Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 12 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | 8:20-CV-29 |
| Citation | 500 F.Supp.3d 881 |
| Parties | The OHIO NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Debra L. ANDERSON, and Douglas Anderson, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Barry D. Geweke, Stowell, Kruml Law Firm, Ord, NE, Stephen L. Ahl, Wolfe, Snowden Law Firm, Lincoln, NE, for Defendant Debra L. Anderson.
Allison K. Rockey Mason, Kathleen K. Rockey, Copple, Rockey Law Firm, Norfolk, NE, for Defendant Douglas Anderson.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on their crossclaims against each other. Filing 32; Filing 35. Plaintiff, Ohio National Life Insurance Company ("ONLIC"), initiated this interpleader action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 because Defendants and Cross-Claimants, Debra and Douglas Anderson, both assert they are solely entitled to the full proceeds due from a life insurance policy it provided. Filing 1. Defendants’ competing claims for the death benefit are the basis of the cross-claims now at issue. Filing 11 at 2; Filing 14 at 3. As discussed below, the Court denies Debra Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Douglas Anderson's motion.1
Debra Anderson is the former spouse of Roger Anderson and a citizen of Nebraska. Filing 1 at 1-3; Filing 11 at 1. In 1979, ONLIC issued a life insurance policy on the life of Roger Anderson. Filing 1 at 2. The policy designated "Debbie Anderson, Wife" as the primary beneficiary of the policy and "Douglas Anderson, Brother" as the contingent beneficiary. Filing 1-1 at 18. Roger applied for the policy in Nebraska and was a Nebraska resident. Filing 1-1 at 18. Douglas Anderson is a resident of Arkansas. Filing 1 at 1; Filing 14 at 1.
In 1988, Debra and Roger were divorced in Nebraska. Filing 11 at 6-10. Their property settlement agreement dated August 26, 1988 (Filing 11 at 11-15 ), was incorporated into the their divorce decree. Filing 11 at 9. In relevant parts, the settlement agreement and decree both provided that Roger "shall have as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim by [Debra] ... The Ohio National Life Insurance policies on the life of [Roger] and [Debra]." Filing 11 at 7, 12. Roger died on December 9, 2018, still residing in Nebraska. Filing 1 at 3. No change of beneficiary for Roger's policy was ever received by ONLIC. Filing 1 at 3.
After ONLIC learned of Roger's death and made efforts to contact the policy beneficiary, Debra confirmed she and Roger had divorced but nevertheless submitted a claim for the proceeds due under the policy. Filing 1 at 3. ONLIC advised Debra that although she was designated as the primary beneficiary, her designation appeared to be revoked by operation of a Nebraska statute providing for automatic revocation of a former spouse's beneficiary designation upon divorce. Filing 1 at 3-4 (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2333 ). Through her attorney, Debra corresponded with ONLIC and disputed whether her designation as the primary beneficiary was revoked by law. Filing 1 at 5-6. Fearing competing claims for the policy proceeds, ONLIC filed this interpleader action on January 17, 2020, admitting its liability for policy proceeds in the amount of $67,733.49 plus interest and bringing Debra and Douglas Anderson before the Court to litigate their claims. Filing 1 at 6. Pursuant to this Court's order, ONLIC deposited the policy proceeds and interest, less ONLIC's fees and costs for this action, with the Clerk of Court and is no longer a party to this action. Filing 31.
Debra and Douglas filed the pending cross-claims against each other, each asserting they are the rightful sole beneficiary under Roger's policy. Filing 11; Filing 14. They now move for summary judgment on their respective claims. Filing 32; Filing 35.
Neither party disputes the facts set forth above. See Filing 11; Filing 14. Now before the Court on the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment are the questions of whether Nebraska2 law operates to automatically revoke Debra's designation as the primary beneficiary on Roger's policy, and whether the language of the divorce decree and incorporated settlement agreement operates as a waiver of her claim to the policy proceeds under Nebraska law. See Filing 33; Filing 36. The Court addresses these questions in turn.
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Garrison v. ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC , 833 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). "[S]ummary judgment is not disfavored and is designed for every action." Briscoe v. Cty. of St. Louis , 690 F.3d 1004, 1011 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court will view "the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Whitney v. Guys, Inc. , 826 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Hitt v. Harsco Corp. , 356 F.3d 920, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2004) ). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, " Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves." Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc. , 642 F.3d 608, 618 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) ). The moving party need not produce evidence showing "an absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods. , 779 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 ). Instead, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Lifecare Int'l, Inc. , 250 F.3d 587, 596 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).
In response to the moving party's showing, the nonmoving party's burden is to produce "specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial." Haggenmiller v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc. , 837 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp. , 670 F.3d 844, 853 (8th Cir. 2012) ). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Wagner v. Gallup, Inc. , 788 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Torgerson , 643 F.3d at 1042 ). "[T]here must be more than ‘the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute’ " between the parties in order to overcome summary judgment. Dick v. Dickinson State Univ. , 826 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vacca v. Viacom Broad. of Mo., Inc. , 875 F.2d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1989) ).
The uncertainty that led ONLIC to file this interpleader action stemmed from the question of whether Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2333 applies to this case. Filing 1 at 6. In relevant part, the Statute, which took effect August 24, 2017, provides:
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2333. Thus, if section 30-2333 applies to the present case, it would operate to revoke Debra's designation as the primary beneficiary of the policy. Douglas does not directly state whether the statute is applicable to the present case, though he suggests it may apply. Filing 42 ("[T]he statute and case law revoke the beneficiary designation of Debra."); but see Filing 36 at 4-5 (). Debra contends section 30-2333 does not apply to this case because it should not be given retroactive effect under Nebraska law. Filing 11 at 3-4. The Court agrees.
"In applying state law, [federal courts] are bound to apply the law of the state as articulated by the state's highest court." Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh , 621 F.3d 697, 707 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "When the state's highest court has not spoken, [a federal court's] job is to predict how the state's high court would resolve the issue." Id. (citation omitted). In Nebraska, "[i]n noncriminal cases, statutes are generally not given retroactive effect unless the Legislature has clearly expressed an intention that the new statute is to be applied retroactively." Millennium Sols., Inc. v. Davis , 258 Neb. 293, 297, 603 N.W.2d 406, 409 (1999) (citing Battle Creek St. Bank v. Haake , 255 Neb. 666, 587 N.W.2d 83 (1998) ); see also Smith v. Mark Chrisman Trucking, Inc. , 285 Neb. 826, 832, 829 N.W.2d 717, 722 (2...
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