Olaf v. Christie Clinic Ass'n

Decision Date26 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 4-89-0894,4-89-0894
Parties, 146 Ill.Dec. 647 Charles R. OLAF, D.O., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTIE CLINIC ASSOCIATION and Personal Care HMO, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Ronald E. Boyer, Boyer & Thompson, Ltd., Watseka, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lorna K. Geiler, Meyer, Capel, Hirschfeld, Muncy Jahn & Aldeen, P.C., Champaign, for Christie Clinic.

Joseph D. Pavia, Kirtley-Pavia-Marsh, P.C., Urbana, for Personal Care HMO.

Presiding Justice KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff brings this appeal alleging the trial court erred in granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. We affirm.

Plaintiff, Dr. Charles R. Olaf, filed a complaint against defendants, Christie Clinic Association (Christie) and Personal Care HMO (Personal Care), alleging the agreement between himself and Christie was wrongfully terminated and his patients were unlawfully notified. In 1984, Christie entered into a contract with Dr. Olaf wherein Dr. Olaf became associated with Christie as a provider of health services for Personal Care at his practices in Paxton and Cissna Park. The contract provided Dr. Olaf was to be paid for his medical services to subscribers of Personal Care by Christie and the contract could be terminated by either party by written notice given at least 90 days in advance of termination. The contract provided for annual review and recited Dr. Olaf "elects during the term of this agreement to participate on an exclusive basis with CHRISTIE in said prepaid health services programs."

After several years as a provider for Personal Care, Dr. Olaf also became a provider for CarleCare, a competing health maintenance organization (HMO). On June 5, 1987, Christie notified Dr. Olaf it would invoke the 90-day termination clause of their contract unless he disassociated himself from CarleCare. When Dr. Olaf refused to terminate his services for CarleCare, Personal Care mailed to its participants, who were also patients of Dr. Olaf, a letter which stated effective September 3, 1987, Dr. Olaf will no longer be a participating physician with Personal Care HMO. The letter asked the participants to select a new primary-care physician as soon as possible.

Dr. Olaf filed suit claiming the actions of Christie and Personal Care had resulted in the loss of patients and the termination of his medical practice. The complaint alleged a conspiracy existed between Christie and Personal Care which had the purpose of destroying Dr. Olaf's medical practice and lessening competition.

Defendants filed answers to the complaint alleging they were justified in terminating the contract with Dr. Olaf and in sending letters to Dr. Olaf's participating patients. In response to Christie's and Personal Care's motion to strike the complaint, counsel for Dr. Olaf stated the complaint should be understood to state a single cause of action for the conspiracy of Christie and Personal Care to tortiously interfere with the contractual relationship between Dr. Olaf and his patients. The trial court amended the complaint accordingly.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Personal Care's motion was accompanied by affidavits which explained and justified the action taken toward Dr. Olaf. Attached to Dr. Olaf's response to the motions for summary judgment were unverified letters and memoranda from Christie and Personal Care. Dr. Olaf did not submit any counteraffidavits in addition to this response. The trial court allowed defendants' motions for summary judgment. The trial court found there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Dr. Olaf had violated the terms of his agreement with Christie.

Summary judgment is properly granted only when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1005; Komater v. Kenton Court Associates (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 632, 104 Ill.Dec. 635, 502 N.E.2d 1295.) In making this determination, the court is to construe the evidence strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the opponent. Spancrete of Illinois, Inc. v. Brickman (1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 571, 26 Ill.Dec. 423, 388 N.E.2d 47.

Although a party is not required to prove his case at summary judgment, some facts must be presented to support the elements of its claim. If the party moving for summary judgment supplies evidentiary facts which, if uncontradicted, would entitle him to judgment, the opposing party cannot rely upon his complaint or answer alone to raise issues of material fact. (In re Estate of Garbalinski (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 767, 76 Ill.Dec. 411, 458 N.E.2d 1065.) Thus, the consequence of failing to file a counter-affidavit is that any statements in the affidavits supporting the motion for summary judgment stand as admitted and must be taken as true. Kellerman v. Mar-Rue Realty & Builders, Inc. (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 300, 87 Ill.Dec. 267, 476 N.E.2d 1259.

Here, Personal Care's motion for summary judgment was supported by verified affidavits. The affidavit of Ronald H. Dearing, Medical Director of Christie Clinic Association, explained Christie's contract with Personal Care and with Dr. Olaf. On June 5, 1987, and August 13, 1987, Dearing mailed a letter to Dr. Olaf stating Dr. Olaf had violated the exclusive-service term of his contract with Christie. Dearing notified Dr. Olaf Christie would be terminating their agreement with him in 90 days unless he complied with the exclusive-service term. According to Dearing, Dr. Olaf never notified Christie he would comply.

The affidavit of Larry Good, Development Director of Personal Care HMO, explained the relationship of Personal Care with Christie and Dr. Olaf. On August 10, 1987, Good spoke with Dr. Olaf regarding Deering's letter of June 5, 1987. Dr. Olaf told Good he did not intend to...

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