Oklahoma Biltmore, Inc. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 29 March 1938 |
| Docket Number | 27776. |
| Citation | 79 P.2d 202,182 Okla. 574,1938 OK 228 |
| Parties | OKLAHOMA BILTMORE, Inc. v. WILLIAMS. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied May 17, 1938.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. In the consideration of alleged erroneous language in an instruction on appeal, the instruction is considered as a whole, and, though the language objected to seems to accept as a fact a controverted circumstance of the case, yet, if in another part of said instruction, the burden of proving said circumstances is properly placed, such error, if any, will be considered cured thereby, and harmless and insufficient ground for reversal unless it clearly appears that the jury was misled thereby.
2. When an employee is present upon a part of his employer's premises with express permission, even though that part or sector of said premises may not be considered the employee's place of employment and though he did not go there to perform any duty of his employment so that his employer would owe him the care of a master to his servant his status is that of a licensee and his employer must exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to him.
3. Where plaintiff is injured by a machine operated by the defendant, whether the negligence of the defendant or its operating agent was the proximate cause of said injury, after the plaintiff had placed himself in a position of danger, is a question for the jury, if the evidence is such that reasonable minds may draw different conclusions upon the question.
4. "Ordinary care" correctly expresses the duty of the possessor of premises toward a licensee thereon, and such an expression of the measure of said duty in an action by the latter against the former for personal injuries is not erroneous.
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Sam Hooker, Judge.
Action by Fannie Williams against the Oklahoma Biltmore, Inc. employer, for personal injuries. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Pierce & Rucker, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Carmon C. Harris and Sam S. Gill, both of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
The plaintiff, a negro maid employed by the defendant corporation at its hotel in Oklahoma City, brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted upon her by an ice-crushing machine owned and operated by the defendant in the basement of said hotel.
The plaintiff's daily hours of employment at the hotel were from 11 o'clock at night until 7 o'clock the next morning and her work principally consisted of cleaning the lobby, the radio station, and the barbershop, and beauty parlor in the hotel.
One part of the basement in the hotel contained a locker room in which individual lockers, and lavatory and toilet facilities were maintained by the defendant for the use of its colored maids in keeping themselves clean and changing from the clothes that they wore to the hotel into the uniforms which they were required to wear while performing their duties within said hotel.
The machine in question was located in another room of the basement called the "ice-room" and contained perpendicular saws propelled by an electric motor. Said machine was used by the defendant to crush large blocks of ice. On the day the injury occurred, the plaintiff had completed her daily routine duties in the hotel and at approximately 6:30 a.m. was on her way to the locker room to change clothes preparatory to leaving the hotel, when she stopped at the ice room and obtained permission from the defendant's employee, R. E. Goodman, to enter said room for the purpose of securing some ice shavings commonly referred to as "snow," which accumulated from the ice-crushing operations of the machine. In reaching into the chute of the machine, out of which chute said shavings came, for her second handful of said shavings or "snow," the plaintiff's hand was mangled by the moving saw blades, so that it later became necessary to amputate her arm at the wrist.
The plaintiff predicates her cause of action upon the negligence of the defendant in failing to furnish her with a reasonably safe place in which to work and the alleged wrongful acts of its employee, Goodman, including his failure to warn her of the dangers of her undertaking.
The defendant answered the plaintiff's charges with a general denial together with an admission of the plaintiff's employment, the accident and its resulting injuries, but denied any negligence or liability on its part. In its answer, the defendant affirmatively alleged that the negligence of the plaintiff herself, or that of one of her fellow servants, or both, caused or contributed to her injuries.
The evidence reveals that the plaintiff's purpose in securing the "snow" was to wash and cool her face while changing from her uniform to her street clothes. The plaintiff testified that at one time she and the other maids of the hotel were told that if they wanted any ice they should see some of the men that worked in the ice room and that they had formed the habit of going there and getting the ice. She also testified that she had never been instructed to stay out of the ice room. On the other hand, the defendant offered testimony to the effect that at meetings held to instruct the maids as to their duties, they had been directed to go only to the parts of the hotel where their duties took them and that the plaintiff as well as the other maids had on several occasions been told not to go into the ice room.
It was established that none of the duties of the plaintiff's employment required that she ever go to the ice room except to wash the door thereof and unless the task of presenting a clean and cool appearance to the hotel's guests with whom she might come in contact in the rooms she cleaned could be termed one of her duties.
It was shown that at the time of the accident Goodman was standing on one side of the machine crushing a block of ice therein and the plaintiff was attempting to obtain a handful of the "snow" accumulating in the chute on the other side thereof.
The plaintiff further testified that she did not know that the ice crusher was running at that time and, in substance, that she knew nothing of its dangerous character.
After the ice-crushing machine in question had been described both by the testimony and photographs that were introduced, the jury was sent to the hotel to view it. When the evidence was all in, the defense counsel moved for a directed verdict but the court overruled this motion and submitted the cause to the jury upon certain instructions, among which was instruction numbered 8. The defendant contends that this eighth instruction is an improper statement of the law, that it is inapplicable to this case, and therefore the court erred in issuing it. Said instruction was as follows:
At the close of the trial, the jury...
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