Ogle v. Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev.
| Decision Date | 20 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-cv-0556-TWP-MJD |
| Parties | RONALD E. OGLE, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Indiana Department of Workforce Development's ("IDWD") Motion to Dismiss, and the parties' various oppositions and replies thereto. The Plaintiff, Ronald E. Ogle ("Mr. Ogle"), filed suit alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For the reasons set forth below, IDWD's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 11) is GRANTED.
On or about June 2006, Mr. Ogle was hired as a "merit" employee by IDWD in Columbus, Indiana, occupying the position of Community Employment Specialist 3 within the Disabled Veteran Outreach Program. On November 10, 2010, Mr. Ogle forwarded an email to several individuals, including co-workers, consisting of a picture of a barbecue restaurant named "Little Pigs Genuine Pit." The restaurant's marquee featured in the picture contained the words, "Safest Restaurant on Earth, No Muslims Inside." Also included in the email was Mr. Ogle's comment, "I think this is wonderful," referring to the message contained in the restaurant's marquee and that Mr. Ogle thought the cartoon was funny. (Dkt. 6 ¶¶ 28-29). Several IDWDemployees found the email and Mr. Ogle's comment offensive, and complained to management. That same day, Mr. Ogle was notified about a predeprivational hearing, to be held two days later, where it was ultimately decided that Mr. Ogle would be terminated for forwarding the offensive email. The predeprivation Officer, Joe Skelton, determined that termination was warranted because Mr. Ogle had violated the State of Indiana's Information Resources Use Agreement. Termination became effective on December 12, 2010, after a thirty day unpaid suspension.
Prior to the controversy that gave rise to the claim, Mr. Ogle had no disciplinary incidents and had satisfactory reviews for 2008 and 2009. Following Mr. Ogle's termination, two other IDWD employees forwarded emails with cartoons about various religions, other than Islam, and were accused of violating the State of Indiana's Information Resources Use Agreement. Although both employees involved in the distribution of those emails had previous disciplinary incidents, they only received five-day unpaid suspensions, and were allowed to return to work.
In January 2011, Mr. Ogle began a merit complaint process, contesting his termination. The administrative process lasted until October 17, 2012, at which time the State Employees' Appeals Commission ("SEAC") issued an order rescinding Mr. Ogle's termination and reinstating him to his previous position with back pay. IDWD's subsequent motion to correct errors was denied by SEAC on December 6, 2012, and IDWD's right to appeal expired on January 5, 2013.
On April 3, 2013, Mr. Ogle filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Then, on April 10, 2013, Mr. Ogle filed an EEOC Form 5, Charge of Discrimination, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), who subsequently issued Mr. Ogle a Notice of Right to Sue on June 12, 2013. The Notice of Right toSue allowed Mr. Ogle to file a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, within ninety days from his receipt of notice. On June 13, 2013, Mr. Ogle filed his First Amended Complaint seeking compensatory damages for IDWD's alleged violation of his First Amendment rights and for religious discrimination under Title VII. Since filing the amended complaint, Mr. Ogle has voluntarily withdrawn his First Amendment claim. IDWD now seeks dismissal of Mr. Ogle's claim of religious discrimination under Title VII.
When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court takes all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski v. Cnty. of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). However, the allegations must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" and the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Stated differently, the complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
In its Motion to Dismiss, IDWD argues that Mr. Ogle did not allege any facts suggesting that he was discriminated against based on his own religion; therefore, Mr. Ogle failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Title VII. Furthermore, IDWD argues that, even if Mr. Ogle has a valid claim, he has failed to bring that claim forward within the applicablestatute of limitations, therefore dismissal is proper. Mr. Ogle maintains that IDWD discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, and also contends that a disparate impact, created by IDWD's employment policy, is sufficient to establish a claim under Title VII. With respect to IDWD's statute of limitations argument, Mr. Ogle concedes that he filed his EEOC Charge of Discrimination outside of the time allotted by the statute of limitations, but asks the Court to equitably toll the filing time, beginning when he exhausted his administrative relief process. The Court is not persuaded because Mr. Ogle has not alleged any facts upon which relief may be granted under Title VII. Furthermore, the Court finds that equitable tolling of the filing time is not available for Mr. Ogle. Thus, IDWD's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
IDWD seeks to dismiss Mr. Ogle's claim, brought pursuant to Title VII, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mr. Ogle contends that IDWD violated Title VII when IDWD terminated him for forwarding an email to several other employees that contained offensive remarks about Islam. Mr. Ogle maintains that the email was an expression of an aspect of his religious beliefs. As such, dismissal of the claim, according to Mr. Ogle, would be improper.
Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The Court agrees with the IDWD's contention that Mr. Ogle has not alleged any facts to suggest that he was discriminated against on the basis of his religion or religious beliefs. Mr. Ogle was terminated for allegedly violating the Information ResourcesUse Agreement. After an administrative hearing, the SEAC found that the Mr. Ogle's action did not warrant termination and ordered him reinstated to his prior position. While Mr. Ogle's initial termination may have been erroneous, it does not follow that he was terminated on the basis of his religious beliefs.
The email that Mr. Ogle sent, despite referencing a religion, did not make any claim to Mr. Ogle's religion or his beliefs. In fact, the record shows that Mr. Ogle has not specified that he is a member of any particular religion at all. The court in Reed v. Great Lakes Companies, Inc., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) noted that, "[i]t is difficult to see how an employer can be charged with discrimination on the basis of an employee's religion when [the employer] doesn't know the employee's religion." Here, not only was the email sent by Mr. Ogle not an expression of his religious belief, but the record is absent of any facts indicating that the employers were aware of what religion, or lack of religion, Mr. Ogle identified with. Rather, Mr. Ogle's email was simply a poorly calculated joke that some people found offensive, and although it may not have warranted termination, it also does not warrant protection under Title VII. Mr. Ogle has not presented, and the Court is not able to find, any Title VII precedent in this Circuit that protects an employee who makes derogatory comments about another religion.
Furthermore, Mr. Ogle's comment in the email, "I think this is wonderful," and his subsequent statement affirming that he thought the cartoon was funny, further bolsters IDWD's claim that Mr. Ogle's email did not contain an expression of his religious beliefs. The restaurant's marquee was undoubtedly an attempt to suggest that Muslims are dangerous people. The cartoon proposes that Muslims would not be found inside a restaurant that frequently serves pork dishes because people who are Muslim refrain from eating pork. Thus, the restaurant, according to the cartoon, would consequently be safer. Certainly, such a proposition would beoffensive to both a Muslim and a non-Muslim person, regardless of whether or not Mr. Ogle thought it was "wonderful." Mr. Ogle cannot first state that he sent the email because of its perceived comedic value, and then claim that that it was actually an expression of his religious beliefs. This Court finds that the email Mr. Ogle sent is not protected by Title VII because it was not an expression of his religious beliefs.
Next, Mr. Ogle claims...
To continue reading
Request your trial