Odom v. White
| Decision Date | 30 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 5–09–0631,5–10–0139.,s. 5–09–0631 |
| Citation | 350 Ill.Dec. 565,408 Ill.App.3d 1113,948 N.E.2d 1072 |
| Parties | Joshua Andrew ODOM, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.Jesse WHITE, Illinois Secretary of State, Defendant–Appellee.Jason H. Janes, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.Jesse White, Illinois Secretary of State, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
J. Israel Slone, O'Fallon, IL, for Appellants.Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Janon E. Fabiano, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Appellee.
[350 Ill.Dec. 566 , 408 Ill.App.3d 1114] OPINION
These cases, consolidated in this court for oral argument and decision only, come before us on administrative review from the circuit court of Jefferson County, which affirmed the decisions of the Illinois Secretary of State (the Secretary) to deny the appellants' petitions to rescind the suspensions of their driving privileges pursuant to section 6–206(a)(31) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(31) (West 2008)). Both appellants had been drivers of motor vehicles that were involved in motor vehicle accidents involving personal injuries to individuals who were transported from the scene in ambulances. At all the stages of the proceedings, the appellants have argued only that the motor vehicle accidents did not involve the types of personal injuries enumerated in the statute as conferring their implied consent to blood-alcohol tests.
Some discussion of the statutory scheme may be helpful to further the discussion of the facts and the law. Section 6–206(a)(31) of the Code gives the Secretary discretionary authority to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person upon sufficient evidence that the person has refused
[350 Ill.Dec. 567 , 948 N.E.2d 1074]
to submit to a blood-alcohol test as required by section 11–501.6 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11–501.6 (West 2008)) or has submitted to a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a) (31) (West 2008).
Section 11–501.6(a) of the Code provides that any person who drives or is in actual control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways and who has been involved in an accident resulting in personal injury or death for which he has been arrested for a nonequipment violation, as evidenced by the issuance of a traffic ticket, shall be deemed to have given consent for a blood-alcohol test. 625 ILCS 5/11–501.6(a) (West 2008). For purposes of this section, a personal injury is defined as follows:
625 ILCS 5/11–501.6(g) (West 2008).
Although this paragraph of the statute speaks in terms of inclusion, the supreme court has held that type A injuries are limited to those listed in the paragraph: severely bleeding wounds, distorted extremities, or injuries that require the injured party to be carried from the scene. Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill.2d 302, 310, 220 Ill.Dec. 369, 673 N.E.2d 281 (1996). Personal injuries requiring only a visit to a doctor's office or a medical facility, without severe bleeding, distorted extremities, or the need for the injured party to be carried from the scene, do not qualify as type A injuries. This ensures that only drivers involved in more serious accidents, in which the expectation of privacy is diminished and the administration of the blood-alcohol test is minimally intrusive, are subjected to testing. Fink, 174 Ill.2d at 311, 220 Ill.Dec. 369, 673 N.E.2d 281. Because the statute does not require that the law enforcement officer have any suspicion or cause to believe that the driver is intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol prior to asking him to submit to testing, its application must be so limited only to motor vehicle accidents of a more serious nature. Fink, 174 Ill.2d at 309–12, 220 Ill.Dec. 369, 673 N.E.2d 281.
A person may contest the suspension of his driving privileges by requesting an administrative hearing with the Secretary in accordance with section 2–118 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2–118 (West 2008)), at the conclusion of which the Secretary may rescind, continue, or modify the order of suspension. 625 ILCS 5/11–501.6(e) (West 2008). The action of the Secretary is subject to judicial review in the circuit court and thereafter in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq. (West 2008)). 625 ILCS 5/2–118(e) (West 2008).
In both the cases before us, the appellant drivers were asked to and did submit to blood-alcohol tests. Both tests revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Accordingly, their driving privileges were suspended. Each driver contested the suspension by requesting a hearing before the Secretary, and in each case the Secretary upheld the suspension. Both drivers sought administrative review in the circuit court of Jefferson County, and in each case the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Secretary. The drivers now appeal to this court.
