Oil Field Haulers Ass'n v. Railroad Commission
| Citation | 381 S.W.2d 183 |
| Decision Date | 03 June 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. A-9780,A-9780 |
| Parties | OIL FIELD HAULERS ASSOCIATION, Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. RAILROAD COMMISSION of Texas, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
Clark, Thomas, Harris, Denius & Winters, Wallace A. McLean and James H. Keahey, Austin, for Oil Field Haulers Ass'n, Inc., et al.
Joe G. Fender, Houston, for Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc.
Brooks, Montgomery & Matthews, Dallas, for Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co. et al.
Waggoner Carr, Atty. Gen., Austin, Norman V. Suarez, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ralph W. Currie, and John J. McKay, Austin, Dallas, for Railroad Commission of Texas et al.
This case presents a number of novel procedural questions, jurisdictional and otherwise, which must be resolved before substantive questions are reached.
The facts and events, shown in the record, which give rise to the procedural questions are as follows:
Pursuant to a complaint filed by Lone Star Steel Company, the Railroad Commission entered an order on December 18, 1962, reducing rail 'rates on wrought iron or steel pipe, in carloads, intrastate in Texas,' the reduction to become effective on January 21, 1963.
On January 18, 1963, Oil Field Haulers, Inc., filed suit in a district court of Travis County against the Railroad Commission and its members seeking to have the order declared invalid and praying for a restraining order, a temporary injunction and a permanent injunction. A restraining order was granted on January 18, and hearing was set on the prayer for temporary injunction for January 28.
On January 25, a number of railroads intervened on the side of plaintiff. On January 28, Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc., intervened on the side of plaintiff. On January 28, Lone Star Steel Company intervened on the side of defendants. On January 28, the restraining order was extended. On February 7, a trial amendment was filed by Oil Field Haulers joining a number of trucking companies as plaintiffs. All of these plaintiffs will sometimes be referred to as 'Haulers.' On February 8, a temporary injunction was granted, conditioned on the filing by 'plaintiffs' of a bond in the sum of $15,000 'payable to the Defendants.' A bond in that sum payable to the Railroad Commission and its members was executed and filed on the same day by the intervening railroads and Oil Field Haulers, Inc., as principals and National Surety Company as surety. It was not executed by any of the trucking companies who had been made plaintiffs by the trial amendment or by Hill & Hill who had intervened.
The Railroad Commission and Lone Star Steel Company both gave notice of appeal, but Lone Star did not file an appeal bond and therefore went out of the case on appeal.
On May 29, 1963, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and dissolved the temporary injunction. See 369 S.W.2d 931. On June 4, all appellees filed a motion to stay the order of dissolution until they had exhausted their right of review. The motion was granted on June 5, with a short per curiam opinion. See 369 S.W.2d 943. On June 7, Oil Field Haulers and the trucking company plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing. On June 13, Hill & Hill and the railroad intervenors filed separate motions for rehearing.
On June 19, the Court of Civil Appeals acted on the motions for rehearing and in connection with its action filed a brief opinion. See 369 S.W.2d 943. In the first part of this opinion the Court simply explained what it meant by certain language in its original opinion. In the last paragraph the Court stated that it should not have dissolved the injunction in so far as it related to shipments of cast iron pipe and to that extent the injunction should remain in force. The Court concluded its opinion with these words: 'In the respect indicated, the Motions for Rehearing are granted; in all other respects they are overruled.' The order actually entered on June 19, as reflected in the transcript, reads:
'THIS DAY came on to be submitted to the Court the Appellees' Motion for Rehearing, the Motion for Rehearing by Railroad Appellees and the Motion for Rehearing by Appellee Hill & Hill Truck Lines, Inc., Intervenor, in this cause and the Court having heard and fully considered said motions is of the opinion that same should be granted in part and overruled in part, IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that Appellees' Motions for Rehearing be, and same are hereby granted to the extent that the Injunction insofar as it relates to rates on cast iron pipe shall remain in full force and effect; it is FURTHER ordered that in all other respects the motions are overruled; it is FURTHER ordered that the judgment heretofore entered herein remain in full force and effect except as modified herein.'
