Office of Professional Conduct v. Dahlquist (In re Discipline of Dahlquist), 20170550

• Decision Date: 30 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 20170550,20170550
• Citation: 443 P.3d 1205
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the DISCIPLINE OF Charles W. DAHLQUIST, II Office of Professional Conduct, Appellant, v. Charles W. Dahlquist, II, Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

443 P.3d 1205

In the MATTER OF the DISCIPLINE OF Charles W. DAHLQUIST, IIOffice of Professional Conduct, Appellant,

v.Charles W. Dahlquist, II, Appellee.

No. 20170550

Supreme Court of Utah.

Filed April 30, 2019

Billy L. Walker, Adam C. Bevis, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Michael F. Skolnick, Salt Lake City, for appellee

Justice Petersen authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Himonas, and Justice Pearce joined.

On Direct Appeal

Justice Petersen, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The Office of Professional Conduct (OPC) filed an attorney discipline case against Charles W. Dahlquist, II for repeatedly violating a judge’s order in limine during a 2008 jury trial. No one present at the trial alerted the OPC to the conduct. Rather, the OPC learned of it from our opinion reversing the jury’s verdict and granting a new trial based in part on Dahlquist’s violations of the order. Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc. , 2012 UT 43, ¶ 27, 289 P.3d 369 (stating that the "persistent and deliberate references to collateral source evidence in violation of the trial court’s in limine order substantially prejudiced the jury").

¶2 The OPC immediately opened an investigation. But by this time, over three-and-a-half years had passed since the original trial. Nevertheless, the OPC proceeded with its investigation and communicated with the plaintiffs in the underlying case. The plaintiffs eventually filed an informal complaint with the Utah State Bar in 2015. After a hearing on the informal complaint before a screening panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, the OPC filed this case in the district court in 2016.

¶3 Dahlquist moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, and the district court granted the motion. The OPC appeals, arguing that the district court misinterpreted what begins and ends the running of the limitations period.

¶4 Rule 14-529 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice governs this issue. It establishes a four-year limitations period for attorney discipline cases that begins to run upon the "discovery" of the alleged attorney misconduct and stops when "[p]roceedings under this article"¹ commence. The issues before us are: (1) whose "discovery" triggers the running of the limitations period and (2) what constitutes "proceedings under this article."

¶5 We hold that discovery by a party with an interest in filing an informal complaint under rule 14-510, as is the case here, is sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations. And we interpret "proceedings" to mean the filing of an informal complaint under that rule.

¶6 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the complaint against Dahlquist as untimely, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶7 Dahlquist represented IHC Hospitals, Inc. in a medical malpractice lawsuit filed against it by Jerome and Leilani Wilson. The jury trial took place from October 29 to November 21, 2008. Before trial, the Wilsons prevailed on a motion in limine to exclude evidence of collateral source benefits they had received. But during the trial, Dahlquist made repeated references to those benefits. Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc. , 2012 UT 43, ¶ 12, 289 P.3d 369.

¶8 The Wilsons moved for a new trial based in part on Dahlquist’s conduct, but the trial court denied their request. The jury returned a verdict in favor of IHC, and the case was dismissed on December 9, 2008.

¶9 The Wilsons appealed the dismissal, based in part on Dahlquist’s violations of the in limine order. In an opinion published on July 20, 2012, we agreed that IHC had "persistently and deliberately violated the trial court’s order," and we granted the Wilsons a new trial. Id. at ¶ 2.

¶10 On the day the opinion was published, the OPC was notified of this court’s decision and opened an investigation into Dahlquist’s conduct. Over the course of its investigation, the OPC corresponded with the Wilsons’ counsel.

¶11 On March 2, 2015, the Wilsons sent a letter to the OPC seeking to file a bar complaint against Dahlquist. That same month, they verified the letter in accordance with rule 14-510(a)(2) of the Rules of Professional Practice. The OPC consolidated the Wilsons’ informal complaint with its pending investigation.

¶12 A screening panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court held a hearing on the informal complaint. The panel recommended that the OPC file a formal complaint against Dahlquist in district court. This case followed.