As always on administrative review, we review the decision of the Secretary and not the decision of the circuit court, because the Secretary is the fact finder responsible for overseeing testimony
[350 Ill.Dec. 568 , 948 N.E.2d 1075]
making credibility determinations, and assigning weight to statements made by witnesses. Emergency Treatment, S.C. v. Department of Employment Security, 394 Ill.App.3d 893, 901, 334 Ill.Dec. 538, 917 N.E.2d 135 (2009). Factual determinations by the Secretary are deemed to be prima facie true and correct and will stand unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Emergency Treatment, S.C., 394 Ill.App.3d at 901, 334 Ill.Dec. 538, 917 N.E.2d 135. Questions of law are subject to de novo review. Emergency Treatment, S.C., 394 Ill.App.3d at 901, 334 Ill.Dec. 538, 917 N.E.2d 135. The question whether the Secretary correctly considered all the facts and correctly applied the law to those facts is a mixed question of fact and law, and the Secretary's decision will be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Emergency Treatment, S.C., 394 Ill.App.3d at 901, 334 Ill.Dec. 538, 917 N.E.2d 135.
The proceedings before the Secretary reveal the following facts. Appellant Joshua A. Odom was involved in a single-vehicle accident May 11, 2008. He crested a hill too fast and lost control of his vehicle, which became airborne and rolled several times. The car came to rest against an embankment, which made it impossible for him to open the driver-side door. His OnStar system alerted authorities and dispatched an ambulance. Odom repeatedly told responding personnel that he was fine and was not injured. Responders told him not to attempt to exit the vehicle until ambulance personnel arrived, in case he was injured. Ambulance personnel removed him from the vehicle and placed him on a gurney. Odom did not remember that any ambulance personnel had asked him if he was injured or if he needed assistance. One of the ambulance personnel wrote in his report that Odom denied any pain or injuries. Odom was not asked if he wanted or needed to go to the hospital in the ambulance. Odom did not know that he could refuse, but he told everyone that he was fine. Had he been given a choice, he would not have gone in the ambulance. Odom's only injury was a minor laceration on his head from a piece of glass. Hospital personnel simply cleaned it up. He was given a CAT scan to check for head injuries, which was negative. He was released from the hospital that night and felt fine the next day. He did not need to take the muscle relaxants he had been sent home with. Odom denied that he had any severely bleeding wounds, any distorted extremities, or any injuries that required he be carried from the scene.
Deputy Donald Wesley Harbison testified that he responded to the accident scene. Harbison testified that Odom told him he was okay but that he was “humped over” and could not get out of the car. It appeared to Harbison that Odom was “pushed forward” and physically could not get over the passenger seat to get out of the car. Harbison did not observe any injuries to Odom other than blood from a superficial cut, but he testified that he was moaning and groaning when ambulance personnel started to move him. Harbison was not aware of any severely bleeding wounds or distorted extremities on Odom. Harbison believed that Odom's injuries did require him to be carried from the scene because when the ambulance personnel put the cervical collar on him, Odom was moaning and groaning and he never told them he was not injured. This moaning increased at the hospital. Harbison testified that on the traffic accident report he indicated that Odom had an incapacitating injury; the actual report shows a type B injury, which is a nonincapacitating injury. Based on his observations, it was Harbison's opinion that Odom's injuries required that he be carried from the scene in an ambulance. Harbison stated that based on
[350 Ill.Dec. 569 , 948 N.E.2d 1076]
the way Odom was sitting in the vehicle and acting, he would not have been able to walk away from the accident and be okay.
Odom testified that he does not remember moaning or groaning at the scene of the accident or in the ambulance. He testified that he might have moaned at the hospital when blood was being drawn because he does not like that procedure. The report of the ambulance personnel did not report any moaning or groaning, nor did hospital records. Odom was only at the hospital for about one hour, and he walked out under his own power and went to work the next day.
The traffic accident report submitted by Deputy Harbison...
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