Ohio National Life Assurance Corporation v. Langkau, No. 08-15142. Non-Argument Calendar (11th Cir. 11/17/2009)
| Decision Date | 17 November 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-15142. Non-Argument Calendar.,08-15142. Non-Argument Calendar. |
| Parties | OHIO NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, v. CHRISTOPHER LANGKAU, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ralph L. Langkau, Defendant-Cross Claimant-Appellee, ERIK T. CLAY, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Cross Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, D. C. Docket No. 06-00290-CV-J-33JRK.
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Erik Clay, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's orders finding Christopher Langkau ("Langkau" or "PR of the Estate"), as personal representative of the estate of Ralph Langkau, entitled to the proceeds of decedent Ralph Langkau's life insurance policy and denying Clay's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
This appeal arises out of an action in interpleader. Pursuant to a land transaction, in which Clay purported to transfer property to Ralph Langkau, Ralph Langkau obtained a life insurance policy from Ohio National Life Assurance Corporation ("ONLAC") in the amount of $100,000. On January 26, 2004, Clay executed a "Mortgage Deed" purporting to convey property subject to a mortgage to Ralph Langkau, who, in turn, executed a "Mortgage Note," promising to pay Clay $120,000 for the property. While the Mortgage Deed is ambiguous, the parties agree that Ralph Langkau attempted to buy the subject property from Clay. On the same day, Ralph Langkau executed an amendment to the insurance policy naming himself as the owner, Clay as the primary beneficiary, and the estate of Ralph Langkau as the contingent beneficiary of the policy. Ralph Langkau also collaterally assigned the policy to Clay by executing an "Assignment." There is no dispute that the insurance policy was intended as security for the Mortgage Note.
After the death of Ralph Langkau, Clay and Langkau in his individual capacity, filed with ONLAC death claim forms for death benefits on Ralph Langkau's life. Accordingly, ONLAC filed an interpleader complaint in the district court, in which it sought permission to pay the proceeds of the policy into the court registry and to require the defendants to interplead and settle between themselves their rights to the insurance proceeds. The district court granted interpleader and dismissed ONLAC from the suit. Subsequently, Langkau moved to substitute himself in his capacity as personal representative of Ralph Langkau's estate as the real party in interest. The district court granted the motion.
During the litigation, the district court imposed sanctions against Clay for failure to appear at a first pretrial hearing. After reviewing Clay's response to its order to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed against him, the district court found that Clay's noncompliance was unjustified and ordered Clay, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f)(2), to pay the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees Langkau had incurred in preparing for and attending the pretrial hearing.
During a second pretrial hearing, the district court ascertained the relevant law, and the parties agreed that, under Florida law, a life insurance beneficiary must have an insurable interest in the life of the insured at the time the beneficiary is named. Clay argued that he had an insurable interest in Ralph Langkau's life by virtue of his relationship of natural affection with Ralph Langkau and a pecuniary interest, which arose from the enforceable Mortgage Deed and attached Mortgage Note.
During the bench trial, Clay testified that after Ralph Langkau had failed to make a single payment on the Mortgage Note, the two men "decided to dissolve the mortgage deed and note, to let go of each other's interests, and cancel the mortgage deed and note forever." There is no dispute that, after ONLAC filed the interpleader complaint, Clay reclaimed the property and gifted it to his aunt. Noting that Clay had "disregarded the [M]ortgage [D]eed," reclaimed the land, and gifted it to his aunt, Langkau argued that the estate was entitled to the insurance proceeds or the subject property, as it would be inequitable for Clay to retain both the insurance proceeds and the property.
On August 13, 2008, the district court resolved the merits of the parties' claims to the interpleaded insurance proceeds in favor of the contingent beneficiary, Langkau, as the representative of Ralph Langkau's estate. Adhering to the parties' legal stipulation, the court first concluded that Clay did not have a relationship of natural affection sufficient to give rise to an insurable interest. With respect to Clay's pecuniary interest, the district court rejected Clay's claim of entitlement to the insurance proceeds on the ground that he had no insurable interest in Ralph Langkau's life. The court reasoned that the land transaction was insufficient to give rise to an insurable interest in Ralph Langkau's life because the Mortgage Note was unsupported by consideration, and Clay never transferred title or the land to Ralph Langkau. The court further found that the Mortgage Deed did not contain a promise to transfer the land to Ralph Langkau. A disbursement voucher from the clerk of court in the amount of $119,534.12 was issued to Langkau as PR of the Estate on August 14, 2008.
Clay filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court rejected, noting that both parties had stipulated that a life insurance beneficiary must have an insurable interest in the life of the insured.
On appeal, Clay raises numerous issues, which generally encompass (1) the district court's disbursement of the insurance proceeds; (2) commencement and maintenance of the interpleader action; (3) imposition of sanctions against Clay for failure to appear at the preliminary hearing; (4) merits of the district court's order awarding the insurance proceeds to Langkau, as PR of the Estate; (5) alleged errors committed during the first pretrial hearing and the bench trial by the district court and counsel for Langkau; (6) Clay's entitlement to costs, expenses, and damages; and (7) the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
As an initial matter, we review pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). However, courts will not act as de facto counsel for pro se parties or rewrite a deficient pleading. GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). "[I]ssues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned." Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 74 (2008). A party does not sufficiently raise an issue on appeal when he mentions the issue in his brief without providing specific argument in support of the issue. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (counseled); see also Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (); but see Lorisme v. I.N.S., 129 F.3d 1441, 1444 n.3 (11th Cir. 1997) ().
Further, issues not raised before the district court generally will not be considered. See S.E.C. v. Diversified Corporate Consulting Group, 378 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 46 (). However, "[f]ailing to object does not prejudice a party who had no opportunity to do so when the ruling or order was made." Fed.R.Civ.P. 46.
In this case, because jurisdiction is premised on diversity, the procedural aspects of the case are controlled by federal law, and the substantive aspects of the case are controlled by Florida law. Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying Georgia law).
Clay argues for the first time in his reply brief that the district court abused its discretion in disbursing the insurance proceeds before the time within which to file a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal had expired. Because the question of premature disbursement may render the instant appeal moot, we address it first.
Rule 62 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a ten-day automatic stay on the enforcement of judgments. Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(a). This rule provides an appellant with the opportunity to post a supersedeas bond to obtain a stay pending appeal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d) ().
An appellant's rights to property on deposit in the court registry are not abolished merely because the court has entered judgment and disbursed the property. See Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786, 49 S. Ct. 492, 493, 73 L. Ed. 954 (1929) ().
We conclude from the record that this appeal is not rendered moot by the district court's disbursement of the proceeds because Clay can recover the proceeds if the court determines on remand that he is the proper recipient of the insurance proceeds.
"Interpleader is the means by which an innocent stakeholder, who typically claims no interest in an asset and does not know the asset's rightful owner, avoids multiple liability by asking the court to determine the asset's rightful owner." In re Mandalay Shores Co-op. Hous. Ass'n Inc., 21 F.3d 380, 383 (11th Cir. 1994). Interpleader action proceeds in...
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