Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1953
• Docket Number: No. A--319,A--319
• Citation: 26 N.J.Super. 295,97 A.2d 699
• Parties: OKKER v. CHROME FURNITURE MFG. CORP.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 295

26 N.J.Super. 295

97 A.2d 699

OKKER v. CHROME FURNITURE MFG. CORP.

No. A--319.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued June 1, 1953.

Decided June 17, 1953.

Paul Rittenberg, Paterson, argued the cause for plaintiffs-appellants (Joseph V. Fumagalli, Paterson, attorney; Howard Stern, Paterson, on the brief).

Samuel Doan, Paterson, argued the cause for defendant-respondent (Charles C. Stalter, Paterson, attorney).

Before Judges STEIN, PROCTOR and CONLON.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.A.D. (temporarily assigned).

The infant plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries. His father joined in the action for his consequential damages.

A motion to dismiss, made by the defendant at the end of plaintiffs' opening, was granted and the plaintiffs appeal from the judgment entered thereon.

Counsel for plaintiffs in his opening stated that on September 14, 1951 James Okker, accompanied by his 13-month-old son, entered a neighborhood tavern for the purpose of making a purchase of a bottle of beer. At the bar there was a line of six stools provided for the accommodation of patrons. These were high stools on four legs having a cylinder in the middle of each stool, and a seat welded to a pin fitted into the cylinder, allowing the seat to freely revolve. While Okker, with the child in his arms, sat on one of these stools awaiting the delivery of his purchase, the seat became dislodged from the pin and he and the child fell to the floor, causing injury to the infant plaintiff. It was further stated that the tavern owner had purchased the stools in 1948 from the defendant-manufacturer; that at various times during the period the stools were in use every one of them broke at the same point; that this dislodgment was due to improper and defective welding of the pin to the seat; further, that upon the return of the stools to the defendant the tavern owner was informed that they had been 'improperly welded'; further, 'we have obtained evidence that there was a batch, about a dozen of these stools, all improperly welded so that they had trouble with the seat becoming dislodged from the pin.'

Summary disposition on counsel's opening should not be employed unless the the facts stated are clearly insufficient in law to prove a cause of action. See Ross v. Orr, 3 N.J. 277, 69 A.2d 730 (1949); Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 8 N.J.Super. 275, 74 A.2d 322 (App.Div.1950); Sole v. Clifton Colonial Gardens, Inc., 14 N.J.Super. 575, 82 A.2d 633 (App.Div.1951). Plaintiffs base their cause of action upon the alleged negligence of the defendant in the manufacturing of the stool which it had sold to the proprietor of the tavern and which, because of its negligent construction, caused the infant plaintiff's injuries. The trial court's reason for the dismissal was that the stool had been out of the control of the defendant for approximately three years before the mishap.

The applicable rule is that set forth in Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 101 N.J.L. 385, 128 A. 242, 243, 39 A.L.R. 989 (E. & A.1925):

'The manufacturer of an article, not inherently dangerous, but which may become dangerous when put to the use for which it is intended, owes to the public the duty of employing care, skill and diligence in its manufacture and of using reasonable diligence to see to it that it is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended.'

This rule was applied in Clark v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co., 149 A. 828, 8 N.J.Misc. 284 (Sup.Ct.1930), where the manufacturer of a porcelain handle for a bathroom faucet was held liable for negligence to a tenant injured when the handle broke in her hand. The principle has likewise been held applicable to a person injured by reason of defectively constructed chairs. Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal.2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (Cal.Sup.Ct.1942); S. Blickman, Inc., v. Chilton, 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1938). Cf. O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 25 N.J.Super. 335, 96 A.2d 534 (App.Div.1953).

No inference of negligence could properly be drawn simply because the accident occurred, especially since the stool had not been in possession and control of the defendant for...