Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Jones

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: ANDREA M. SIMONTON
• Decision Date: 07 May 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 11-23786-CIV-SIMONTON
• Citation: Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Jones, CASE NO. 11-23786-CIV-SIMONTON (S.D. Fla. May 07, 2013)
• Parties: OHIO NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. LIZZETTE JONES, ANDREA CAROLINE JONES, STEPHEN ALEXANDER JONES, MICHELLE MARIE BROWN, BETSY DIAZ, EDWARD JONES and FORETHOUGHT CAPITAL FUNDING, INC., Defendants.

OHIO NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff,

v. LIZZETTE JONES, ANDREA CAROLINE JONES, STEPHEN ALEXANDER JONES, MICHELLE MARIE BROWN,BETSY DIAZ, EDWARD JONES and FORETHOUGHT CAPITAL FUNDING, INC., Defendants.

CASE NO. 11-23786-CIV-SIMONTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Dated: May 7, 2013

CONSENT CASE

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Presently pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Michelle Brown, Stephen Jones and Andrea Jones (DE # 79). This case has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge based on the consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (DE # 80, 81). Having thoroughly reviewed the record and, for the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Ohio National Life Assurance Corporation initiated this interpleader action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 and 28 U.S.C. sections 1335, 2361, and 1132(a)(3), to determine the distribution of proceeds from a life insurance policy held by the decedent, Robert L. Jones. (DE # 1). Plaintiff named as potential claimants Lizzette Jones, Michelle Brown, Stephen Jones, Andrea Jones, Betsy Diaz, Edward Jones and Forethought Capital Funding, Inc. (Id.). The primary beneficiary under thepolicy when Robert L. Jones died on June 30, 2011, was his wife, Betsy Diaz ("Diaz"), with Edward Jones named a contingent beneficiary. (DE # 1, ¶¶12, 14). Plaintiff alleged that between July 12 and 22, 2011, Diaz and the decedent's children from his marriage to Lizzette Jones, Defendants Michelle Brown, Stephen Jones and Andrea Jones (hereafter referred to as "Defendants"),¹ each filed a claim for the proceeds of the policy. (DE # 1, ¶¶15, 17-19). In addition, Forethought Capital Funding, Inc. ("Forethought"), filed with Plaintiff an assignment from Diaz and claimed a right to $2,293.00 from the policy. (DE # 1, ¶16).

Plaintiff served the potential claimants with summons and the Complaint. Defendants and Diaz filed Answers with affirmative defenses (DE # 19, 20, 21 and 30), Lizzette Jones filed an Answer (DE # 10) and Forethought and Edward Jones failed to respond. Defendants Michelle Brown, Stephen Jones and Andrea Jones each asserted the following affirmative defenses: (1) Illegality of Changes to Policy - Changes Are Void and Unenforceable; (2) Equitable Estoppel and Waiver as Against Ohio National and Defendant, Betsy Diaz (Defendants argue that Plaintiff and Betsy Diaz should be equitably estopped from asserting any rights or defenses against the Defendants based on their improper conduct); and (3) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against Plaintiff. (See, e.g., DE # 21, pp. 3-6).

Diaz asserted the following affirmative defenses: (1) that she was the actual beneficiary of the policy at the time of death, and thus entitled to recover the policy proceeds in accordance with the terms of the policy; (2) that the decedent was the ownerof the policy, the policy was on his life, and he was paying the policy premiums, and thus he had the right to change beneficiaries; (3) that any claim that the decedent breached some duty or obligation must be brought as a claim against the estate of the decedent, and are not valid claims on the policy; (4) that there were no minor children at the time the decedent changed beneficiaries, and thus no longer any legal basis to restrict his right to change beneficiaries; (5) that the claims of the other defendants are limited to the extent of their insurable interest, which cannot exceed the amount of unpaid child support; and (6) that the only parties in interest are residents of the State of Florida, and diversity jurisdiction does not exist. (DE # 30, pp. 2-3).

Defendant Lizzette Jones filed a pro se Answer in which she disclaimed her own interest, requesting that the Court "settle this interpleader in favor of Michelle Marie (Jones) Brown, Andrea Caroline Jones and Stephen Jones." (DE # 10, ¶24.C.),

Defendants Forethought and Edward Jones failed to respond to the interpleader Complaint. The Clerk of Court entered a default against Edward Jones on January 25, 2012 (DE # 42) and against Forethought on January 30, 2012 (DE # 46). On January 30, 2012, the Honorable Cecilia Altonaga ordered Plaintiff to file a motion for default judgment as to Forethought on or before February 10, 2012, but Plaintiff never filed such a motion. (DE # 47).

