Oestreich v. Ocean Shores Estates, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 42654
• Citation: Oestreich v. Ocean Shores Estates, Inc., 516 P.2d 507, 83 Wn.2d 143 (Wash. 1973)
• Parties: Milton E. OESTREICH et ux., et al., Appellants, v. OCEAN SHORES ESTATES, INC., a Washington corporation, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 143

83 Wn.2d 143

516 P.2d 507

Milton E. OESTREICH et ux., et al., Appellants, v. OCEAN SHORES ESTATES, INC., a Washington corporation, et al., Respondents.

No. 42654.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Dec. 6, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1974.

Lewis S. Armstrong, Edward D. Campbell, Seattle, for appellants.

Davis, Wright, Todd, Riese & Jones, and Donald A. Schmechel, Judd Kirk and David B. Goldstein, Riddell, Williams, Voorhees, Ivie & Bullitt, Stimson Bullitt, Seattle, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This action was brought in the King County Superior Court by Oceanroad, Inc., and its directors to seek damages and specific performance from over 100 lenders and assignees of interest in the real estate and contracts of purchase surrounding the original Wendell-West development of a 12,000-lot community in Ocean Shores, Grays Harbor County, Washington. The amended complaint includes eight causes of action which basically assert that: (1) representations were made to the buyers of Ocean Shores property concerning numerous items involving the habitability of the land, many of which were required to be set forth under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701--1720 (1970), and some of which were part of implied agreements under the sales contracts; (2) falsity or breach of these representations by the defendants and their assignees has been committed; and (3) damages have resulted to the buyers. The plaintiffs do not seek to repudiate any real estate transaction nor to declare any of the various deeds void.

The crucial question raised here is whether the subject matter of this suit is basically 'local' in nature and therefore falling under RCW 4.12.010. ¹ The trial court held that the action was local in character and dismissed the action.

We held in Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 74 Wash.2d 519, 445 P.2d 334 (1968), that where the basis of an action is transitory, the court may hear and determine the action even though a question of title may be involved and even though the question of title may constitute the essential point on which the case depends. Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., Supra at 526, 445 P.2d 334. We also note that what little authority there is on the question indicates that an action at law for damages for alleged misrepresentation in the sale of land is transitory in nature, permitting it to be brought in a county other than that wherein the land is situated. Kaluzok v. Brisson, 27 Cal.2d 760, 167 P.2d 481, 163 A.L.R. 1308 (1946); 56 Am.Jur. Venue § 14, at 7 (1973 Supp.);...