Ohio Legal Rights Service v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2:04CV384.,2:04CV384.
• Citation: 365 F.Supp.2d 877
• Parties: OHIO LEGAL RIGHTS SERVICE, Plaintiff, v. THE BUCKEYE RANCH, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

365 F.Supp.2d 877

OHIO LEGAL RIGHTS SERVICE, Plaintiff, v. THE BUCKEYE RANCH, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:04CV384.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

April 12, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael Kirkman, Ohio Legal Rights Service — 2, John Richard Harrison, Ohio Legal Rights Service — 2, Ronald Lee Smith, Ohio Legal Rights Service — 2, Columbus, OH, for Ohio Legal Rights Service, Plaintiff.

Douglas Langston Rogers, Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease — 2, Columbus, OH, for The Buckeye Ranch, Incorporated, Richard Reiser, Michelle Delery Stratman, Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GRAHAM, District Judge.

Plaintiff Ohio Legal Rights Service ("OLRS") brings this action under the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act ("PAMII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, and under Ohio law, Ohio Rev.Code § 5123.60(E) to obtain access to records from Defendant the Buckeye Ranch, Inc. Defendant operates a residential treatment facility for children with mental illness. OLRS seeks access to two categories of records: (1) records relating to a 13-year-old child who suffered a wrist injury in February 2004 while residing at the Buckeye Ranch, and (2) logs maintained by the Buckeye Ranch regarding its staff's use of seclusion and restraint techniques on children. OLRS requests relief in the form of a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. Also named as defendants are the Buckeye Ranch's President, Richard E. Reiser, and Quality Improvement Director, Michelle Delery Stratman.

This matter is before the Court on two related motions: the Buckeye Ranch's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and OLRS's motion for summary judgment. OLRS has requested that the Buckeye Ranch's motion to dismiss be treated as a motion for summary judgment. The Court agrees. Attached to the motion to dismiss are two letters not referenced in the complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. A, B. Further, the motion to dismiss refers to events that occurred after this action was filed. Id., p. 10. In briefing OLRS's motion for summary judgment, both parties have had a reasonable opportunity to present their arguments and supporting materials. Thus, the Buckeye Ranch's motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

I. Background

A. The Parties

OLRS was created under Ohio law to "protect and advocate the rights of mentally ill persons." O.R.C. § 5123.60(A). The Governor of Ohio has designated OLRS as a protection and advocacy agency for persons with mental illness, meaning that OLRS may exercise the powers given under PAMII to such state agencies. Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex A. (Executive Order 98-35V); 42 U.S.C. § 10805. OLRS has the authority to pursue legal, administrative and other remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in Ohio. See 42 U.S.C. § 10805; O.R.C. § 5123.60.

The Buckeye Ranch is a not-for-profit corporation located in Franklin County, Ohio. Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D. The Buckeye Ranch is licensed by the Ohio Department of Mental Health as a mental health organization, and it operates a residential treatment facility in which it provides care and community services for children with mental illness. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, p. 2. The Buckeye Ranch also has a crisis center in which "many" of the youth admitted are "not mentally ill or developmentally delayed." July 22, 2004 Decl. of Richard E. Reiser, ¶ 11. According to Mr. Reiser, "approximately twenty percent of the youth receiving residential or partial hospitalization treatment services from the Buckeye Ranch... are in the custody of their parents," while eighty percent are in the custody of a governmental agency. Id., ¶ 17.

B. Wrist Records

In February 2004, OLRS received an incident report regarding an injury to a 13-year-old child residing at the Buckeye Ranch. See May 27, 2004 Decl. of Patrick Washburn, ¶ 11. The report stated that the child had been diagnosed with a buckle fracture of an unknown cause. Id., ¶ 12. Mr. Washburn, an investigator for OLRS, interviewed staff at the Buckeye Ranch about the incident. Id., ¶ 13. He found that the child had complained of pain in her wrist in early February 2004 and was seen by a medical doctor, who diagnosed her with a strain. Id., ¶ 14. On February 10, 2004, restraints were used on the child three times in one day. Id. The child again complained of wrist pain, and an x-ray was taken on February 13. Id. The x-ray revealed a buckle fracture. Id. Mr. Washburn concluded that, based on the incident report and his interviews with staff, there was probable cause to believe that the child had been abused or neglected and that she might be abused or neglected in the future. Id., ¶ 16.

