Ojeda v. Metro. Transp. Auth.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2020
• Docket Number: 16 Civ. 00003 (JCM)
• Citation: 477 F.Supp.3d 65
• Parties: Domingo OJEDA, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

477 F.Supp.3d 65

Domingo OJEDA, Plaintiff,

v.METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendant.

16 Civ. 00003 (JCM)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed August 3, 2020

Philip J. Dinhofer, Philip J. Dinhofer, LLC, Rockville Centre, NY, for Plaintiff.

Beck S. Fineman, Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP, Bridgeport, CT, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUDITH C. McCARTHY, United States Magistrate Judge

On November 12, 2019, the Court commenced a jury trial in the instant matter. At the conclusion of the trial on November 15, 2019, the jury rendered a unanimous verdict finding Plaintiff Domingo Ojeda ("Plaintiff") 80% at fault, Defendant Metropolitan Transportation Authority's ("MTA" or "Defendant") 20% at fault, and awarding Plaintiff $2,650,000. (Docket No. 139). Before the Court are Defendant's motions for: (1) a renewed judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), (2) a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A), and (3) a remittitur pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b). (Docket No. 142). Defendant also requests a hearing to determine the appropriate set-off amount for the wages it claims to have already paid to Plaintiff. (Id. ). Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Docket No. 147). Defendant further requests a stay of enforcement of the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b) pending the Court's disposition of its motions. (Docket No. 143). For the reasons set forth below, (1) Defendant's motions pursuant to Rules 50, 59, and 60 are denied, (2) Defendant's request for a hearing is granted in part and denied in part, and (3) Defendant's motion to stay the enforcement of the judgment pursuant to Rule 62(b) is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of this case and only summarizes the relevant facts.

A. The Incident

On the evening of October 2, 2013, Plaintiff was working as an Emergency Services Unit ("ESU") police officer for the MTA performing general patrol and security duties with his partner, Officer Greg Cella ("Cella"), at the Harrison train station in Harrison, NY ("Harrison Station"). (Trial Tr.¹ at 112-13). Plaintiff and Cella were assigned to an ESU truck, which contained two doors in the front, and a section in the back to carry equipment. (Id. at 113, 202-03); (Docket No. 147-2 at 24-26). While Plaintiff and Cella were monitoring the train station from their vehicle, Plaintiff noticed a male and female engaged in a dispute. (Trial Tr. at 125-26). Plaintiff immediately alerted Cella; they both exited the truck and approached the two suspects and separated them. (Id. at 126-27, 129). Cella stayed with the female and Plaintiff was with the male. (Id. at 129). Cella approached Plaintiff to tell him that he believed the female said there was an order of protection against the male suspect, but Cella could not completely understand her because she was speaking in Spanish. (Id. ). Plaintiff and Cella switched suspects so Plaintiff could communicate with the female in Spanish to gather more information. (Id. ).

The officers subsequently confirmed that the male suspect had, in fact, violated an order of protection, so Plaintiff proceeded to arrest and handcuff him. (Trial Tr. at 132). The MTA then dispatched a backup sector car to the scene to transport the suspect. (Id. at 143-44). Meanwhile, the female approached Plaintiff while Cella, who was standing 10 to 15 feet away, was on a call relating to the situation. (Id. at 133). Plaintiff was responsible for the male arrestee at this time. (Id. at 134-35). After the female approached, the situation between the male and female escalated again, prompting Plaintiff to lean closer to the female to quietly ask whether the male suspect was on drugs. (Id. at 135). At that point, Plaintiff heard a voice yell out, "running," and realized the arrestee had fled. (Id. ). The backup officers still had not arrived at the scene to transport the arrestee. (Id. at 138, 167).

Plaintiff chased after the suspect and followed him up a hill in an attempt to subdue him. (Trial Tr. at 136-37). About 30 to 40 feet into the chase, Plaintiff felt a "pop" in his left lower calf/Achilles heel and immediately felt pain. (Id. at 136, 215, 152). By the time Plaintiff got to the top of the hill, he saw Cella arriving at the location in the ESU truck. (Id. at 127-38). Cella then called for further backup, which arrived approximately 20 minutes after the suspect had initially fled. (Id. at 141-45). The officers searched for the suspect for several hours, but they never found him. (Id. at 140-145). As a result of his ankle injuries

, Plaintiff went on sick leave and underwent surgery and physical therapy. (Id. at 181-87). Plaintiff eventually returned to work at the MTA on "restricted duty." (Id. at 173, 190). He was never able to return full time as an MTA police officer. (Id. at 176). Plaintiff's employment with the MTA ended on February 16, 2016 for reasons unrelated to this matter. (Id. at 195-96).

