Olausen v. Murguia
| Decision Date | 12 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-00388-MMD-VPC |
| Parties | STEVEN JOHN OLAUSEN, Plaintiff, v. SGT. MURGUIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Before the Court is Defendants' objection to the Magistrate Judge's Order denying their motion to stay proceedings pending the Court's screening of Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint filed over a year after the action was initiated ("Objection"). (Dkt. no. 91.) The Court has also reviewed Plaintiff's response (dkt. no. 92). Defendants' Objection is premised on their contention that the Magistrate Judge made a legal error by finding that post-answer screening of an inmate's proposed complaint is discretionary under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. There is no question that the PLRA requires courts to engage in pre-answer screening of an inmate's complaint. Defendants contend, however, that this compulsory judicial screening requirement extends to every proposed amended complaint filed post-answer. The Court disagrees and overrules Defendants' Objection.
Plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections, initiated this action on July 23, 2013. (Dkt. no. 1.) On October 7, 2013, the Courtscreened Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Dkt. no. 3.) The Court permitted Plaintiff's due process and retaliation claims to proceed and dismissed his Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims with prejudice. (Id. at 5-6.) The Court imposed a ninety (90) day stay and encouraged the parties to engage in informal settlement discussions. (Id.; dkt. no. 6.) The stay was lifted on January 9, 2014. (Dkt. no. 21.) The case has since progressed through the normal phases of litigation until August 2014 — the parties have filed numerous motions and Plaintiff pursued an appeal of the Court's decisions, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (See, e.g., dkt. nos. 16, 17, 19, 31, 40, 53.) On August 25, 2014, Plaintiff requested a ninety (90) day stay to permit the parties to engage in settlement discussion, citing discovery of new evidence. (Dkt. no. 69.) Defendants agreed that the case should be stayed but suggested that the parties could complete settlement negotiations within forty-five (45) days. (Dkt. no. 78.) On September 9, 2014, the Court issued an order scheduling a settlement conference for September 25, 2014. (Dkt. no. 79.) Settlement was not accomplished. (Dkt. no. 84.)
In the meantime, on September 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint based on newly discovered evidence ("Motion to Amend"). (Dkt. no. 73.) On October 2, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order addressing pending motions and setting a briefing schedule on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. (Dkt. no. 86.) Defendants waited until October 17, 2014, the deadline for Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend as established by the Court's Order, to move to stay proceedings, taking the position that the Court is mandated to re-screen Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint. (Dkt. no. 88.) The Magistrate Judge promptly denied Defendants' motion (dk. no. 89), which led to Defendants' filing of their Objection.
Magistrate judges are authorized to resolve pretrial matters subject to district court review under a "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); L.R. IB 3-1(a) (). Section 636(b)(1)(A) "would also enable the court to delegate some of the more administrative functions to a magistrate, such as . . . assistance in the preparation of plans to achieve prompt disposition of cases in the court." Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869 (1989). A magistrate judge's pretrial order issued under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) is not subject to de novo review, and the reviewing court "may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court." Grimes v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). Where the magistrate judge's ruling involves question of law, however, the standard of review is de novo. See Wolpin v. Philip Morris Inc., 189 F.R.D. 418, 422 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (). Because the Magistrate Judge's decision involves the legal question whether a court must carry out post-answer screening under the PLRA, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge's legal conclusion de novo.
Defendants rely on three statutes governing inmate litigation to argue that a federal district court is compelled to screen every amended complaint before a defendant is required to respond: 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). Defendants are correct that the determination of a statutory mandate begins with the statute's plain meaning, but they err in interpreting such plain meaning here. As the Supreme Court recently cautioned, in construing the PLRA, the lower court's "job is to construe the statute-not to make it better," such that courts "must not read in by way of creation, but instead abide by the duty of restraint, the humility of function as merely the translator of another's command." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Heeding this warning, the Court will address each of Defendants' cited statutes.
Defendants argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) supports their contention that the screening of a complaint filed by a plaintiff who seeks in forma pauperis status is mandatory. True enough. Courts are required to screen an in forma pauperis complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate under certain circumstances. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) ().1 However, Defendants read more into the statute by arguing that the screening requirement extends to every proposed amended complaint filed after service of process and a defendant's response. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) states, in pertinent part, that "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines" that the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Just because a court has authority to dismiss the case at any time does not mean it is compelled to re-screen every proposed amended complaint filed after the initial pre-answer screening. Defendants fail to cite to any case where a court has construed § 1915(e)(2)(B) to require court screening of every proposed amended complaint filed after service of process and defendant's response.
Moreover, Defendants' proposed construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) would yield a result that is contrary to the purpose of the statute. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130(reasoning that "the goal of judicial economy" could be undermined if the PLRA required plaintiffs to file new lawsuits without providing them an opportunity to cure their original complaints through amendment). If, as Defendants argue, the Court is required to re-screen Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, and if the Court finds that it fails to state a claim, Plaintiff may still proceed with the two claims that survived the Court's pre-answer screening of his initial Complaint. Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status would not be affected by the Court's denial of his Motion to Amend. Thus, compulsory court re-screening of Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint would not serve to dispose of claims early.
Defendants contend that 28 U.S.C. § 1915A by its plain meaning requires screening of "a complaint" and because an amended complaint is "a complaint," § 1915A covers amended complaints.2 This interpretation ignores the statute's plain meaning.
Section 1915A(a) states as follows with respect to screening:
(a) Screening. — The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The statute could not be any clearer as to the timing of the mandatory screening. A court must screen "before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing." Id. As the Supreme Court has clarified, "[a]ll this may take place before any responsive pleading is filed — unlike in the typical civil case, defendants do not have to respond to a complaint covered by the PLRA until required todo so by the court, and waiving the right to reply does not constitute an admission of the allegations in the complaint." Jones, 549 U.S. at 213. But the screening provision does not require a court, either explicitly or implicitly, to screen every time a plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint. Defendants focus on the phrase "a complaint" but ignore the timing of compulsory screening.
The Court's construction of § 1915A is further bolstered by the Supreme Court's characterization of the PLRA's screening provision. In Jones, the Supreme Court reviewed the exhaustion provision of the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), to determine whether the PLRA requires the inmate litigant to plead and demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint, or whether the defendant must raise failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. In discussing the PLRA's statutory framework, the Court explained that "[a]mong other...
To continue reading
Request your trial