supervising personnel." Cranman, supra ; Reynolds, supra. There is no dispute that the supervision of McHenry was the basis of Odom's claims. However, in an attempt to evade the clear import of this subcategory of covered conduct involving "supervising personnel," Odom argues that the supervisory defendants did not come within its scope because they violated "non-discretionary" policies and procedures. Yet that is not properly an argument that the supervisory defendants were not engaged in covered conduct; rather, it is an argument that the supervisory defendants’ covered conduct came within an exception to State-agent immunity regarding conduct beyond the agent's authority, an issue we address next.

If the defendant carries his burden of showing agency and covered conduct, then the plaintiff must show either (1) that non-immunity is required by the federal Constitution or laws; the Alabama Constitution; or Alabama laws, rules, or regulations enacted or promulgated to regulate a governmental agency; or (2) that the agent "act[ed] willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law." Cranman, supra ; see Reynolds, supra. Here, Odom contends that the supervisory defendants acted willfully and beyond the scope of their authority. The only specific act or omission to which Odom points is the supervisory defendants’ "failure[ ] to supervise McHenry ... after he violated the [r]elay procedure" that required him to notify the trooper post of his starting mileage when he began to transport Odom from the accident scene.

To meet the willfulness exception, a plaintiff must show more than that the defendant was negligent. See City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So. 2d 755, 762 (Ala. 2002) ; Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1057 (Ala. 2003). Rather, in this context, "willfully" means that the defendant was consciously aware that his act or omission would likely cause harm to someone. Cf. Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 181 So. 3d 325, 333 (Ala. 2015) (" ‘ " ‘Implicit in ... willful ... misconduct is an acting, with knowledge of danger, or with consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some act will likely result in injury.’ " ’ " (quoting Phillips ex rel. Phillips v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 988 So. 2d 464, 467 (Ala. 2008), quoting other cases)); Hooper v. Columbus Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 956 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (Ala. 2006) (" ‘To constitute "willful or intentional injury," there must be knowledge of danger accompanied with a design or purpose to inflict injury ....’ " (quoting English v. Jacobs, 263 Ala. 376, 379, 82 So. 2d 542, 545 (1955) )). Thus, Odom was required to provide evidence that, when McHenry violated the relay procedure by failing to call in his starting mileage, the supervisory defendants were consciously aware that their omission to contact him immediately or to take other action would likely result in harm to someone. However, Odom presented no evidence that the supervisory defendants were consciously aware of McHenry's relay-procedure violation, let alone that their omission would harm anyone. Sgt. Helms was on medical leave at the time, and there was no evidence that any of the other supervisory defendants was informed that McHenry had failed to follow the relay procedure in time to prevent his assault on Odom. Thus, Odom did not make a prima facie showing of willfulness.

As for the beyond-the-scope-of-authority exception, Odom argues that the supervisory defendants failed to follow Highway Patrol Division policies and procedures when they failed to respond immediately to McHenry's violation of the relay procedure. "A State agent acts beyond authority ... when he or she ‘fail[s] to discharge duties [in accordance with] detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.’ " Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000) ). Odom relies on the following provisions in the Highway Patrol Manual. As to Cpls. Furukawa, Burch, and Woodard:

"A. General

"1. Corporals are ‘first line’ supervisors in the Highway Patrol Division. Corporals are responsible directly to the Post Commander.

"2. Corporals shall provide leadership and counsel for subordinates and by their own bearing and conduct, they will set an example for these subordinates.

"....

"B. Responsibilities

"1. Corporals must remain alert to any unusual incidents which occur within the Post and keep the Post Commander informed of such incidents. Any action

...