Ohio Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act, 2016–0313.
| Decision Date | 18 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2016–0313.,2016–0313. |
| Citation | 59 N.E.3d 1274,147 Ohio St.3d 42 |
| Parties | OHIO MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION et al. v. OHIOANS FOR DRUG PRICE RELIEF ACT et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, Anne Marie Sferra, Nelson M. Reid, and James P. Schuck, for relators.
McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, and Derek S. Clinger, for respondents William S. Booth, Daniel L. Darland, Tracy L. Jones, and Latonya D. Thurman.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Steven T. Voigt, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Brodi J. Conover, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted.
{¶ 1} This is an original action pursuant to Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution, challenging the petition signatures submitted in support of the proposed “Ohio Drug Price Relief Act.” The relators are the Ohio Manufacturers' Association, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Keith A. Lake, and Ryan R. Augsburger (collectively, “OMA”).
{¶ 2} Respondents, William S. Booth, Daniel L. Darland, Tracy L. Jones, and Latonya D. Thurman (collectively, “Booth”), who comprise the committee responsible for the Ohio Drug Price Relief Act petition, have filed a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that a challenge to the specific part-petitions at issue does not fall within the scope of our original jurisdiction conferred by Section 1g. Alternatively, Booth asks for judgment on the pleadings as to two of the four claims in the challenge.
{¶ 3} Respondent Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State, has filed a motion for leave to file a response to Booth's motion, along with a proposed memorandum. We grant the motion for leave and hereby deem Husted's memorandum filed instanter.
{¶ 4} Upon consideration of the motion for judgment on the pleadings and the filings of the parties, we reject Booth's jurisdictional arguments, and therefore we will not dismiss the challenge in its entirety. We also deny the motion's alternative arguments for partial judgment on the pleadings.
{¶ 5} Article II, Section 1b of the Ohio Constitution describes a two-step initiative-petition process, by which citizens may propose the passage of a statute. The process begins with the circulation of a petition asking the General Assembly to enact the proposed statute. Section 1b mandates that the petition be submitted to the secretary of state and verified not less than ten days before the commencement of a legislative session. Section 1b further provides that once the sufficiency of the signatures has been confirmed, the secretary of state must submit the petition to the General Assembly as soon as it convenes.
{¶ 6} The General Assembly then has four months in which to consider the proposal. Id. If the General Assembly rejects the proposed statute, enacts the proposed law in amended form, or allows the four months to elapse without taking any action, then the backers have 90 days to submit a supplementary petition. Id. If the supplementary petition is timely and contains a sufficient number of valid signatures, then the proposed law shall be placed on the ballot at the next regular or general election occurring more than 125 days after the supplementary petition is filed. Id.
{¶ 7} This case arises out of an effort to enact The “Ohio Drug Price Relief Act” as R.C. 194.01. Booth submitted part-petitions to the office of the secretary of state on December 22, 2015. On February 4, 2016, Husted certified that the petition met the constitutional thresholds for transmission to the General Assembly, in terms of both the absolute number of signatures and the geographic distribution of signatures.1
{¶ 8} On February 29, 2016, OMA commenced the present action. The challenge alleged four defects in the part-petitions that OMA claims should cause them to be discounted in their entirety:
OMA requested an “order and/or judgment declaring” the part-petitions and signatures thereon invalid and an “order and/or judgment” that the petition failed to meet the requirements of Section 1b.
{¶ 9} Booth filed an answer on March 9, 2016, and on March 30, 2016, a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all claims based on lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, judgment on the pleadings as to the signature-deletion and circulator-statement claims. OMA filed a memorandum in opposition on April 6, 2016. On April 11, 2016, Husted filed his motion for leave to respond. Husted's proffered memorandum opposes Booth's arguments for partial judgment on the pleadings but does not discuss the jurisdictional question.
{¶ 10} The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure apply to actions brought pursuant to Section 1g, except insofar as they conflict with this court's rules of practice. S.Ct.Prac.R. 14.01(C)(2). When considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must construe the material allegations in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true.
Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶ 18. Judgment is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts entitling it to relief. Id.
{¶ 11} OMA's challenge cites Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution as the source of this court's jurisdiction to hear its petition-signature challenge. Booth argues that there is no cause of action under Section 1g to challenge signatures on a Section 1b petition that asks the General Assembly to adopt a statute.
{¶ 12} Article II, Section 1g provides, “The Ohio supreme court shall have original, exclusive jurisdiction over all challenges made to petitions and signatures upon such petitions under this section.” The language of Section 1g is broad and unequivocal: it confers upon this court original exclusive jurisdiction to hear all petition-signature challenges.
{¶ 13} Booth contends that challenges to petitions under Article II, Section 1b proposing a statute for the General Assembly's adoption do not fall within the scope of Section 1g. According to Booth, the reference in Section 1g to “[a]ny initiative, supplementary, or referendum petition” refers only to Article II, Section 1a initiative petitions proposing constitutional amendments, Section 1b “supplementary” petitions to place proposed statutes on the ballot, and Section 1c referendum petitions to prevent statutes from taking effect. But the constitutional language does not support that interpretation.
{¶ 14} Moreover, a ruling that challenges to Section 1b proposal petitions are outside the scope of Section 1g would lead to absurd results. Section 1g is the constitutional authority for a number of fundamental petition rules and requirements, including the authorization of part-petitions, the requirement of a circulator's statement, the requirement that the petition contain the complete title and text of the proposed law, and the mandates that signers must be electors and must sign in ink. Article II, Section 1g, Ohio Constitution. To say that Section 1g's grant of jurisdiction does not encompass a challenge to a Section 1b proposal petition is to say that none of those requirements apply to such petitions. This cannot have been the intention of the drafters of Section 1g.
{¶ 15} For these reasons, we hold that we have original jurisdiction over this petition challenge pursuant to Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution. We therefore deny the request for judgment on the pleadings premised on Booth's assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction.
{¶ 16} In the alternative, Booth seeks judgment on the pleadings as to two of OMA's claims regarding alleged petition defects. Specifically, Booth argues that as a matter of law, the overcounting of signatures and the crossing out of signatures do not warrant invalidating the entire part-petition and that as to those claims, it is therefore beyond doubt that OMA can prove no set of facts entitling it to the relief it seeks, i.e., invalidation of the part-petitions.
{¶ 17} OMA alleges in its challenge that more than 1,400 part-petitions contain false circulator statements because the circulators claim to have witnessed more signatures than actually appear on the face of the petition. Each part-petition had space for a maximum of 28 signatures. But OMA's challenge alleges that “even though most part-petitions did not have 28 signatures, circulation companies * * * instructed the circulators to write the number ‘28’ in the circulator's statement.” OMA contends that these part-petitions should be invalidated due to the overcounting. Booth, on the other hand, argues that part-petitions may never be rejected on the basis of an overcount, as a matter of law.
{¶ 18} R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) requires petition circulators to indicate the number of signatures on each petition paper and to sign an attestation that they personally witnessed each signature. A part-petition is not “properly verified” if it appears that the circulator's statement is false in any respect. R.C. 3519.06(D) ; State ex rel. Spadafora v. Toledo City Council, 71 Ohio St.3d 546, 549, 644 N.E.2d 393 (1994).2
{¶ 19} The requirement that a circulator state the number of signatures she or h...
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