Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010–14–Appeal.,2010–14–Appeal. |
| Citation | 45 A.3d 527,115 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 775 |
| Parties | Tijani A. OLAMUYIWA v. ZEBRA ATLANTEK, INC., et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Robert E. Savage, Esq., Warwick, for Plaintiff.
Douglas Darch, Esq., Pro Hac Vice, for Defendant.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
The plaintiff, Tijani A. Olamuyiwa, appeals from a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants— viz., Zebra Atlantek, Inc. (Zebra Atlantek), John Conway, Francis Delillo, Karen Vaillancourt, Roger Sevigny, and Paul Follett.1 On appeal, the plaintiff contendsthat certain provisions of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) 2 render the release document which the plaintiff executed as part of his severance package void as it applied to his pending FEPA claims.
This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After reviewing the record and considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
In December of 2001, plaintiff, an African–American male of Nigerian origin, was hired by Atlantek, Inc. as a technician.3 When Zebra Technologies Corporation later acquired Atlantek, Inc., plaintiff remained in his position.
Almost three years later, plaintiff was notified by a letter dated October 1, 2004 from Zebra Atlantek that Zebra Technologies Corporation would be laying off employees and that the layoff was “expected to be permanent in nature;” the letter also stated that the layoff of plaintiff was “expected to occur in February 2005.”
On January 10, 2005, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (Commission) against the previously named defendants; in that charge, he alleged the existence of “discriminatory terms and conditions of employment on the basis of * * * race * * * and ancestral origin * * * including harassment and retaliation.” The charge of discrimination included a statement that plaintiff was represented by an attorney, and it also set forth the attorney's contact information. On or about January 28, 2005, Zebra Atlantek received a copy of the charge of discrimination.
Although plaintiff had originally been notified that the layoff was expected to occur in February of 2005, plaintiff was not actually laid off until April 29, 2005.4 On that date, Zebra Atlantek held a meeting with the employees whose positions were being “phased out and terminated,” which meeting was attended by plaintiff. At the meeting, each employee whose position was being eliminated received two documents: the first document was a “Letter Agreement” setting forth the employee's “separation benefits;” the second document was entitled “Confidential Waiverand Agreement and General Release” (the release document). Under the terms of the Letter Agreement, the employee's receipt of the separation benefits was “contingent on,” inter alia, the receipt by Zebra Atlantek of a signed copy of the release document. The amount of money that plaintiff was to receive as separation benefits was his “base pay rate of $492.00 * * * weekly, for a period of six (6) weeks.”
The release document included provisions (1) releasing Zebra Atlantek and its present and former employees ( inter alios ) from liability for attorneys' fees and (2) discharging all claims which the employee “may have against” those parties—including but not limited to any claims under the FEPA. Specifically, the release document reads in pertinent part as follows:
“2.1 By signing this Waiver/Release, the Employee permanently waives, releases and discharges each and every one of the Released Parties of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, expenses and liabilities of any kind, including but not limited to attorneys' fees, which the Employee may have against them. * * *
The release document also contained a revocation clause, whereby an employee was expressly permitted to revoke the terms of the release document within seven days of executing same.
Moreover, and especially pertinent to the case at hand, the Letter Agreement contained the following explicit language:
“The Employer encourages you to consult with an attorney regarding this Letter Agreement and the enclosed Waiver/Release, if you so desire.”
