Ohemeng v. Delaware State College

Citation643 F. Supp. 1575
Decision Date02 October 1986
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 85-748-JRR.
PartiesEmmanuel K. OHEMENG, Plaintiff, v. DELAWARE STATE COLLEGE, William C. Dix, Richard Barros, Lee Kallos, Cora Selby, Helen Kirch, James H. Williams, William Davis, James C. Hardcastle, Arthur Richardson Luna Mishoe, Willard Speakman, III, Individually and as Trustees, Delaware State College; James E. Lyons, Individually and as former Vice President and Academic Dean, Delaware State College; Harriet R. Williams, Individually and as former Interim Vice President and Academic Dean, Delaware State College; and Raymond J. Grandfield, Individually and as Chair of the Department of Economics and Business Administration, Delaware State College, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Delaware)

Leonard L. Williams, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Nicholas H. Rodriguez, of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

ROTH, District Judge.

Plaintiff Emmanuel K. Ohemeng has brought an employment discrimination action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, against Delaware State College and several individual members of the Board of Trustees and present or former deans and presidents of the college. Before the Court are defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Because the record in this matter contains material outside of the pleadings, the Court will view defendants' motion as one for summary judgment.

Defendants contend that recovery under either of the statutes relied on by the plaintiff is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Moreover, as to plaintiff's § 1981 claim, defendants also contend that Ohemeng has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We find that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning each of plaintiff's claims, and, consequently, we deny defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTS.

Plaintiff Ohemeng is a black naturalized American citizen. He came to the United States from Ghana in 1959. Ohemeng has several degrees: a Bachelor of Arts, a Masters in Business Administration and a Juris Doctor. Prior to his retention as an assistant professor of business administration at Delaware State College, Ohemeng had taught for ten years at four post-secondary institutions. Plaintiff received a teaching appointment at Delaware State College on August 28, 1980, which was renewed for the 1981-1982 and 1982-1983 school years.

In addition to naming Delaware State College as a defendant in this action, plaintiff Ohemeng also seeks redress from eleven members of the college's Board of Trustees, both in their individual and representative capacities, and from James E. Lyons, individually and as the college's former Vice President and Academic Dean; Harriet R. Williams, individually and as the college's former Interim Vice President and Academic Dean; and Raymond J. Grandfield, individually and as the Chair of the college's Department of Economics and Business Administration. Defendants Lyons, Williams and Grandfield are all native-born American citizens.

During the period from 1981 to 1983, Ohemeng was evaluated by the Economics and Business Administration Department chairman on three occasions. The first two evaluations were conducted on January 25, 1981, and April 25, 1983, by Chair John Robert Price who rated plaintiff as excellent in almost every category of performance. Price noted, however, that plaintiff needed to acquire an additional degree before he could be promoted from an assistant professor and that plaintiff needed more years of teaching experience before he could be considered for tenure. Price also commented that the plaintiff had experienced a few disputes with students concerning grades that required the department chairman's attention.

On April 28, 1983, Ohemeng signed a letter from Delaware State College appointing him an assistant professor of economics and business administration for the 1983-1984 school year. Ohemeng claims that at the time he did not notice the letter's asterisked provision that stipulated the contract was terminal after one year. Ohemeng avers that when he did become aware of the termination provision in September, 1983, he approached department Chair Price who assured him he would not be terminated from the teaching position. Chair Price died a month later and was replaced by Raymond J. Grandfield.

The third evaluation was conducted by the department's new Chair Grandfield on October 31, 1983, several months after plaintiff had entered into the one-year terminal contract. Chair Grandfield gave plaintiff high marks in all categories of performance but noted that because plaintiff was hired pursuant to a terminal contract, Grandfield was not in a position to recommend that plaintiff be promoted, tenured or reappointed as an assistant professor.

The Economics and Business Administration Department held faculty meetings on February 14, 1984, and March 6, 1984, to discuss, respectively, the Fall 1984 and Spring 1985 schedule of courses. Plaintiff was assigned to teach four undergraduate courses for each of those semesters. Plaintiff argues that the specific teaching assignments for the 1984-1985 school year nullified and revoked the one-year terminal provision of his contract for the 1983-1984 school year.

Subsequent to these faculty meetings, plaintiff was informed on March 16, 1984, pursuant to a letter from Harriet Williams, Interim Vice President and Dean of Academic Affairs, that the Board of Trustees for Delaware State College had on March 8, 1984, determined that Ohemeng would not be reappointed for the 1984-1985 academic year. During the course of grievance procedures that Ohemeng brought under a collective bargaining agreement, the college explained that it had dismissed Ohemeng because he did not have a doctoral degree and, thus, did not meet the long term needs of the college.

Three months later, in the June 20, 1984 issue of Chronicle of Higher Education, Delaware State College placed advertisements seeking two assistant professors, one who held a JD and MBA or LLM and another who held an MBA, CPA and, preferably, a doctoral degree. Ohemeng held both a JD and MBA at the time of his termination from Delaware State College. These are the exact qualifications sought by the defendant in one of the advertised positions and are not unsimilar to the qualifications sought in the second. The College contends it sought two applicants with doctoral degrees in order to initiate an MBA program, but neither person hired to fill those positions had a doctoral degree. In fact, the first person hired had an LLM but no MBA while the second person had a CPA and MS, not an MBA. In short, neither the advertisement nor the persons hired to fill the new positions would appear to support defendants contention that Ohemeng was dismissed because he did not have a doctoral degree.

Plaintiff charges that the open positions described in the two advertisements triggered the realization that he had been terminated for discriminatory reasons. Ohemeng avers that during his three years at Delaware State College he had been derisively referred to as "the African teacher" by defendants Lyons and Grandfield, he had been denied an office telephone and he had not been designated to attend professional meetings or conferences. Ohemeng also alleges that Delaware State College, under similar circumstances, terminated other assistant professors who were non-native Americans and/or non-white citizens. Plaintiff seeks as relief to be reinstated in the position he would have held in the absence of alleged discriminatory conduct, compensation for back pay, benefits and interest, compensation for mental anguish, punitive damages, and costs and attorney's fees.

Defendants deny the allegations of discriminatory conduct and contend that plaintiff has no basis either in law or fact to pursue this litigation.

II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and the Court shall view any material offered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In a summary judgment proceeding, the Court shall not decide the issues of material fact, but rather the Court shall only determine whether a dispute as to a material fact exists. Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1018 (3d Cir.1942). The Court shall resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Id.

III. ANALYSIS.

Defendants' basis for moving for summary judgment is twofold. First, defendants argue that each of plaintiff's claims is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, as to plaintiff's § 1981 claim, defendants assert that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A. A Disputed Material Fact Prevents A Summary Judgment Holding That Plaintiff's Claims Are Time-Barred.

In the pleadings, defendants set forth as an undisputed fact the date they deem is the appropriate accrual date for plaintiff's causes of action. Defendants contend that their calculation of the periods of limitation to be applied to the accrual date is also an undisputed fact. The Court rejects defendants' appraisal of the undisputed nature of the material facts and of the law to be applied in this matter.

1. Plaintiff's Title VII Claim.

Defendants' argument that the statute of limitations bars pl...

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