Ohio Casualty Co. of Hamilton, Ohio v. Swan
Decision Date | 30 April 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 10680.,10680. |
Citation | 89 F.2d 719 |
Parties | OHIO CASUALTY CO. OF HAMILTON, OHIO, v. SWAN. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Albert L. Ramacciotti, of Omaha, Neb. (Charles S. Reed and Richard E. Robinson, both of Omaha, Neb., on the brief), for appellant.
Harvey Johnsen, of Omaha, Neb. (Dan Gross and Bryce Crawford, Jr., both of Omaha, Neb., on the brief), for appellee.
Before STONE, SANBORN, and VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judges.
July 19, 1931, Blanche Swan, appellee, and plaintiff below, was injured in an automobile accident on Lincoln Highway, about 4½ miles east of Dorchester, Neb. The automobile was owned by Lloyd V. Smith, and, at the time of the accident, was driven by Mrs. Gladys Stapp, who was appellee's daughter, and apparently the fiance of Smith. In the car also were William Swan, husband of appellee, and LeRoy Hoehn, eleven year old son of Mrs. Stapp. The occupants of the car were starting on a vacation trip to Estes Park, Colo., where they planned to take a cottage and do some fishing, etc. The car for some cause left the highway at the point above indicated, overturned, and finally landed in the ditch. The only person sustaining substantial injury was the appellee. Mrs. Swan brought suit for damages against Smith in the district court of Douglas county, Neb., and recovered judgment in the sum of $7,500, afterwards reduced by remittitur to $6,000. At the time of the accident the Smith automobile was covered by a liability policy under which appellant herein carried the risk, which was limited to $5,000 for bodily injury to any one person for any one accident. After judgment as aforesaid in the state court, appellee caused a writ of execution to be issued against Smith upon which a nulla bona return was made. Thereupon, July 14, 1934, appellee, alleging her inability to collect from Smith because of his insolvency, brought suit against appellant in the district court of Douglas county, Neb., for the full amount of her judgment with interest and costs. The case was removed to the federal District Court for the District of Nebraska at Omaha, and therein, December 21, 1935, appellee recovered judgment in the sum of $5,685. This appeal followed.
In order that the issues presented may be better understood, a recital of the acts of the parties during a substantial period succeeding the accident are deemed necessary. July 23, 1931, Smith made a signed statement to D. F. Lynch, a representative of appellant, in which he said that the parties were making the trip as aforesaid with an arrangement to share the expenses; that he was driving the car at a rate of about 30 to 35 miles per hour. The center of the highway, particularly, was covered with gravel about 6 inches deep. That a Chevrolet coupe, apparently to avoid the gravel in the center of the highway, came toward him somewhat on Smith's side of the road. That to avoid a threatened collision, "I turned a little to the right, and the car then simply went off the shoulder into the ditch, overturning twice."
August 4, 1931, William Swan, husband of appellee, made a statement to Lynch containing the following:
To this statement Gladys Stapp appended the following:
"I have read the report of my father, and believe it correct from my own knowledge of the accident."
October 15, 1931, Blanche Swan also made a statement:
November 4, 1931, Blanche Swan filed her first petition against Smith in the district court of Douglas county, Neb., in which she stated that Smith was the driver of the car and that "he, the said defendant, negligently and carelessly and while going at a high, reckless and terrific rate of speed, and at a rate of speed of at least forty to fifty miles, caused his car to swerve and drive directly into the ditch at the right hand or north side of the roadway causing the car to turn turtle twice, and causing the plaintiff to be severely injured as hereinafter stated, and that he was grossly negligent in so driving and operating said vehicle."
December 19, 1931, Mrs. Swan filed her first amended petition in which the same recital respecting the negligence of Smith was contained. Further investigation by representatives of appellant disclosed the falsity of the statements theretofore made in certain material respects, and, on April 29, 1932, Smith was confronted by this disclosure, and finally confessed that Mrs. Stapp was driving at the time of the accident at a speed not exceeding 30 or 35 miles per hour, and that she had been forced off the highway by a car approaching them at an excessive rate of speed. This confession was finally made in a sworn statement in which, among other things, Smith said:
"Both Mr. and Mrs. Swan had ridden with Mrs. Stapp on many occasions prior to this time and made no objections whatever to her operating the car on this trip, nor to the manner in which she drove."
This disclosure made necessary the filing of a second amended petition in the state court in which it was alleged that the automobile was being driven at the time of the accident by Mrs. Stapp, "acting as defendant's agent, and driving said automobile at his special instance and request." Then followed the same charges of negligence in driving on the part of Mrs. Stapp, as had been attributed to Smith in the two previous petitions. It was upon the issues framed upon this petition and the answer thereto that the judgment sued on was recovered in the state court. Immediately after learning of the false statement made by Smith, he was advised that the insurance company considered the policy voided by his breach of its condition respecting co-operation, and that the company would defend the suit in the state court only under that reservation. To this Smith agreed and the action was defended by counsel for appellant.
The policy in question contains the following pertinent provisions:
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