Olavarria v. Jones
| Decision Date | 17 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5:19-CV-162-FL,5:19-CV-162-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | REINALDO OLAVARRIA, Plaintiff, v. DORETHA JONES, in her individual and private capacity; YETVETTE GRIFFIN, in her individual and private capacity; NICOLE FIELDS, in her individual and private capacity; DOREEN PEARSON, in her individual and private capacity; MANDY COHEN, NCDHHS Secretary, Defendants. |
This matter is before the court on defendants' motions to dismiss (DE 35, 38), and on plaintiff's motion to show cause (DE 46) and motion to recuse (DE 47). The motions have been briefed fully, and in this posture the issues raised are ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motions are granted, and plaintiff's motions are denied.
Plaintiff commenced this action on April 24, 2020, by moving for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On January 2, 2020, Magistrate Judge James E. Gates allowed plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis and, on frivolity review, recommended that portions of plaintiff's claims beallowed to proceed against a limited number of defendants but that plaintiff's other claims be dismissed. The court adopted that recommendation by February 5, 2020 order. Plaintiff claims, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, that a number of state and county officials, specifically Wake County Human Services ("WCHS") employees, violated his constitutional rights, including his right to due process and rights under the First and Fourth Amendment, and wrongfully denied him supplemental nutrition assistance program ("SNAP") benefits. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in excess of $20,000,000, costs of the litigation, and other declaratory or remedial relief as appropriate.
On March 5, 2020, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of the court's order allowing plaintiff's claim to proceed in part. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on June 22, 2020.
On June 3, 2020, defendants Nicole Fields ("Fields"), Yetvette Griffin ("Griffin"), Doretha Jones ("Jones"), and Doreen Pearson ("Pearson") (collectively "WCHS defendants") filed the instant motion to dismiss. Defendant Mandy Cohen ("Cohen"), the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services ("NCDHHS"), filed the instant motion to dismiss on June 5, 2020. Plaintiff filed his response to defendants' motions, which also included a "motion to recuse" and a request for "judgment in favor of plaintiff . . . based on the defense response." ((DE 47) 1, 20). Plaintiff also filed a motion to show cause, seeking a hearing on alleged perjury by defendants' counsel and seeking to hold them in contempt.
The court incorporates by reference the background of this case set forth in its February 5, 2020 order and includes the following facts alleged in the complaint summarized as relevant to resolution of the instant matter. In March 2019, Fields, an employee of WCHS, denied plaintiff'sSNAP recertification. (Compl. (DE 5) at 7). Fields denied plaintiff's benefits because plaintiff refused to sign a consent for the release of information form, and because he failed to attend a recertification interview. (Id. at 7-9). Plaintiff alleges that he did not sign the consent for release of his information because the requirement to sign is a violation of his privacy and his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. (Id. at 8, 10). He also alleges that Fields failed to send notice of the recertification interview. (Id.). Pearson and Griffin, also employees of WCHS, assisted Fields by allegedly using coercion, blackmail, and threats when communicating with plaintiff. (Id. at 8-9).
Plaintiff previously had problems with WCHS prior to the March 2019 denial of SNAP benefits. (Id. at 9). WCHS allegedly denied his SNAP applications in error on multiple occasions over the past several years, and workers allegedly falsified records or failed to abide by SNAP policies and regulations. (Id. at 9, 11, 13-17). Plaintiff appealed the denial of his benefits on several occasions, in one instance resulting in a stipulation between plaintiff and WCHS that WCHS allegedly failed to abide by. (Id. at 9, 13). WCHS allegedly did not process his applications within the required 30 days, and WCHS employees asked for documents that they knew plaintiff did not have. (Id. at 10). WCHS workers allegedly expressed racist and prejudiced attitudes toward individuals like plaintiff who are disabled, Hispanic, and male. (Id. at 11). WCHS allegedly denied him benefits in retaliation for filing complaints. (Id.). During a hearing, Jones, an intake supervisor for WCHS, allegedly lied under oath on multiple occasions and defamed plaintiff. (Id. at 19).
Plaintiff communicated with Regina Petteway ("Petteway"), who is the head of WCHS and a former defendant, about the intentional acts of WCHS employees and Petteway did not respond to plaintiff's complaints. (Id. at 10). He filed a state level complaint with Therman Newton ("Newton"), a policy consultant for NCDHHS, who is also a former defendant, that also wentunaddressed. (Id.). The Governor, Wake County Board of Commissioners, and North Carolina Office of State Human Resources all allegedly had the capability to intervene and address the matter but failed to act. (See id. at 10, 15, 23). NCDHHS trained and supervised the WCHS defendants in conjunction with issuing the WCHS defendants their licenses to engage in social services in North Carolina. (Id. at 2).
Finally, plaintiff alleges that he applied for employment with the State of North Carolina but was denied because of a disability. (Id. at 26).
"Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455. "Disqualification is required if a reasonable factual basis exists for doubting the judge's impartiality," In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987), as judged under an "objective standard [that] asks whether the judge's impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable, well-informed observer who assesses all the facts and circumstances." United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998). The "Supreme Court has made crystal clear, however, that litigants may not make the trial judge into an issue simply because they dislike the court's approach or because they disagree with the ultimate outcome of their case." United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, there is no basis in law or in fact for the court to recuse itself from this matter. As to plaintiff's argument that the court acted inappropriately by allowing portions of the case, such asentry of an initial scheduling order, to continue while his appeal from a non-appealable order was pending, "[t]he general rule is that the filing of a timely and sufficient notice of appeal immediately transfers jurisdiction of all matters relating to the appeal from the district court to the court of appeals." In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689, 692-694 (5th Cir. 1979) (). Accordingly, there was no impropriety committed by the court during plaintiff's appeal's pendency.
To plaintiff's contention that the court made arguments on behalf of defendants, it is the court's statutory duty to "dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The court's responsibility is to announce the law and its application to the case or controversy before the court. Const. art III., sec. 2, cl. 1. The fact that the law and the alleged facts do not support portions of plaintiff's claim is not indicative of bias by the court. Nor is there a basis for plaintiff's claim that this court's adverse rulings constitute racial and gender discrimination.
Finally, the court construes plaintiff's request that "judgment in favor of plaintiff be entered based on the defense [sic] response" ((DE 47) 20), as a request for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Such a motion is premature as pleadings have not closed since an answer has not been filed by any of the defendants against whom plaintiff moves.
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for the undersigned to recuse herself is dismissed and plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is dismissed without prejudice.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating whether a claim is stated, "[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
As the court has already held, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, the only available relief plaintiff may seek from defendant Cohen under his ...
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