Oke v. Wenerowicz

• Decision Date: 04 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-cv-61
• Parties: AYODELE OKE v. MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

AYODELE OKE v. MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-cv-61

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 4, 2016

ORDER

AND NOW, this 4th day of February 2016, upon careful and independent consideration of Petitioner Ayodele Oke's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1), Respondents' response in opposition to the petition (Doc. No. 13), Petitioner's numerous pending motions (Doc. Nos. 11, 21, 22, 29, 30, 41, 42 & 43), the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell (Doc. No. 34), Petitioner's objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 39), and the record before the Court, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 34) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as modified by this order.

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED without an evidentiary hearing.

3. Petitioner's objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 39) are OVERRULED in part.

4. Petitioner's motion to amend the original petition (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED.

5. Petitioner's motions for sanctions (Doc. Nos. 21 & 22) are DENIED.

6. Petitioner's motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing (Doc. No. 29) is DENIED.

7. Petitioner's motion for judicial notice (Doc. No. 30) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

8. Petitioner's motion to supplement the original petition or his objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 42) is DENIED.

9. Petitioner's "motion to grant" the petitioner's motion to supplement the petition for writ of habeas corpus or his objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 43) is DENIED.

10. Petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability (Doc. No. 41) is DENIED.

11. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this matter for statistical purposes.

I. Background

The factual and procedural background of this matter is set forth Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell's Report and Recommendation. The Court does not repeat it here, except where it is relevant to the analysis.

Petitioner raises six claims for habeas relief. He argues as follows: (1) the prosecution used a peremptory strike in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the prosecution presented false testimony at trial and withheld evidence; (3) the trial judge should have recused himself and Petitioner was denied the right to an impartial trial judge; (4) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; (5) Petitioner was denied the right to an impartial jury because the trial court and counsel pressured the victim into testifying against Petitioner at trial; and (6) Petitioner's sentence was enhanced in violation of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), because the trial judge rather than the jury found Petitioner used a deadly weapon. (Mem. Law & Fact Supp. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus 11, 42, 74, 89, 99, 105, Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing with respect to several of his claims. (Mem. Supp. Pet. 73, 88, 104; Pet'r's Mot. for Disc. & Evidentiary Hr'g 1, Doc. No. 29.)

In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Angell recommended that the Court deny the habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing. (R. & R. 2.¹) Petitioner objected to the Report and Recommendation on numerous grounds. (See Pet'r's Objs. to Magistrate J. M. Faith Angell's R. & R., Doc. No. 39.) He subsequently filed three additional motions, in which he requested a certificate of appealability (Pet'r's Req. for Certificate of Appealability, Doc. No. 41), asked to supplement his petition or his objections with additional arguments (Mot. to Suppl. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus &/or Pet'r's Objs., Doc. No. 42), and requested that this Court grant his "motion to supplement" as uncontested (Pet'r's Mot. to Grant Pet'r's Mot. to Suppl., Doc. No. 43). Petitioner had also previously filed several other motions, including a motion to amend his petition (Pet'r's Mot. to Amend Original Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. No. 11), two motions for sanctions (though both motions appear largely the same in substance) (Pet'r's Mot. for Sanctions, Doc. No. 21; Pet'r's Mot. for Sanctions, Doc. No. 22), a motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing (Pet'r's Mot. for Disc. & Evidentiary Hr'g, Doc. No. 29), and a motion for judicial notice (Mot. for Judicial Notice, Doc. No. 30). The Court now reviews the petition, the Report and Recommendation, and the numerous outstanding motions.

II. Governing Legal Standards

A. AEDPA and the Habeas Petition

Petitioner's application for federal habeas review of his state conviction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. The scope of federal review of a habeas petition is limited both by principles of federalism and by AEDPA's deferential standard of review. At a minimum, federalism and comity require that a state court have a chance to rule ona petitioner's claims before a federal court steps in. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730-31 (1991).

The claims must be "fairly presented" to the state court; in other words, the "factual and legal substance" of the claims must have been raised before "the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted." McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999). Exhaustion requires that a petitioner litigate his claims through "one complete round of the State's established appellate review process," including a petition for discretionary review with the state's highest court. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). If any claim in a habeas petition is unexhausted, the federal court must either dismiss the petition or stay it until the state court has had a chance to rule on the claim. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).

If a petitioner has not fully presented a claim to the state courts but a state procedural rule now prevents him or her from doing so, exhaustion is excused on the basis of futility; however, the claim is deemed procedurally defaulted. See Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2001). In Pennsylvania, a claim is procedurally defaulted if "the state court refuses to hear the merits of the claim because either (1) the defendant waived a [Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA")] claim she could have raised in an earlier proceeding but failed to do so; or (2) some other procedural bar exists, such as a statute of limitations." Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 518 (3d Cir. 1997). A claim that is procedurally defaulted may not be considered on the merits by a federal court unless the petitioner demonstrates "cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000). "To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that 'some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.' Todemonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors during his trial created more than a possibility of prejudice; he must show 'that the errors worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.'" Tribuani v. Phelps, 820 F. Supp. 2d 588, 592 (D. Del. 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 494 (1986)). Ordinary attorney error or inadvertence is insufficient. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. A fundamental miscarriage of justice will only be found "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Id. at 496.

Additionally, AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations beyond which a petition for habeas corpus is deemed untimely and may not be considered on the merits by a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); e.g., Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitation period begins to run on the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period is tolled during the pendency of a "properly filed" state petition for collateral review. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

AEDPA sets forth the standard of review that a federal court must apply to a timely, properly exhausted claim. This standard is intentionally "difficult to meet," in light of thedeference due to state courts under AEDPA. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). If a state court has adjudicated a habeas applicant's claim on the merits, the reviewing federal court must generally defer to the state court adjudication, except in narrow circumstances. Section 2254(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code established two distinct paths for the invalidation of a state conviction on federal habeas review. First, federal habeas relief is warranted if a state conviction is "contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This path applies when a state court's actions are "diametrically different" or "mutually opposed" to clearly established law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second,...