On July 1, Oil Field Haulers and the trucking company plaintiffs filed an instrument denominated 'Appellees' Motion to Reform The Trial Court's Order And Second Motion For Rehearing.' By this motion appellees requested the Court of Civil Appeals to reform the trial court's order granting the temporary injunction to include in it as an additional reason for granting it that the trial was de novo and therefore the Commission's order revising freight rates was suspended. On the last page of the seven-page instrument is this paragraph:
'Having due respect for this Court's time, Appellees will not restate herein the Points of Error set out and discussed in their original Motions for Rehearing; but, to avoid any suggestion as to waiver, Appellees hereby incorporate and reurge each of their Points of Error previously urged.'
On July 10, the Court of Civil Appeals overruled this motion with a brief written opinion (see 373 S.W.2d 394) in which it held that the Commission's order was not suspended by the suit even though it was to be tried de novo.
The Railroads did not file an application for writ of error. In fact, they have 'switched sides' and by briefs filed in this Court defend the validity of the Commission's order. Hill & Hill filed an application for writ of error on August 8. Oil Field Haulers and the trucking companies filed an application for writ of error on August 7. Both applications were granted.
The procedural questions will be indicated and answered separately.
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction of the application filed by Hill & Hill? We answer this question 'No.' A negative answer is clearly compelled by our Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Court of Civil Appeals' order of June 19 be interpreted as overruling 1 Hill & Hill's motion for rehearing, it did not file a second motion (if authorized so to do) and did not file its application for writ of error within the thirty day period prescribed by Rule 468. 2 Filing of the application in the Court of Civil Appeals within thirty days from June 19 was prerequisite to this Court's jurisdiction to consider the application. Gulf Coast Rice Mills v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 162 Tex. 329, 347 S.W.2d 250.
If the Court of Civil Appeals' order of June 19 be treated as granting Hill & Hill's motion for rehearing and entering a new judgment, this Court has no jurisdiction of its application because it did not file a new motion and have it overruled and thus lay a necessary predicate for its application. This Court has no jurisdiction of a party's application unless and until a motion for rehearing has been filed in and overruled by the Court of Civil Appeals. Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson & Guyger, 119 Tex. 572, 34 S.W.2d 1090; Rule 468.
Finally, Hill & Hill cannot take a 'free ride' on the Second Motion filed by Haulers even if we have jurisdiction of that application. The situation is analogous to that in which a party attempting to perfect an appeal from a trial court judgment seeks to avail himself of the benefit of another party's motion for new trial. See Angelina County v. McFarland, Tex.Sup., 374 S.W.2d 417, 421; Neuhoff Bros., Packers v. Acosta, 160 Tex. 124, 327 S.W.2d 434.
2. Does this Court have jurisdiction of the application filed by Haulers and of the points of error contained therein? We answer the first part of the question 'yes.' Strict application of the Rules would require a negative answer to the second part, but considering all of the attendant facts and circumstances, we have decided to take jurisdiction of the points.
The correct answer to the first part of the question turns on an interpretation of certain provisions of Rule 458 and of the Court of Civil Appeals' order of June 19.
Rule 458 provides in pertinent part: 'If the Court of Civil Appeals hands down an opinion in connection with the overruling of a motion for rehearing, a further motion for rehearing may, if the losing party deems same necessary, be filed within fifteen days after such opinion is handed down * * *; but a further motion for rehearing shall not be made as a matter of right in any other case.' It will be noted that a further motion for rehearing is expressly authorized only when an opinion is handed down in connection with the overruling of a motion for rehearing.
While the Rule does not expressly so state, a new motion or further motion for rehearing is impliedly always required when a prior motion is granted and the judgment is vacated and a new judgment is entered. This is so because under the express provisions of Rule 467 this Court may review only 'final judgments of Courts of Civil Appeals upon writ of error,' and a judgment which has been vacated cannot under any circumstances be a final judgment. Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson & Guyger, 119 Tex. 572, 34 S.W.2d 1090. A motion for rehearing which seeks a change in a judgment which is subsequently vacated, cannot lay a jurisdictional predicate for an application for writ of error.
But the order of June 19 does not purport either to overrule the original motions for rehearing or to grant them; it is a hybrid type of order which...
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