Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Hecht

• Decision Date: 16 June 1888
• Citation: 17 N.E. 297,115 Ind. 443
• Parties: Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Hecht.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

115 Ind. 443

17 N.E. 297

Ohio & M. Ry. Co.

v.Hecht.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 16, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; W. T. Friedley, Judge.

Action by Abraham Hecht against the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries. Judgment was entered for plaintiff, assessing his damages at $2,500, from which defendant appeals. One ground of appeal is that evidence was admitted, against defendant's objection, that plaintiff, at the time of the trial, was afflicted with Bright's disease, cause by the injuries complained of.H. D. McMullen and John McGregor, for appellant. Korbly & Ford, for appellee.

Elliott, J.

The appellee bought a ticket, entitling him to passage on the trains of the appellant, and while at the appellant's station at North Vernon, for the purpose of entering one of its trains, as he was entitled to do under the ticket he had purchased, he was injured, without any fault on his part, by stepping into a hole in the platform, which the appellant, in disregard of its duty, had negligently permitted to remain unprotected. The complaint thus describes the injury sustained by the appellee, and states the damages occasioned by the wrong of the carrier: “The plaintiff was violently thrown down, and upon his valise, which he was carrying in his hand, and his foot and ankle were sprained, strained, and otherwise greatly injured and bruised, and the ligaments and tendons of plaintiff's foot were strained and drawn and permanently injured, so that the plaintiff suffered great pain and anguish, and became sick, sore, and lame, and was confined to his bed and room from thence hitherto, and was wholly incapacitated from attending to his usual vocation, and he laid out and expended a large sum of money, to-wit, $ ------, for doctor's fees and medicines and nursing, in attempting to be cured of said hurt, and received a permanent injury, which will lame him for life, and always impede his successful prosecution of his business; whereby he has sustained damages in the sum of five thousand dollars.” The complaint makes a case entitling the appellee to full compensation for the injury which proximately resulted from the appellant's wrong. Where a disease caused by the injury supervenes, as well as where the disease exists at the time of the injury, and is aggravated by it, the plaintiff is entitled to full compensatory damages. The decisions upon this point are numerous and harmonious. Railroad Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 542, and cases cited, 567, 14 N. E. Rep. 572; Railroad Co. v. Jones, 108 Ind. 551, 9 N. E. Rep. 476; Railroad Co. v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, and cases cited, 188, 6 N. E. Rep. 310, and 10 N. E. Rep. 70; Railway Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409, 3 N. E. Rep. 389, and 4 N. E. Rep. 908; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346;Railroad Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568;Keyser v. Railway Co., 33 N. W. Rep. 867;Quackenbush v. Railway Co., 35 N. W. Rep. 523. The complaint is sufficiently comprehensive to entitle the plaintiff to give evidence of the nature and consequences of his injury. In Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264, it was said by the court: “Upon the trial, plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that he had a disease of the spine, of a permanent nature, as the result of his injuries. This evidence was objected to by the counsel for the city, on the ground that the plaintiff had not alleged such a result from the injury in his complaint. We think the complaint is sufficient. It alleges that he suffered great bodily injury; that he became, and still continues to be, sick, sore, and disabled; that he was obliged to spend large sums in attempting to cure himself, and was prevented for a long time from attending to his business, and that he was otherwise injured, to his damage $25,000. These allegations are sufficient to authorize proof of any bodily injury resulting from the accident; and, if the defendant desired that they should be more definite, it could have moved to have them made more specific, or for a bill of particulars.” Chief Justice Campbell said in Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 472: “Where the defendant was informed that damages were sought for sickness and disorder, and their attendant expenses, as well as for wounds and bruises, he was bound to expect evidence of any sickness, the origin or aggravation of which could be traced to the act complained of.” In the case of Delie v. Railway Co., 51 Wis. 400, 8 N. W. Rep. 265, the question before us was carefully examined and well discussed; the court saying, among other things, “that it is not claimed on the part of the appellant that the complaint does not state a cause of action. If the allegations of the injury are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover anything more than nominal damages, then it seems to us very clear that he is entitled to recover such damages as he actually sustained by reason of all injuries to his person resulting from the accident, and that, in order to enable the jury to estimate his damages, he must be permitted to show what those injuries in fact were. We think that in cases of this kind, if the defendant does not desire to have the plaintiff make his allegations, as to the nature of his injuries, more definite and certain, and does not ask to have it done by a proper motion for that purpose, he must come prepared to meet any proof which the plaintiff may offer, which shows, or tends to show, the real nature of the injuries which were the direct result of the accident. This, we think, was the rule held, even under the old practice, by this court in Bichard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 74-92. In that case the court held that, under allegations as general as in this case, the plaintiff might show, as one of the results of the battery, that his shoulder-blade was broken. The present chief justice, in his opinion, says: ‘It was contended on the argument that the fracture of the shoulder-blade should have been specially and circumstantially set forth, in order to apprise the defendant of the facts to be proved, and that it was a surprise upon him to admit proof of it under the general language of wounding, beating, bruising, etc.; and, although we think such a special statement of the injury might have been very proper, yet we cannot say it was essentially necessary. As already stated, we can but view that injury as the natural and necessary result or consequence of the battery. That wrongful act was the efficient producing cause of the fracture and loss of health, and we think it is sufficient to allege it in this general manner.’ See, also, Schmidt v. Pfeil, 24 Wis. 452-455. If, under the old rules of pleading, under general allegations of wounding, bruising, and beating, the plaintiff could be permitted to show all of the injuries to the person which resulted from the battery, there is much greater reason for allowing such evidence under the code practice, which gives the defendant the clear right to have the general allegations made more specific and...