Oldendorf v. General Motors Corp.
Decision Date | 07 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2-00-0343.,2-00-0343. |
Citation | 751 N.E.2d 214,256 Ill.Dec. 161,322 Ill. App.3d 825 |
Parties | Steven L. OLDENDORF and Dana M. Oldendorf, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; Dan Wolf Pontiac-GMC Trucks, Inc.; Harris Bank Barrington, N.A.; and Judicial Recovery Systems, Inc., a/k/a REI Towing, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Norman H. Lehrer, Maureen Flaherty, Lehrer, Flaherty & Canavan, Wheaton, for Dana M. Oldendorf, Steven L. Oldendorf.
Edward J. Lesniak, Jay S. Dobrutsky, Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C., Chicago, for Harris Bank Barrington, N.A.
Joseph M. Laraia, Michael T. Navigato, Laraia & Hubbard, P.C., Wheaton, for Dan Wolfe Pontiac-GMC Trucks.
Thomas A. Carton, James R. Branit, Bullaro & Carton, Chtd., Chicago, for Judicial Recovery.
Robert Johnson, Brothers & Thompson, P.C., Chicago, for General Motors Corp.
Plaintiffs, Steven and Dana Oldendorf, appeal the circuit court's order granting the motion of defendant Dan Wolf Pontiac-GMC Trucks, Inc. (Wolf), to dismiss counts IV and V of plaintiffs' amended complaint. Plaintiffs also appeal the court's order granting motions for summary judgment in favor of defendants Harris Bank Barrington, N.A. (Harris Bank), and Judicial Recovery Systems, Inc. (JRS), as to counts VII and VIII of plaintiffs' amended complaint. (Plaintiffs pleaded two count VIIs in their original complaint, which were repeated verbatim in their amended complaint; for purposes of this opinion, we refer to the second count VII as count VIII.) We affirm the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment against plaintiffs as to counts VII and VIII of their amended complaint and reverse the court's judgment dismissing counts IV and V of the amended complaint. The portion of our opinion regarding counts VII and VIII will not be published.
Plaintiffs purchased a used 1995 Pontiac Bonneville from Wolf on December 27, 1997. Plaintiffs financed the purchase and executed a retail installment agreement, which contained the following provisions:
As required by section 433.2 of the Code of Federal Regulations (FTC Rule) (16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975)), the agreement also contained the following language:
The financing agreement subsequently was assigned to Harris Bank, which is identified as "First Lienholder" on the certificate of title. No other security interest is identified on the certificate of title. Plaintiffs concede on this appeal that Harris Bank has a perfected security interest in the car under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (810 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq. (West 1998)).
At the time of purchase, plaintiffs paid $620 for "General Motors Protection Plan Major Guard Coverage" (GMPP contract), which was issued by defendant General Motors Corporation (GM). Plaintiffs also executed a form entitled "Contract Registration," which was completed at the time the car was purchased. Our analysis of the content of the registration form will be provided below.
In November 1998, plaintiffs sent notice to Wolf, GM, and Harris Bank of their intent to revoke their acceptance of the car. Plaintiffs alleged that the car was defective, and unsafe and unreliable as a result, because the car excessively leaked oil in spite of repeated attempts to repair the problem. They requested the cancellation of the "contracts," the return of all payments made, and compensation for their damages. The notice was silent as to the nature and the dollar amount of the damages claimed. Plaintiffs also stated that they would make no further payments under the financing agreement and maintained that repossession was prohibited because they were also "asserting their security interest in the vehicle, pursuant to 810 ILCS 5/2-711, which [gave] them a superior right to possession over any lien holder."
On or about March 19, 1999, JRS, under contract with Harris Bank, repossessed the car. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on March 22, 1999. On December 29, 1999, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging, in pertinent part, violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act or Act) , common-law fraud, and conversion. Counts IV and V alleged violation of the Consumer Fraud Act and common-law fraud, respectively, against GM and Wolf, its authorized dealer. Counts VII and VIII alleged conversion and violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, respectively, against Harris Bank and JRS. On Wolf's motion, the trial court dismissed counts IV and V pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)). On motions brought by Harris Bank and by JRS, the court granted summary judgment against plaintiffs on counts VII and VIII, pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1998)). This appeal followed.
Count IV alleges violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. In order to set forth a cause of action under the Act, a complaint must set forth specific facts that establish each of the following elements: (1) a deceptive act of misrepresentation of a material fact by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention that the plaintiff rely on the deception of misrepresentation; and (3) that the deception or misrepresentation occurred in the course of business. Gragg v. Calandra, 297 Ill.App.3d 639, 647, 231 Ill.Dec. 711, 696 N.E.2d 1282 (1998).
Plaintiffs alleged that, "at all times relevant," defendants were engaged in trade or commerce and that the following "representations and/or omissions" were made to plaintiffs:
The "Contract Registration" form, which was attached to the amended complaint as Exhibit "B," identified the car purchased by plaintiffs as a GM certified used vehicle. The form indicated that the car's odometer mileage was 18,734, the purchase date was December 27, 1997, and the car was originally placed "in service" on January 12, 1995. Limited warranty information was provided next. The form explained that, on vehicles covered under the 48-month/ 50,000 mile and 60-month/62,000 mile limited warranties, the "time and mileage limits begin on the date the vehicle was first delivered as a new vehicle or put into service and at zero (0) miles." On vehicles covered under the 12-month/12,000 mile warranty, the "time and mileage limits begin on the vehicle purchase date and at the mileage shown above."
Beneath the limited warranty information was a section explaining optional coverage. The form explained that the following optional coverage was available to plaintiffs at the price of $620.00:
The reverse side of the form contained the following language:
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