Mr. Washburn spoke with Michelle Delery Stratman on March 26, 2004 and requested access to the child's records. Id., ¶ 17. On March 30, Ms. Stratman phoned Mr. Washburn and told him that he could not review the records without the consent of the child's legal guardian. Id., ¶ 18. Ms. Stratman informed Mr. Washburn that the child's legal guardian was Franklin County Children Services. Id., ¶ 19.

On June 15, 2004, after this action was filed, the Buckeye Ranch informed OLRS that it had contacted Franklin County Children Services and obtained permission to disclose the child's records to OLRS. Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I. According to Mr. Washburn, certain records relating to the child were indeed disclosed to OLRS, but other documents were not, such as daily progress reports, counseling notes, and documentation of contra-indications for the use of seclusion and restraint.¹ July 1, 2004 Decl. of Patrick Washburn, ¶ 8.

C. Seclusion and Restraint Logs

The Buckeye Ranch maintains documentation of its staff's use of physical restraint and seclusion techniques on its residents. Reiser Decl., ¶ 9; see Ohio Admin. Code § 5122-26-16(D)(10) (requiring agencies that care for mentally-ill individuals to maintain such logs).

Based on incident reports received by OLRS and investigations it conducted, OLRS became concerned about "the number of incidents of alleged abuse and neglect occurring during seclusion and restraint as well as the nature of injuries during such episodes." June 2004 Decl. of Carolyn S. Knight, ¶¶ 7-10. OLRS staff met with Mr. Reiser in July 2003 to discuss its concerns. Id., ¶ 14.

On December 16, 2003, OLRS sent a letter to the Buckeye Ranch requesting monthly copies of the Buckeye Ranch's seclusion and restraint logs. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A. The letter stated that OLRS was making the same request to children's treatment facilities around the state in an effort to develop a statewide database of seclusion and restraint usage. OLRS sent another letter on February 18, 2004 repeating its request to the Buckeye Ranch. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B.

On March 9, 2004, the Buckeye Ranch responded with a letter stating that it is required to send its logs to the Ohio Department of Mental Health. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C. The letter suggested that if OLRS wanted the logs, it should obtain them from the Department of Mental Health. "The Buckeye Ranch is not comfortable forwarding Seclusion and Restraint logs to an agency that has not been charged with this responsibility." Id.

In that same month, the Cincinnati Enquirer published a series of newspaper article on widespread abuse and neglect of children in state-funded treatment facilities. Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. F. One of the facilities mentioned was the Buckeye Ranch. OLRS Executive Director Carolyn S. Knight read those articles. Knight Decl., ¶ 17. This prompted Ms. Knight to write the Buckeye Ranch once again to request copies of its seclusion and restraint logs. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D. Though the letter mentioned the newspaper articles, Ms. Knight requested the logs for the purpose of developing a database on seclusion and restraint usage. There is no evidence on the record that the Buckeye Ranch responded to this letter.

On April 23, 2004, counsel for OLRS sent a letter to the Buckeye Ranch again requesting access to the seclusion and restraint logs. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. E. OLRS asserted that it had a right under PAMII and state law to review the logs. On May 4, counsel for the Buckeye Ranch responded by asserting that OLRS had no such right. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. F.

Ms. Knight states that she has concluded that probable cause exists to believe that one or more children at the Buckeye Ranch may have been subjected to abuse or neglect during incidents of seclusion and restraint. Knight Decl., ¶ 26. Ms. Knight reached this conclusion based on the number of incident reports received, OLRS's investigation of the Buckeye Ranch over a 2-year period, the Cincinnati Enquirer articles, and the report of the wrist injury to the 13-year-old child. Id., ¶ 27.

II. Standards of Review

A. Summary Judgment

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993); Osborn v. Ashland County Bd. of Alcohol, Drug Addiction & Mental Health Servs., 979 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir.1992) (per curium). The party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact in the case at issue, LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 378, which may be accomplished by pointing out to the court that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir.1993). In response, the nonmoving party must present "significant probative evidence" to demonstrate that ...