OIL, ETC., WORKERS, LOCAL 8-898 v. TEXACO REFINING
| Decision Date | 06 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 87-130 MMS. |
| Citation | 660 F. Supp. 1350 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
| Parties | OIL, CHEMICAL & ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO LOCAL 8-898, Plaintiff, v. TEXACO REFINING & MARKETING, INC., Defendant. |
Henry Heiman of Heiman and Aber, Wilmington, Del. (Warren J. Borish and James F. Runckel of Spear, Wilderman, Sigmond, Broish, Endy & Silverstein, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel), for plaintiff.
Walter L. Pepperman, II of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Del., for defendant.
Petitioner Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union Local 8-898 ("OCAW") filed for a preliminary injunction directing Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. ("Texaco") to permit employees to take single vacation days pending arbitration of a dispute over permissible vacation time under the collective bargaining agreement. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 1, 1987, as mandated by § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107, followed by briefing which concluded on April 20. The following constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
The parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective January 8, 1986, through January 31, 1988. The sections of the agreement relevant to the dispute are Articles X, XVI and XX. Article XVI, the Grievance Procedure, states, Docket ("Dkt.") 1, Appendix A. (Emphasis added). The procedure entails a four-step process, beginning with a meeting between the grievant and the immediate supervisor and culminating, when necessary, in binding arbitration by a Board of Review. Article XX provides,
Benefit Plans
Id. (Emphasis added). Article X(B) of the collective bargaining agreement states, "Vacations shall be scheduled throughout the year in accordance with operating requirements and Vacation Rules posted throughout the refinery." Id.
In late 1985 OCAW and Texaco began negotiating the terms of the agreement. Texaco originally proposed eliminating all use of vacation days in increments of four days or less, a position the union successfully opposed. The parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement ("Memorandum") on February 10, 1986, that set forth the framework for the collective bargaining agreement. The latter agreement was signed on March 31, 1986. The provisions of the Memorandum and the collective bargaining agreement relating to vacations were separately negotiated, but the parties did not specifically address vacation scheduling at that time.
The relevant sections of the Memorandum on vacations are Articles IV, XXIV, and XXVII:
Dkt. 1, Appendix B. The Memorandum also contains the exclusion from arbitration found in Article XX of the collective bargaining agreement. The parties agreed informally that Texaco would not enforce Articles IV and XXIV of the Memorandum during 1986, instead maintaining the old vacation plan in effect prior to the merger of Texaco and Getty Oil that became effective in February, 1984.
On September 15, 1986, Texaco issued the "1987 Delaware Control Laboratories Vacation Scheduling Plan" ("Scheduling Plan") that is at the heart of this dispute. Dkt. 8, Appendix A. The Scheduling Plan covers, inter alia, all Technology Services employees and Bottlewashers, who had not previously been governed by such plans. A 46-week period for scheduling vacations, mandated by Article XXVII of the Memorandum, runs from February 15 through December 31, 1987. The Scheduling Plan also provides that "employees will be permitted to take a maximum of five (5) days of vacation in increments of four (4) days or less." Id. The right of an employee to take incremental days of vacation is limited, however, to the maximum number of employees permitted to be on vacation at any one time under the Plan. Affidavit of Patrick Lister, Dkt. 7; see infra note 2. Texaco also altered the formula for calculating the number of single vacation days available1 and limited to four the maximum number of workers who could be on vacation at any one time.2 This change made it virtually impossible for an employee to take a single day during the peak summer months. From January 1 through March 15, Control Laboratory personnel governed by the Plan took 31 vacation days in increments of four days or less, and an additional 34 days are scheduled the rest of the year.
On October 9, 1986, OCAW filed a grievance (# 86-55) concerning the inclusion of the Technology Services technicians and Bottlewashers under the Plan and the provision of February 15 — December 31 as the 46-week vacation period for 1987. After being processed through the first three levels of the Article XVI Grievance Procedure, Texaco agreed to utilize the full 52-week period for vacation distribution in 1987, but refused to remove the technicians and Bottlewashers from the scheduling plan. OCAW then requested arbitration, and on February 27, 1987, the parties selected an arbitrator and scheduled a hearing on the grievance for June 18, 1987. The union filed a second grievance (# 86-60) on November 5, 1986, concerning the Plan's alleged failure to permit vacations in increments of four days or less. After the first three steps of the Grievance failed to achieve a satisfactory result, OCAW again requested arbitration of the dispute.
On March 6, 1987, Texaco notified Arthur Wilson, president of OCAW Local 8-898, that the company would not proceed to arbitration on either grievance, because the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction, citing Article XX of the collective bargaining agreement. On March 16, 1987, OCAW filed for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Texaco from implementing the Vacation Plan and an order to compel arbitration of the grievances.
Arbitration of disputes between employers and unions over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is resolutely favored by the federal courts. The Supreme Court recognizes an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's broad prohibition of injunctions in labor matters where judicial involvement is necessary to promote arbitration of disputes. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970). A Boys Markets injunction compelling arbitration is only permissible where two conditions are met: 1) the underlying dispute is subject to mandatory arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement; Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976); 2) the conduct that a party would enjoin threatens or frustrates the arbitral process agreed to by the parties. Nursing Home & Hospital Union No. 934 v. Sky Vue Terrace, 759 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.1985). See Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union Local 1034 v. Doxsee Food Corp., Inc., 650 F.Supp. 861, 863-64 (D.Del.1986). Once the issue of arbitrability is determined, the petitioner "must satisfy the traditional requirements for injunctive relief by demonstrating a probability of success on the merits, irreparable injury if the injunction is denied, and that the balance of hardships favors the injunction." Id. (citing Sky Vue, 759 F.2d at 1098).
The Supreme Court enunciated four basic principles for determining the arbitrability of a dispute in AT & T Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). Based on the teaching of the Steelworkers Trilogy, Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960), Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960), Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960), the Court stated:
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