Oldaker v. Lowe's Home Ctrs.

• Decision Date: 05 May 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:21-CV-14
• Parties: ALEXANDER OLDAKER, Plaintiff, v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia

ALEXANDER OLDAKER, Plaintiff, v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:21-CV-14

United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia

May 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS AND AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL

THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE

Pending before the Court are Defendant's Objections [ECF No. 30] to the Magistrate Judge's Order [ECF No. 26] granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery [ECF No. 20]. This Court stayed that Order pending resolution of Defendant's Objection. [ECF No. 42]. Plaintiff requested information and documents related to other incidents arguably like the incident giving rise to Plaintiff's claims here. Defendant objected arguing the requested information is not sufficiently similar to be discoverable. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Order are OVERRULED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff brings a personal injury action against his then-employer for so-called “deliberate intent” under West Virginia Code § 23-4-2. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, on May 31, 2019, Plaintiff alleges he was crushed beneath a riding mower while loading the machine on a customer's truck. He claims his employer directed and required the use of dual ramps at an excessive angle contrary to the mower's owner's manual. Plaintiff also alleges he was never trained on the manual.

During ongoing discovery, Plaintiff requested information from Defendant about prior “similar” incidents involving loading or unloading mechanized equipment including lawnmowers, onto customer vehicles resulting in injury or death. Defendant initially objected to the requests. Fulfilling their mutual “meet and confer” obligation, counsel had agreed to limit the temporal scope of the requests to the five-year period preceding Plaintiff's incident.^[1] A dispute remained on two requests: (1) Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 2 which requested Defendant identify whether it had been a party in any previous litigation arising from loading or unloading mechanized equipment and (2) Request for Production No. 27 which sought copies of all citations and investigative files of alleged citations and/or violations of any safety, health, and/or environmental protection regulations and/or rules related to injury or death arising from loading or unloading mechanized equipment onto customer vehicles.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel related to that dispute. Therein, he sought information related to prior similar incidents for the preceding five (5) years specifically where:

• Any such injury or death resulted from a similar occurrence (loading a riding mower with a ramp onto a vehicle);

• A riding mower and ramps were involved;

• Defendant sold the mower;

• Defendant was involved in loading the mower; and,

• A party alleged Defendant was at fault for the injury or death.

That motion was fully briefed, and the Magistrate Judge heard argument on the question. In his Reply brief, Plaintiff more narrowly tailored the scope of the disputed request to include:

1. The identification and description of prior lawsuits filed against Lowe's during the 5- year period preceding the subject incident arising from injuries and/or death caused during the loading of a riding mower onto a vehicle with a ramp(s).

2. The production of citations issued to Lowe's during the 5-year period preceding the subject incident for any citation or violation of a governmental safety and health regulation or law arising from an injury or death sustained during the loading of a riding mower onto a vehicle with a ramp(s).

3. The production of Lowe's investigative file during the 5-year period preceding the subject incident for any alleged citation or violation of a safety and health regulation or law arising from an injury or death sustained during the loading of a riding mower onto a vehicle with a ramp(s).

ECF No. 24 at 1. The Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff's motion finding the requested information within the boundaries of permissible discovery. ECF No. 26.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

This Court referred the instant discovery dispute to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). On non-dispositive matters, such rulings can only be disturbed if the reviewing court finds the Magistrate Judge's order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). “A court's finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Patrick v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 298 F.R.D. 333, 335-36 (N.D. W.Va. 2014) (Groh, J.) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “In light of the broad discretion given to a magistrate judge in the resolution of non-dispositive discovery disputes, the court should only overrule a magistrate judge's determination if this discretion is abused.” Shoop v. Hott, No. 5:08CV188, 2010 WL 5067567, at *2 (N.D. W.Va. Dec. 6, 2010) (Stamp, J.). “As other courts have noted, this standard of review affords great deference to the magistrate judge.” United States v. Hackett, No. 1:11CR51, 2011 WL 5244695, at *1 (N.D. W.Va. Nov. 2, 2011) (Keeley, J.).

As this Court is required to assess whether the Magistrate Judge is clearly erroneous or contrary to law, a review of the applicable discovery standard is appropriate. Rule 26(b)(1) permits parties to

obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

This Court, specifically Magistrate Judge Aloi, has expounded on the scope of Rule 26.

To be discoverable, information must be relevant. “Relevance for discovery purposes [, however] is defined more broadly than relevance for evidentiary purposes.” Kidwiler v. Pregressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 193 (N.D. W.Va. March 30, 2000); see also, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). Information is relevant “if it ‘bears on, or ... reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.'” Id.; see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Moreover, “‘[r]elevancy is not limited by the exact issues identified in the pleadings, the merits of the case, or the admissibility of discovered information.' Rather, the general subject matter of the litigation governs the scope of relevant information for discovery purpose.”

Furthermore, “control over pretrial discovery is within the discretion of the trial court.” King v. McCown, 831 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1987) (table).

Taylor v. Wallace Auto Parts & Servs., Inc., No. 2:19-CV-27, 2019 WL 13096506, at *5 (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 11, 2019) (Aloi, M.J.).

III. ANALYSIS

To sustain a claim for excess damages against an employer under W.Va. Code § 23-4-2, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(i) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in the workplace which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or death;

(ii) That the employer, prior to the injury, had actual knowledge of the existence of the specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by the specific unsafe working condition.

(I) In every case actual knowledge must specifically be proven by the employee or other person(s) seeking to recover under this section, and shall not be deemed or presumed

(II) Actual knowledge is not established by proof of what an employee's immediate supervisor or management personnel should have known had they exercised reasonable care or been more diligent.

(III) Any proof of the immediate supervisor or management personnel's knowledge of prior accidents, near misses, safety complaints or citations from regulatory agencies must be proven by documentary or other credible evidence.

(iii) That the specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation, whether cited or not, or of a commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the industry or business of the employer.

(iv) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set forth in subparagraphs (i) through (iii), inclusive, of this paragraph, the person or persons alleged to have actual knowledge under subparagraph (ii) nevertheless intentionally thereafter exposed an employee to the specific unsafe working condition; and

(v) That the employee exposed suffered serious compensable injury or compensable death as defined in section one, article four, chapter twenty-three as a direct and proximate result of the specific unsafe working condition.

. . .

W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). A plaintiff in a deliberate-intent action bears the burden to show that his or her “supervisor ... or another management employee[ ] actually knew” of the unsafe working condition that allegedly resulted in his or her injury. FirstEnergy Generation, LLC v. Muto, 832 S.E.2d 58, 63 (W.Va. 2018). In granting the underlying motion to compel, the Magistrate Judge found the requested information to be discoverable with respect to whether Defendant, as Plaintiff's employer, had “actual knowledge of the existence of the...