Karen Vaillancourt, who was the Manager of Human Resources at Zebra Atlantek when the April 29, 2005 meeting took place (and who was named as a defendant in the instant case and whose deposition was taken), testified that she had “read verbatim the whole [L]etter [A]greement” to those in attendance at the meeting on April 29, 2005; she further testified that she had read to the attendees “almost the whole letter on the Confidential Waiver and Agreement and Release.” 5 Ms. Vaillancourt also stated that it is her customary procedure at such meetings to “several times, indicate that [the attendees] should take [the release document] to their legal counsel and have it reviewed and make sure they understand what they're signing before they sign it.” However, at his deposition, plaintiff testified that Ms. Vaillancourt did not read the Letter Agreement aloud and that she “didn't read the whole [release document]” at the just-referenced meeting; he also testified that he could not recollect whether she had advised the employees to contact an attorney, but he did state that Ms. Vaillancourt had said that “[the employees] need[ed] to think about it.” 6
Ms. Vaillancourt further testified at her deposition that plaintiff not only signed the Letter Agreement at the April 29, 2005 meeting but that he also sought to submit the document to her at that time; Ms. Vaillancourt testified that she declined to accept the executed Letter Agreement from plaintiff at that time and instead told him that “it would be wise for him to take it and have his legal counsel review it.” 7 Ms. Vaillancourt further testified that, approximately ten minutes later, plaintiff came to her office “with both documents signed;” she stated that she again told him that she would not accept the documents at that time and that he “really needed to have his legal counsel look at [the documents].” The plaintiff, for his part, testified that he did not sign the documents on the day of the group meeting with Ms. Vaillancourt but instead took them home.8 It is undisputed, however, that plaintiff did sign the documents a few days later and mailed them to Zebra Atlantek.9 It is also undisputed that plaintiff never consulted with his attorney before signing the documents and that his attorney was not aware of the release document until a few weeks after plaintiff had executed it.
On August 30, 2005, the Commission issued a “Notice of Right to Sue” to plaintiff. Subsequently, in November of 2005, plaintiff commenced this action against defendants in the Superior Court for Washington County. In his complaint, which was later amended, plaintiff alleged that he had been discriminated against by Zebra Atlantek and the above-mentioned individual defendants on the basis of race, color, and ancestral origin in violation of the FEPA and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act. Zebra Atlantek filed an answer to both the complaint and the amended complaint. Zebra Atlantek also filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, in which it alleged that plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit “constitute[d] a material breach” of the release document.
On February 26, 2009, Zebra Atlantek filed a motion for summary judgment, to which plaintiff objected. On June 29, 2009, a hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment. At that hearing, Zebra Atlantek contended that plaintiff had signed a valid and binding release and had thereby waived the claims which he was seeking to litigate in the Superior Court; on that basis, Zebra Atlantek requested that summary judgment be granted in its favor. In response, plaintiff contended that the FEPA requires that plaintiff's counsel had to attest “that there wasn't a waiver of attorney's fees as a condition of settlement both at the Commission and at the Superior Court;” plaintiff further contended that, since there had been no such attestation by counsel, the result was “a void settlement.”
On August 28, 2009, the hearing justice issued a written decision in which she ruled (1) that, as a matter of law, the release document was “valid and binding;” and (2) that, therefore, plaintiff had “waived his claims” against Zebra Atlantek. The hearing justice reasoned that there was “nothing in FEPA that voids the Release.” Moreover, the hearing justice ruled that plaintiff had “violated the terms of the Release by bringing the present action.” Consequently, the hearing justice ruled that Zebra Atlantek was entitled to summary judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's claims and granting Zebra Atlantek's breach of contract counterclaim “as to liability only.”
Thereafter, a judgment was entered,10 from which plaintiff appealed, but only concerning the dismissal of three counts of his complaint and as to the grant of Zebra Atlantek's counterclaim for breach of contract.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the Superior Court...
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...and rewrite or amend statutes already enacted by the General Assembly.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc. , 45 A.3d 527, 536 (R.I. 2012) ("It is not our role to contort the language of an unambiguous statute in order to include within its reach a situati......
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...in past opinions, relied on dictionary definitions to provide the plain meaning of certain words. See, e.g., Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 535 (R.I.2012) (“It is well established that [w]hen * * * a statute does not define a word, courts will often apply a common meaning a......
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...a statute, the "ultimate goal [of the Court] is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent." Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 534 (R.I. 2012); see also Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I. 1987) (holding that the court's role is "to determine and effectuate the Legi......
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...and rewrite or amend statutes already enacted by the General Assembly.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 536 (R.I. 2012) ("It is not our role to contort the language of an unambiguous statute in order to include within its reach a situatio......