Ohio Farmers Indemnity Co. v. Charleston Laundry Co.
| Decision Date | 24 July 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 6105.,6105. |
| Citation | 183 F.2d 682 |
| Parties | OHIO FARMERS INDEMNITY CO. v. CHARLESTON LAUNDRY CO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Robert W. Lawson, Jr., and Charles W. Yeager, Charleston, W. Va. (Steptoe & Johnson, Charleston, W. Va., on brief), for appellant.
Jackson D. Altizer, Charleston, W. Va. (Samuel D. Lopinsky, Charleston, W. Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER, Circuit Judge, and WYCHE, District Judge.
The question in this case is whether Ohio Farmers Indemnity Company is relieved from liability under an automobile policy with respect to an accident in which an automobile truck of the Charleston Laundry Company, the insured, was involved, because of a misstatement contained in a report of the accident by the insured to the Indemnity Company.
The policy indemnified the Laundry Company against loss resulting from legal liability arising from the operation of a number of laundry trucks; and the contract provided that no action should lie against the Indemnity Company unless the insured had fully complied with the conditions of the policy which included a notice clause and a cooperation clause in the following words:
On November 24, 1948, one of the laundry trucks covered by the policy was involved in an accident with a car of one Meade Davis, and as the result, Davis suffered substantial injuries. He brought suit in a state court of West Virginia against the Laundry Company which was settled by the payment of $5,000. The Insurance Company approved the settlement but reserved the right to contest liability under the policy. The instant suit was brought by the Laundry Company on the policy to recover this sum and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. The Insurance Company defended on the ground that the Laundry Company did not comply with the notice and cooperation clauses above set out in that the insured's report of the accident contained a materially false statement as to the driver of the insured truck.
When the accident occurred, the truck was in charge of William E. Slaughter, a route man for the Laundry Company, but it was driven at the time by Delbert C. Johnson, also a route man who had a day off but accompanied Slaughter at the latter's request. Johnson had no express authority to drive the truck or assist Slaughter on this occasion, and the supervisory officers of the Laundry Company had no knowledge that he was doing so. There was a conflict of evidence as to whether it was permissible under the rules of the company for one route man to accompany and assist another in servicing his route and driving the truck. Accordingly the Insurance Company made the additional defense that it was not liable for the loss caused by the accident because at the time of the occurrence the truck was not being driven by the authorized agent of the insured with its permission; but there was evidence tending to show that Johnson was driving with the implied permission of the Laundry Company and in accordance with its custom, and hence the question was for the jury, and since it was fairly submitted in the judge's charge, it is not reviewable on this appeal.
The important question, which was raised by the defendant by motions for directed verdict and for judgment n. o. v., is whether the Laundry Company must be denied recovery because its report of the accident to the Insurance Company contained the statement that the truck was being driven at the time by Slaughter, whereas in fact Johnson was at the wheel. The materiality of the misstatement was shown...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wise v. U.S.
...employment. See England v. American Southern Insurance Co., 380 F.2d 137, 140 (4th Cir.1967) (citing Ohio Farmers Indem. Co. v. Charleston Laundry Co., 183 F.2d 682, 684 (4th Cir.1950)); Standard Oil Co. v. Wakefield's Administrator, 102 Va. 824, 835, 47 S.E. 830, 832 (1904). Consequently, ......
-
Ragland v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
...being made against the insurer. It was so held in Charleston Laundry Co. v. Ohio Farmers Indemnity Co., D.C., 89 F.Supp. 649, affirmed 4 Cir., 183 F.2d 682, a case in which the Federal Court applied the West Virginia law. It is in cases where the vital terms 'condition precedent', or 'forfe......
-
Jarrell v. Ford Motor Company
...280 F.2d 508 (7 Cir. 1960); Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Rollason, 246 F.2d 105, 110 (4 Cir. 1957); Ohio Farmers Indemnity Co. v. Charleston Laundry Co., 183 F.2d 682 (4 Cir. 1950); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Midgett, 116 F.2d 562 (4 Cir. 1941); and Smails v. O'Malley, 127 F.2d ......
-
Hazel v. Medical Action Industries, Inc.
...where it had "constructive knowledge." A working definition of "constructive knowledge" is found in Ohio Farmers Indem. Co. v. Charleston Laundry Co., 183 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.1950): The general rule of law respecting notice to or by an officer or agent of a corporation is that the rights of t......
-
CHAPTER § 5.08 Importance of Notice Provisions
...2 Kalis, N.198 supra, § 24.02[E].[212] Charleston Laundry Co. v. Ohio Farmers Indem. Co., 89 F. Supp. 649, 653 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd 183 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1950).[213] Id. at 652-53.[214] Crowley Mar. Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 307 F. Supp.3d 1286, 1289 (M.D. Fla. ......