Okoye v. Medicalodge North
| Decision Date | 11 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-2074-JWL.,98-2074-JWL. |
| Citation | 45 F.Supp.2d 1118 |
| Parties | Victor OKOYE, Plaintiff, v. MEDICALODGE NORTH and Cindy Frakes, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Vincent M. Ekeh, Kansas City, KS, for Victor Okoye, plaintiff.
Patrick E. McGrath, Glenn S. Grayson, Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, Overland Park, KS, Garen L. Cox, Medicalodges, Inc., Coffeyville, KS, for defendants.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This matter is presently before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. # 19). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety.1
Plaintiff Victor Okoye began his employment with Kansas City Post Acute Care Center (the "Center")3 as a licensed practical nurse in November 1994. The Center provides care for individuals recovering from acute illness or injury and individuals in need of long- or short-term skilled nursing. Defendant Cindy Frakes is the Administrator of the Center.
On December 12, 1995, Nancy Mark, another nurse at the Center, reported to Ms. Frakes that plaintiff had mentally abused a patient two days earlier. The patient, who suffers from dementia, has a doll that the patient apparently believes is her living baby. Ms. Mark reported that plaintiff, in the patient's presence, had smashed the head of the doll, bent the head of the doll backwards and shook the doll. According to Ms. Mark's report, the patient started screaming and crying at plaintiff's actions. Upon receiving this report, Ms. Frakes suspended plaintiff pending an investigation of the incident. Hyacinth Hamilton, a certified nursing aide who purportedly witnessed the incident, confirmed that Ms. Mark's report was correct. Plaintiff, however, denied that the doll incident occurred and suggested that Ms. Mark and Ms. Hamilton fabricated the report.4 In her affidavit, Ms. Frakes testified that she concluded, based upon her investigation, that the incident had occurred as described to her. Although the parties dispute the manner in which plaintiff's employment relationship with the Center ended, plaintiff did not return to work following his suspension.5
Ms. Frakes reported the doll incident to the Kansas State Board of Nursing (the "Board"). In January 1997, the Board filed a petition against plaintiff alleging unprofessional conduct and professional incompetency arising out of the doll incident. In April 1998, after a full hearing in which plaintiff was represented by counsel, a hearing officer for the Board issued an initial order in which the officer found that the allegations against plaintiff were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that plaintiff "committed an act of professional incompetency" as defined by the Kansas Nurse Practice Act, K.S.A. § 65-1113 et seq. The hearing officer, however, denied the Board's request to revoke plaintiff's nursing license and, instead, suspended plaintiff's license. The hearing officer further ordered that the suspension would be stayed provided that plaintiff complied with certain requirements including, inter alia, a requirement that plaintiff's future employers send quarterly reports to the Board's Nurse Practice Specialist concerning plaintiff's work performance. Moreover, the order provided that the Board would issue plaintiff a new license card bearing an "S" alert code.
On September 24, 1998, after review and a unanimous vote by a quorum of the Board, the hearing officer's initial order was adopted by the Board as its final order, with certain technical modifications regarding the requirements imposed upon plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that he is in the process of seeking judicial review of the Board's decision.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 670-71. In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Id. at 671 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 n. 1 (). The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. "To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein." Id.
Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
Plaintiff claims that defendants terminated his employment based on his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.6 The court applies the same standards and burdens as applied in Title VII cases, see Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1403 n. 3 (10th Cir.1997), and, accordingly, analyzes plaintiff's claim under the familiar burden-shifting framework first pronounced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In the summary judgment context, plaintiff initially must raise a genuine issue of material fact on each element of his prima facie case of discrimination. See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir.1995).
Once plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817; EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1317-19 (10th Cir.1992)). If the defendant comes forward with a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions the burden then reverts to the plaintiff "to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for the challenged action is pretextual—i.e., unworthy of belief." Id. (citing Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 622 (10th Cir.1994)). If the plaintiff proffers such evidence, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id.
The parties dispute whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case of race discrimination. The court assumes, without deciding, that plaintiff has established his prima facie case. Nonetheless, as set forth below, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants' articulated reason for plaintiff's discharge —Ms. Frakes' conclusion that plaintiff had mentally abused a patient — is pretextual.7
In support of his pretext argument, plaintiff argues that his performance prior to December 10, 1995 was satisfactory. He states that he received a 5% raise in November 1995, that he received notes of appreciation for his good work from his immediate supervisor, and that he never received a negative performance evaluation.8 Defendants' proffered reason for discharging plaintiff, however, is that plaintiff mentally abused a patient on December 10, 1995 — a reason wholly unrelated to plaintiff's performance prior to that time. Thus, the mere fact that plaintiff's performance may have been satisfactory prior to December 10, 1995 does not demonstrate that defendants' proffered reason for discharging plaintiff is pretextual or unworthy of belief. In other words, plaintiff's performance prior to December 10, 1995 would be relevant to the pretext analysis only if defendants had relied on plaintiff's prior performance as a basis for the discharge decision. Defendants have not suggested that plaintiff's performance factored into the employment decision.9 Thus, the court disregards plaintiff's efforts to refute defendants' proffered, nondiscriminatory reason with facts relating to his prior performance.
The only other evidence that the court has uncovered with respect to plaintiff's § 1981 claim is an excerpt from plaintiff's deposition in which he states that his immediate supervisor told him that ...
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