On February 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Pay Money into the Registry of the Court and for Discharge (DE # 68). That motion sought an order allowing Plaintiff to deposit $206,535.31 into the registry of the Court and discharging the Plaintiff from any further liability in these proceedings and under the policy. (DE # 68, p. 2). The motion further provided that, "counsel for the Defendants has indicated that the Defendants will not oppose the motion." (Id. at ¶4). At the time, Defendant Diaz was prose and though Plaintiff served her with a copy, Plaintiff made no reference to her position on the motion.

On February 28, 2012, the Court entered an Order granting Plaintiff's motion. (DE # 69). After concluding that there were adverse claimants to a single fund and that Plaintiff was an uninterested stakeholder in the proceeds of the Policy, the Court determined that

[T]he first two jurisdictional requirements of the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1335, have been satisfied: the amount of the policy proceeds is $200,000.00, and there exists diversity of citizenship by at least two adverse claimants. (See Compl. 1-2 (Defendant, Forethought Capital Funding, Inc., is a foreign corporation with a principal place of business in Indiana; all other Defendants are residents of Florida)).

(DE # 69, p. 3). The Court further ordered Plaintiff to deposit the proceeds of the policy in the registry of the court. Upon deposit of the funds, the court ordered that Plaintiff would be "discharged from any further liability under the policy and in this proceeding." (Id. at p. 4). Plaintiff deposited $207,003.38 with the court on March 6, 2012 (DE # 70).

A. Pending Motion for Summary Judgment

On June 22, 2012, Defendants Michelle Brown, Stephen Jones and Andrea Jones filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion asserts that the affirmative defenses raised by Diaz are insufficient or not valid and seeks an award of summary judgment in their favor against Diaz on those claims. (See, e.g., DE # 79, p. 13). While Diaz posits that Defendants do not directly address or seek relief on their own affirmative defenses (DE # 85, ¶14), the Court finds that Defendants have explicitly and implicitly sought relief on their own affirmative defenses. Defendants state in their papers that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor and to receive the $200,000 death benefit from the policy. (See, e.g., DE # 79, p. 8 ("[T]he Court should find that the Marital SettlementAgreement in this case controls the disposition of the proceeds and that summary judgment is appropriate in favor of the Movants and against Betsy Diaz, Edward Jones and Forethought Capital Funding, Inc. The Movants are entitled to the $200,000.00 death benefit from the Policy pursuant to the terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement....")). Moreover, in the course of addressing Diaz's affirmative defenses, Defendants have implicitly sought summary judgment on their first affirmative defense - that Robert Jones's attempt to name Diaz as the beneficiary was void and unenforceable.² (DE # 19, p. 3). Thus, the Court considers Defendants' motion as one seeking summary judgment against the other interpleader Defendants and in their favor on their affirmative Defenses.

B. Interpleader Procedure

The parties have each filed an "Answer" and have set forth various "Affirmative Defenses." In an action for interpleader, however, a court may consider an answer filed by a defendant as that defendant's statement of claim to the interpleaded funds. Central Bank of Tampa v. U. S., 838 F.Supp. 564, 566 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Here, the parties' affirmative defenses are not true affirmative defenses, but reasons why they are entitled to the funds and/or why another interpleader defendant is not entitled to the funds. Bluewater Trading, LLC v. Willimar USA, Inc., No. 07-v-61284, 2008 WL 4179861, *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2008)(a true affirmative defense is "one that admits to the complaint, but avoids liability, wholly, or partly, by new allegations of excuse, justification or other negating matters."). Because the Court views both parties' "Answers" and "AffirmativeDefenses" as their statements of claim to the interpleaded funds, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, though directed at Diaz's Affirmative Defenses, is more aptly described as a request for summary judgment on their claim for the interpleaded funds. The Court will, however, address the parties arguments the same as the parties, i.e., by each affirmative defense.

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes entry of summary judgment where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001). The movant has satisfied its burden of proof if, "after adequate time for discovery," the non-movant has failed "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every...