Ohio Stands Up! v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
| Decision Date | 28 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:20 CV 2814 |
| Citation | 564 F.Supp.3d 605 |
| Parties | OHIO STANDS UP!, et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Robert J. Gargasz, Law Office of Robert J. Gargasz, Lorain, OH, Thomas B. Renz, Renz Law, Fremont, OH, for Plaintiff.
Angelita Cruz Bridges, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Toledo, OH, for Defendants U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Chief Information Officer for the Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, Director Brian C. Moyer, John and Jane Doe(s), Rochelle Walensky, Secretary Norris Cochran, Office of Management and Budget Director.
Plaintiffs Ohio Stands Up!, Kristen Beckman, and Dr. Douglas Frank filed their Second Amended Complaint in this matter on March 31, 2021, asserting violations of the Paperwork Reduction Act ("PRA"), Information Quality Act ("IQA"), Administrative Procedures Act "APA", and the "[i]mplied [c]onstitutional [d]uty of [h]onesty and [f]air [d]ealing." (Doc. 27). They seek injunctive and declaratory relief. See id. Defendants – the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), its Secretary, Xavier Becerra1 , and its Chief Information Officer; the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") and its Director, Rochelle Walensky; the National Center for Health Statistics ("NCHS") and its Director Brian C. Moyer; Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") Director Shalanda Young (collectively, "Federal Defendants"), and several John/Jane Doe Defendants – filed the currently-pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32), to which Plaintiffs filed an Opposition (Doc. 33), and Defendants replied (Doc. 34). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Ohio Stands Up! is "an Ohio organization of Ohio citizens whose mission is to challenge the state of emergency [in] Ohio ... challenge the various emergency mandates, orders and restrictions issued by Ohio Governor Mike DeWine and his Cabinet that are predicated on the existence of the Emergency ..., uphold constitutional rights, and educate about the realities of COVID-19." (Doc. 1, at ¶ 3). It asserts Ohio's emergency mandates are driven by COVID-19 case and death counts published by Defendants and that its members have suffered economic loss from business closures, as well as infringements of their First Amendment rights and constitutional right to freedom of movement. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff Beckman is a private citizen who asserts her "rights have been repeatedly trampled by the Emergency Mandates". Id. at ¶ 5. Beckman asserts the mandates interfered with her son's ability to play hockey, infringed on her First Amendment rights, and placed a burden on her right to travel. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff Frank is a scientist, teacher, and researcher "who has been working to create and develop a business related to the analysis and understanding of statistical data regarding COVID-19 and other topics of public interest." Id. at ¶ 7. "He asserts Defendants’ actions made launching his business and obtaining customers difficult, and hampered his ability to "perform in his role educating the public." Id. He further contends social media platforms and news outlets "have claimed his work was illegitimate or false." Id.
All Plaintiffs purport to connect their injuries to the Federal Defendants’ actions in reporting COVID-19 case and death numbers and to emergency mandates implemented by Ohio government officials and agencies they assert are "driven and purportedly justified by" those numbers. See id. at ¶¶ 3-7; see also id. at ¶ 40 ("[Plaintiffs] have been injured by the policies implemented in response to this misleading data."); id. at ¶ 44 ( ).
Plaintiffs broadly base their claims on two primary contentions: (1) PCR testing is inaccurate and leads the Federal Defendants to report misleading COVID-19 case numbers; and (2) the CDC's March 24, 2020 Alert, which introduced a new International Classification of Diseases ("ICD") code for COVID-19 deaths, is invalid. They seek a declaratory judgment holding DHHS violated the PRA, IQA, and APA with its March 24, 2020 Alert. (Doc. 27, at 15). They further seek a declaratory judgment that DHHS's reporting of COVID-19 case and death data violates the PRA, IQA, and the duty of honesty and fair dealing. Id. at 16. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief, asking the Court to enjoin DHHS from reporting COVID-19 case numbers based on PCR testing, and enjoin DHHS from reporting COVID-19 deaths based on the March 24, 2020 Alert. Id. at 17. Finally, Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus to compel Defendants to follow the IQA and PRA. Id.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. , 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dismissal where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction by way of a motion to dismiss fall into two categories: facial attacks and factual attacks. United States v. Ritchie , 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). A factual attack challenges the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. "[N]o presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations". Id. (citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States , 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) ). A factual attack requires the court to "weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter [jurisdiction] does or does not exist." Gentek Bldg. Prods. , Inc. , v. Sherwin-Williams Co. , 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 32). Specifically, they contend the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because: (1) Plaintiffs fail to identify a waiver of sovereign immunity; and (2) Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims under the APA, PRA, or IQA. Defendants further allege Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs contend they do have standing, sovereign immunity is inapplicable, and the Amended Complaint states a plausible claim for relief. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiffs lack standing and dismisses the case in its entirety.
Defendants contend Plaintiffs have not demonstrated standing to bring this suit. This is so, they allege, because: (1) Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate standing under the PRA or IQA because those statutes confer no private right of action, and (2) Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate standing under the APA or Article III. The Court agrees.
Standing is a "jurisdictional" matter, and a lack of standing deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Ward v. Alternative Health Delivery Sys., Inc. , 261 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2001). The standing requirement is meant "to ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversar[ial] context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Sierra Club v. Morton , 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The question of standing "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). To satisfy the requirement of Article III, which is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate she has suffered "injury in fact", that injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of the defendant, and the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. , 454 U.S. 464, 471–72, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). "A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating standing and must plead its components with specificity." Coyne v. American Tobacco Co. , 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. , 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. 752 ).
In addition to the immutable requirements of Article III, "the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing." Id. at 474–75, 102 S.Ct. 752. Like their constitutional counterparts, these "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction," are "founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society," Warth , 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197 ; but unlike their constitutional counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by Congress, see 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197.
"Where ... Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain functions according to law, and has provided by statute for...
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