B. The Claims

Plaintiff commenced the instant action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act ("FELA"), alleging that the MTA was negligent for injuries he sustained during his employment as an MTA police officer. (Docket No. 29) ("Amended Compl.").² Under FELA:

[e]very common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he [or she] is employed by such carrier ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boards, wharves, or other equipment.

45 U.S.C § 51. Liability under FELA is found "if [the railroad's] negligence played a part–no matter how small–in bringing about the injury." CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride , 564 U.S. 685, 705, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011) (alteration in original).

Plaintiff claimed that the injuries he sustained on October 2, 2013 while running after the fleeing suspect were caused solely by the negligence, carelessness, and recklessness of the MTA and its agents for failing to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work and equipment with which to work. (Amended Compl. ¶ 21). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the MTA was negligent for failing to provide Plaintiff with appropriate and timely backup, failing to provide Plaintiff with a police vehicle that was properly equipped with a containment facility for persons under arrest, and for the negligence of Cella for leaving Plaintiff alone to manage two suspects. (Id. ).

C. Trial and Verdict

A jury trial commenced on November 12, 2019 before this Court. (Trial Tr. at 1). Two witnesses testified on behalf of Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified about his experience as a patrol officer and an ESU officer with the MTA and being assigned to a patrol vehicle, the training he received, as well as to what he personally observed Cella doing during the night of the incident. (Id. at 100-167). Plaintiff also testified regarding his injuries, his time off work, and the various medical procedures he endured. (Id. at 168-189). Dr. McWilliam, Plaintiff's treating orthopedist, testified regarding his treatment of Plaintiff, the extent of the injury, and the potential permanence of the injury. (Docket No. 147-3 at 5-58). Defendant only called one witness – Cella – to testify. (Docket No. 147-2). Cella testified regarding his experience as an MTA ESU police officer and his observations and actions during the night of the incident. (Id. at 29-135). He also testified about the details of the ESU truck they were using, how ESU officers are trained to make arrests, and his observations regarding other MTA officers that are assigned to patrol with or without vehicles. (Id. at 20-29). No experts testified on behalf of either party.

Prior to the jury verdict, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony on the standard of care of police conduct, which Defendant argued was required, and (2) the MTA was immune from liability under the governmental defense doctrine. (Trial Tr. at 354-55). The Court denied Defendant's requests on the grounds that, although there was not a "wealth of evidence in this case on certain things," there was "enough to go to the jury." (Id. at 356). Regarding the governmental immunity defense, the Court found that it is "not established that [governmental immunity] even applies in a FELA case." (Id. at 355). The Court thereafter submitted the case to the jury. (Id. at 457).

On November 15, 2019, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for Plaintiff, awarding him: $750,000 for past lost earnings; $900,000 for future lost earnings; $300,000 for past pain and suffering; and $700,000 for future pain and suffering, for a total award of $2,650,000. (Trial Tr. at 514-15). The jury further found Plaintiff 80% at fault and Defendant 20% at fault. (Id. ); (see also Docket No. 139). On November 18, 2019, a judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $150,000 for past lost earnings; $180,000 for future lost earnings; $60,000 for past pain and suffering; and $140,000 for future pain and suffering, for a total award of $530,000. (Docket No. 139). Defendant's post-trial motions followed. (Docket Nos. 142, 143).

D. Post-Trial Motions

Defendant now moves for: (1) a renewed judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 on the grounds that (i) Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony on the standard of police conduct, which Defendant claims is required, and (ii) the MTA is immune from liability under the governmental immunity defense; (2) a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 because of (i) the admission of evidence regarding Plaintiff's "disabled" status, and (ii) opposing counsel's "pervasive misconduct" throughout the trial; and (3) a remittitur pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 (i) to correct the error in allowing the jury to...