Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n

• Decision Date: 05 May 1936
• Docket Number: Case Number: 26901
• Citation: 58 P.2d 124,177 Okla. 179,1936 OK 375
• Parties: OKLAHOMA GAS & ELEC. CO. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMM'N
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1936 OK 375

58 P.2d 124

177 Okla. 179

OKLAHOMA GAS & ELEC. CO. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMM'N

Case Number: 26901

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: May 5, 1936

Syllabus

¶0 1. STATUTES - Reference to Title of Act to Determine Legislative Intent.

When the exact meaning of a portion of the body of a legislative act is uncertain, it is proper to consider the title of the act to determine the legislative intent, in this jurisdiction where the Constitution requires that the purpose of an act be clearly expressed in its title.

2. TAXATION - Sales Tax Law Held to Apply to All Sales of Electricity not Specifically Exempted.

The 1933 sales tax law, chapter 196, S. L. 1933, imposes a tax upon all sales of electricity to consumers, except such as are specifically exempted thereby.

Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Lucius Babcock, Judge.

Action by Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company against the Oklahoma Tax Commission to recover sales tax paid under protest. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeal. Affirmed.

Rainey, Flynn, Green & Anderson and Calvin Jones, for plaintiff in error.

C.D. Cund, C.W. King, A.L. Herr, and W.A. Dillon, for defendants in error.

WELCH, J.

¶1 This appeal involves the question of whether or not the sale of electric power to the state, counties, cities, churches, charitable institutions, schools, lodges, hospitals and fraternal organizations, and used by them for power and light, is subject to the provisions of the sales tax law of 1933. A tax on such sales was paid under protest, and upon suit to recover same plaintiff's right to recover was denied.

¶2 The cause is presented upon the following proposition:

"The Oklahoma Sales Tax Law of 1933, same being chapter 196, Session Laws of 1933, laid a tax upon the sales of electricity, electric current and electric power only where such sales are to domestic or industrial consumers thereof, and sales to any other consumers are not taxable; the sales involved herein were not to either domestic or industrial consumers, and, therefore, plaintiff should recover the taxes it has paid on account thereof."

¶3 The question requires the construction of that portion of the 1933 sales tax law which we quote as follows:

"There is hereby levied a tax of one per centum (1%) upon the gross proceeds of all sales of tangible personal property consisting of goods, wares or merchandise, sold at retail in the state of Oklahoma, to consumers or users; and a like tax upon the gross proceeds of all sales, within this state, derived from the following:

"* * * Upon all sales of electricity, electric light current, electric power, gas (natural or artificial) to domestic or industrial consumers thereof. * * *"

¶4 Our consideration is ultimately narrowed to the construction of the last hereinabove quoted paragraph of law.

¶5 The controversy concerns the extent of the meaning of the phrase therein used "to domestic or industrial consumers thereof." The briefs are devoted largely to the question of the legislative intent in the use of these quoted words. Plaintiff contends that these words have a highly restrictive meaning, and that the electricity sales here involved were not made to exactly domestic consumers nor exactly industrial consumers, and that therefore the act does not apply. Upon the other hand, the Tax Commission contends that the quoted words were used in their broad and general sense, and that it was the legislative intent to cover all such sales as are here involved.

¶6 In the case of Loren E. Kimball v. Northeast Harbor Water Co. 78 A. 865, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 805, the Supreme Court of Maine construed the use of water for the operation of an elevator in a summer hotel to be within the term "domestic," as used in a provision of law chartering a water company, and in the case of City of Erie v. Erie Gas & Mineral Co. (Kan.) 97 P. 468, the court construed "domestic purposes," as used in a contract, as covering a field broader than that conceived here by plaintiff. We quote the fourth paragraph of the syllabus thereof as follows:

" 'Domestic purposes,' as the term is here used, includes gas furnished for homes, churches, stores, offices, and the opera house, where its principal use is for heating and lighting, and not for power."

¶7 In Spring Valley Water Works v. City and County of San Francisco, 52 Cal. 111, the Supreme Court of California construed "family uses," as used in an act requiring a corporation to furnish pure fresh water to the inhabitants of the city for family uses, to be sufficient to include therein the requirement that such water be furnished to hospitals, poorhouses, schools, and other institutions, pointing out therein that the purpose for which same is used, rather than the place used, as being the proper criterion.

¶8 The case of Pejepscot Paper Co. v. Town of Lisbon (Me.) 142 A. 194, is substantially to the same effect, as well as Metropolitan Water Board v. Avery, [1914] A. C. 118, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 556.

¶9 It is obvious that the paragraph of the statute here in question is not crystal clear or unequivocal in its meaning, and the clause...