Odrowski v. Swift & Co.

• Decision Date: 11 November 1916
• Docket Number: 20830
• Parties: ODROWSKI v. SWIFT & CO.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

162 P. 268

99 Kan. 163, 99 Kan. 631

ODROWSKI v. SWIFT & CO.

No. 20830

Supreme Court of Kansas

November 11, 1916

On Motion for Modification of Judgment, Jan. 18, 1917.

Syllabus by the Court.

The cancellation of a written contract, purporting to release an employer from further liability on account of an injury to a workman, is not justified by a showing that misrepresentations were made to him as to his physical condition, unless it is also shown that he signed the release by reason of being misled thereby. And where he testifies that he signed it without reading it, not knowing that it was a release, he shows affirmatively that he was not induced to give his employer a full discharge through reliance on the statements made as to his condition.

A written release of an employer from further liability on account of an injury to an injured workman cannot be set aside on the mere ground that it was signed by the employé without reading it, where he was able to read it, and no obstacle to his doing so was presented, and no misrepresentation was made as to its contents.

The provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Laws 1911, c 218, § 29), authorizing an “award” to be set aside, because of being grossly inadequate or grossly excessive, refers to the amount fixed by arbitration, and has no application to a contract releasing the employer from further liability.

The payment of a substantial sum is a sufficient consideration to support a contract, releasing an employer from further liability on account of an injury to a workman, although the amount paid was just what the statute made due at that time.

In Girten v. Zinc Co., 98 Kan. 405, 158 P. 33, it was not decided that the weekly allowance for partial disability under the compensation act may ever be less than 25 per cent of the workman’s former average weekly earnings.

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Where in an action under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, judgment for plaintiff was improper, because he failed to introduce evidence showing that a release which he executed should be set aside, plaintiff is not, upon reversal on appeal, entitled to have the cause remanded, so that he may have another opportunity to offer such proof.

Appeal from District Court, Wyandotte County.

Action by Stanley Odrowski against Swift & Co. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Russell Field, of Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.

J. K. Cubbison, of Kansas City, Kan., and Bird & Pope, of Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.

OPINION

MASON, J.

Stanley Odrowski was injured while in the employ of Swift & Co. He recovered a judgment under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the defendant appeals.

1. About four months after his injury the plaintiff had signed a writing (which was filed with the clerk of the district court), purporting to release the company from all liability, in consideration of $45 paid him at that time and of $103.50 which he had already received. He pleaded, and the jury in effect found, that he had been induced to execute this instrument by statements made to him, by a physician who represented the company, minimizing the extent of his injuries. A release procured by such means can, in some circumstances, be set aside. Ladd v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 543, 155 P. 943; 2 Black on Rescission and Cancellation, § 390. But to justify a finding that it was so procured it is necessary that there should be evidence, not only that false representations were made, but that they were relied upon. Here the plaintiff not only failed to testify that he was induced to sign a release in full by misstatements as to his condition, but he also showed affirmatively that this could not have been the case, by testifying that he signed it not knowing that it was a release, not having read it. The release must therefore be given effect as a bar to a recovery, unless some basis exists for setting it aside other than that relied upon by the jury.

2. There was neither pleading nor proof of any misrepresentation of the contents of the writing which the plaintiff signed, nor of any fraud practiced by which he was led to sign it without reading. The jury found that he was able to read and write and understand the English language. The modern tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the power of courts to grant relief against contracts induced by unfair dealing. 1 Black on Rescission and Cancellation, preface, p. v., and section 59. But the fact that a person does not read a writing which he signs is not a ground for avoiding its effect, where he is able to do so, where no obstacle is presented, and where no misrepresentation is made as to its contents. 2 Black on Rescission and Cancellation, § 384.

3. The Compensation Act does not authorize the setting aside of such an instrument as that here involved upon any less showing than would be required in the case of any contract of a similar character. The statute provides that agreements for compensation, "other than a release," must be in the form prescribed (Laws 1911, c. 218, § 23); that arbitration may be had under certain rules (section 24); that "every agreement for compensation and every award shall be in writing, signed and acknowledged" (section 27) that "every release of liability hereunder, every agreement for or award of compensation," must be filed (section 28). It then gives the district court jurisdiction to cancel "such agreement or award" on certain conditions. Section 29. These provisions seem to indicate a legislative purpose to reserve to the courts a control over "agreements for compensation," and "awards," but not over "releases." This view is strengthened by the provision of a subsequent section that "an action to set aside a release or other discharge of liability on the ground of fraud or mental incompetency may be joined with an action for compensation under this act." Section 36. If, however, a release is deemed to be within the scope of the section granting to the court the power of cancellation, it must be because it is covered by the term "agreement"; it cannot be regarded as an "award," since that word is consistently used throughout the statute to designate the result of an arbitration as distinguished from an...