¶13 In the district court, Dahlquist filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the applicable four-year statute of limitations barred the OPC’s complaint. The rule governing the limitations period in attorney discipline cases states: "Proceedings under this article shall be commenced within four years of the discovery of the acts allegedly constituting a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct." SUP. CT. R. PROF’L PRACTICE 14-529.

¶14 The OPC argued that the statute of limitations should run from the time that it discovered Dahlquist’s misconduct in July 2012—when this court issued its decision in Wilson . And the OPC argued that it commenced proceedings against Dahlquist when it opened its investigation the same day, which was within the four-year limitations period.

¶15 The district court disagreed. The district court reasoned that discovery by any person permitted to file an informal complaint for attorney discipline "will ordinarily be sufficient to trigger the limitations clock." Accordingly, the district court found that discovery of the alleged misconduct took place at the trial in 2008 because the Wilsons, their counsel, and others—any of whom could have filed an informal complaint—witnessed the misconduct. The district court also ruled that "proceedings" commenced when the Wilsons filed their informal complaint with the Utah State Bar in March 2015, not in July 2012 when the OPC opened its investigation.

¶16 The OPC appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(c) and article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, which grants this court governance of the "discipline of persons admitted to practice law."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17 Generally, we review the district court’s interpretation of our Rules of Professional Practice for correctness. In re Discipline of Welker , 2004 UT 83, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1197. But because of our constitutional authority in attorney discipline cases, "we employ a unique standard of review." In re Discipline of Barrett , 2017 UT 10, ¶ 11, 391 P.3d 1031 (citation omitted). "We presume the district court’s findings of facts to be correct ‘unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error,’ but we ... ‘reserve the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ from the inferences drawn’ by the district court." Id. (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶18 In this case, we must interpret one of our own rules governing lawyer discipline. Rule 14-529 of the Rules of Professional Practice contains a four-year limitations period and reads, "Proceedings under this article shall be commenced within four years of the discovery of the acts allegedly constituting a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct."

¶19 The parties disagree as to whose "discovery" starts the running of the limitations period and what constitutes the commencement of "[p]roceedings under this article." We turn first to the question of what begins the limitations period and then to the question of what ends it.

I. "DISCOVERY"

¶20 The question of whose discovery starts the running of the four-year limitations period in rule 14-529 is not easily answered because the rule is entirely silent on the matter. It refers to "the discovery of the acts allegedly constituting a violation" but does not tell us whose discovery is contemplated. The relevant portion of the rule contains no subject.

¶21 The usual methods of statutory interpretation guide our analysis. "[W]e interpret a court rule in accordance with its plain meaning" with our objective being "to give effect to the intent of the body that promulgated it." In re Discipline of Brussow , 2012 UT 53, ¶ 14, 286 P.3d 1246 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because this court is the body that promulgates these rules, the constitutional considerations that require us to take a purely textual approach to statutory enactments may not apply with equal force here.

¶22 The OPC argues that only its discovery of the alleged misconduct should trigger the running of the limitations period. In support, the OPC points to prior iterations of this rule. The predecessor to the Rules of Professional Practice was the Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar Governing Professional Conduct and Discipline, adopted in 1937. See Vol. XXII, Utah Bar Bulletin, November 1952 (stating that the Supreme Court approved the Revised Rules on March 1, 1937). Rule V(3) of the 1971 Revised Rules barred disciplinary action after three years "from the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts upon which such action is based." Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Rule V(3) (1971) (emphasis added). By 1981, the rules changed to read that a complaint must be filed within four years from "the discovery by the complainant of the fact upon which the claim of unprofessional conduct is based." Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Rule XV (1981) (emphasis added).

¶23 The OPC claims that the removal of references to "the aggrieved party" and "the complainant" was intended to broaden the possible cases that could be brought to the OPC for investigation and prosecution. But adopting the OPC’s interpretation would effectively eliminate the statute of limitations for attorney discipline cases—a result inherently inconsistent with the title of rule 14-529 ("Statute of limitations") and the inclusion of a discovery provision in the text itself.

¶24 Further, it is unclear to us how removal of the actor in the rule...