Olaniyan v. Csx Transp.
| Decision Date | 09 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04 C 5827.,04 C 5827. |
| Parties | Zacheaus OLANIYAN, As Special Administrator of the Estate of Bolutife Olaniyan, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION and Anthony Stall, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Benjamin Obi Nwoye, Mendoza & Nwoye, P.C., A. Denison Weaver, A. Denison Weaver, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Harold Abrahamson, Scott R. Bilse, Abrahamson, Reed & Adley, Hammond, IN, for Defendants.
On Sunday September 14, 2003 Bolutife Olaniyan was struck and killed by a freight train owned by defendant CSX Transportation ("CSX") at approximately 8:55 a.m. At the time of his death, Bolutife Olaniyan was five years old and lived with his mother and sister in a basement apartment at 4517 Baring Avenue in East Chicago, Indiana. The apartment was located approximately one half block from the train tracks where he was killed.
On the morning of September 14, unbeknownst to his mother and sister, Bolutife Olaniyan, who had been eating his breakfast alone in the kitchen, unlocked the apartment door, left the apartment, and wandered down the street. A witness, Leonard Grigsby ("Grigsby"), observed Bolutife Olaniyan prior to his death. Grigsby first noticed Bolutife Olaniyan walking toward the tracks from the South and observed that he appeared to be crying. Bolutife Olaniyan was wearing a long blue shirt and did not appear to be wearing any pants. Afraid that people would think that he had taken the boy's pants if he approached him, Grigsby decided to call the police to alert them that a young boy was playing near the tracks. In search of a phone, Grigsby came upon witness Jesse Hawkins ("Hawkins") in front of a building and asked that he call the police. Grigsby stated that Bolutife Olaniyan was on the tracks approximately 1-2 minutes before being struck by the train.
While attempting to contact the police, Grigsby heard a train approaching. The train Grigsby heard was a CSX locomotive traveling westward. Defendant Anthony Stall ("Stall") was the engineer of the train and John Kostoff ("Kostoff") was the conductor. The train's horn started blowing approximately one mile east of the Baring stop as the train approached a series of crossings and continued to sound until the train struck Bolutife Olaniyan. According to the record, there was nothing obstructing Stall and Kostoff's view from the train for more than one mile as it approached the Baring Avenue crossing. According to Kostoff, he was keeping a lookout from his position on the cab of the lead locomotive and could see "as far as you can see on a clear day."
The record is unclear as to exactly where Kostoff and Stall first saw Bolutife Olaniyan. According to the CSX accident report (created in March, 2004) the two saw the boy after moving over the Indianapolis Ave. crossing, which is approximately 720 feet east of the Baring Avenue crossing. According to the depositions of Stall and Kostoff (taken in August, 2005), the two first saw the boy at Magoun Avenue, which is approximately 360 feet east of the Baring Avenue crossing. When Stall saw Bolutife Olaniyan, he was bending over and Stall believed him to be standing in between the two sets of parallel tracks at the Baring Avenue crossing. Stall asked Kostoff if he thought the boy was in the clear and Kostoff replied "I think so." Stall did not apply the brakes. The train proceeded at the same speed and fatally struck Bolutife Olaniyan. The record shows that prior to impact Bolutife Olaniyan stood up, but otherwise did not move from the time Stall saw him.
After the train struck Bolutife Olaniyan, Stall made a service (non-emergency) application of the brakes and stopped the train in approximately 3,200 feet. According to Kostoff and Stall, the impact occurred approximately ten feet west of the Baring crossing.
Subsequent to the accident, Bolutife Olaniyan's father, Zacheaus Olaniyan, brought a two count complaint as special administrator to the estate of Bolutife Olaniyan. The first count alleges that defendants breached their duty of ordinary care to Olaniyan by 1) operating the train at an excessive speed for the then prevailing conditions; 2) operating the train without sufficient brakes; 3) failing to sound a warning at sufficient distance from the crossing to allow pedestrians to clear the crossing; 4) failing to stop the train in time to avoid the collision; 5) failing to keep a proper and sufficient lookout; 6) failing to adequately operate or maintain the pedestrian restriction gate at the Baring Avenue crossing; 7) failing to equip the train with efficient power brakes including an efficient emergency system; 8) failing to apply the brakes when danger was imminent; and 9) failing to provide and place and then adequately operate or maintain a pedestrian restriction gate at the Baring Avenue crossing. The second count alleges that CSX failed to comply with the Federal Safety Appliance Act 45 U.S.C. § 1 by failing to equip the train with efficient and operating power brakes.
Defendants move for summary judgment. At this time I also review defendants' motion to strike the report of plaintiff's expert Richard Biell and Olaniyan's motion to file a second amended complaint.
Defendants move to strike the report of plaintiff's expert Richard Beall ("Beall") from consideration. FED. R. EVID. 702 states in part that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise .
"[A] court should consider a proposed expert's full range of practical experience as well as academic or technical training when determining whether that expert is qualified to render an opinion in a given area." Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir.2000). It is evident that Beall is qualified as an expert. Beall has worked in the railroad industry since 1969 as, inter alia, an engineer, a conductor, and a safety and operations consultant. Additionally, Beall has taught and presented at numerous seminars regarding railway safety and has been published in numerous publications regarding railway safety and accidents.
Defendants argue that Beall's report should be stricken because it is based upon unsupported speculation. Defendants seek to strike the following assertions made by Beall: 1) that the event recorder indicates improper horn sequencing; 2) that the horn activation was insufficient to warn vehicular traffic, the general public and the decedent of the approaching train; 3) that if the crew had been keeping a proper lookout, they could not have missed the decedent; 4) the train crew should have applied the brakes in emergency when they saw the boy; 5) that if the engineer had blown long distinct whistle blasts at the crossings followed by frantic successions instead of the horn sequences evidenced on the event recorder, the decedent would have had a better chance of hearing the oncoming train; and 6) that the crew's violation of the CSX operating rules, alleged lack of reasonable care, and possible insufficient training and experience was a contributing cause to the accident.
To the extent Beall's report is relevant and derives from his extensive experience it is useful and admissible under Rule 702. Therefore, Beall's analysis of the event recorder is both appropriate and relevant. Furthermore, his experience in the railway history qualifies him to speak about effectiveness and appropriateness of various safety procedures. To the extent Beall's testimony exceeds the scope of his particular knowledge, it is inappropriate, however, and will not be considered in this motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, 165 F.3d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1999); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). I must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson. v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction applies the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). In a tort case, Illinois courts use the most significant contacts approach. Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1031, 250 Ill.Dec. 495, 738 N.E.2d 964, (2000). This requires the court to apply the local law of the place of the injury unless it is shown that another state has a more significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties. Id.
In this case, the injury took place in Indiana and no evidence suggests any other state has a more significant relationship with the injury or the parties. Therefore, Indiana law applies.
The first count of the complaint asserts that defendants were negligent for a number of reasons. "Actionable negligence has three essential elements: (1) a duty imposed by law to do or not to do a certain act; (2) a violation of that duty by an act or omission to act which constitutes a breach of that duty; and (3) injury proximately caused by such breach of duty." Terre Haute, etc. Traction Co. v. Phillips, 191...
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