Oldfield v. Athletic Congress

• Decision Date: 26 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-2814,84-2814
• Citation: 779 F.2d 505
• Parties: Brian R. OLDFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ATHLETIC CONGRESS, U.S. Olympic Committee & Don Miller, individually and as Executive Director of the U.S.O.C., James Carnes, individually and as President of the Athletic Congress of the U.S., Ollan C. Cassell, individually and as Executive Director of the Athletic Congress of the U.S., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 505

779 F.2d 505

Brian R. OLDFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ATHLETIC CONGRESS, U.S. Olympic Committee & Don Miller individually and as Executive Director of the U.S.O.C. James Carnes, individually and as President of the Athletic Congress of the U.S., Ollan C. Cassell, individually and as Executive Director of the Athletic Congress of the U.S. Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-2814.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 14, 1985.

Decided Dec. 26, 1985.

David S. Shane, Law Office of Melvin M. Belli, Sr., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

John J. Hansen, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before SNEED, KENNEDY and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges.

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a decision of the district court granting the summary judgment

motion of appellees, The Athletic Congress (TAC) and the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), against appellant, Brian Oldfield.

I. FACTS

Brian Oldfield is a world-class athlete in the shot put competition. Shortly after participating in the 1972 Olympics, Oldfield signed a professional performance contract with the International Track Association (ITA)--an act that resulted in the suspension of his amateur status. He competed with the ITA for four years, at which time he sought to reestablish his standing as an amateur.

Oldfield was only partially successful in this attempt. In accordance with a rule of the International Olympic Committee that bars from the Olympic Games athletes who have been "registered as professional ... in any sport," By-laws to Rule 26 of the Olympic Charter, TAC sought to exclude Oldfield from the 1980 Olympic Trials on the ground that his ineligibility to compete in the Games rendered him ineligible to participate in the Trials.

Oldfield initiated an arbitration proceeding to challenge his exclusion, but the arbitrator agreed with TAC's stand on the issue. Oldfield took no further action to challenge the arbitrator's decision. Nonetheless, ultimately he was allowed to compete in the Trials. Presumably, this was because the USOC had withdrawn its entry in the 1980 Summer Games and the so-called "Trials" would not serve to select athletes for the Olympic Team.

In April 1984, Oldfield sent a telegram to TAC inquiring about his eligibility to compete in the 1984 Olympic tryouts. On April 24, 1984, TAC informed Oldfield that he was not eligible because he could not play in the Games under IOC rules. Two days before the Olympic tryouts, on June 13, 1984, Oldfield filed his complaint in this action. Among other things, he claimed that TAC and the USOC were arbitrarily denying him his right to compete, in violation of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. Secs. 371-396 (1982).

On the eve of the competition, the district court denied Oldfield's motion for a temporary restraining order; Oldfield appealed, but this court denied his motion for an injunction pending resolution of the appeal. The parties subsequently stipulated to a dismissal of that appeal, but Oldfield retained his claim for damages. The USOC filed a motion for summary judgment on September 21, 1984, which TAC joined on September 28. The district court summarily granted the motion and Oldfield timely filed this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court's judgment is reviewable de novo. The judgment should be affirmed only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Poland v. Martin, 761 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir.1985). The judgment below may be affirmed on any ground appearing in the record. See Veit v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir.1984).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Private Right of Action

The Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. Secs. 371-396 (1982), was enacted in response to years of rivalry, warfare, and confusion among amateur athletic organizations--a situation that, in Congress's estimation, was impairing the ability of American athletes to compete on the international level. See S.Rep. No. 770, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report ]. The Act attacked the problem through structural revision: it created a hierarchical system headed by the USOC, in which the power is vested "to act as the coordinating body for amateur athletic activity." Id. at 4. Among its responsibilities under the Act, the USOC is charged with "[providing] for the swift resolution Although Oldfield concedes that no part of the Act explicitly affords athletes a private right of action to enforce this statutory directive, he argues that such a right may fairly be inferred.

                of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organizations, and [protecting] the opportunity of any amateur athlete ... to participate in amateur athletic competition."    36 U.S.C. Sec. 374(8).  It is primarily from this provision that Oldfield seeks to nourish his claim
                

In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Supreme Court prescribed the four factors that are relevant in determining whether a statute contains an implied cause of action: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is an indication of Congress's intent to create or deny a private remedy; (3) whether a private remedy would be consistent with the statute's underlying purposes; and (4) whether the cause of action traditionally is relegated to state law. Id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2087. As more recent Supreme Court cases have made clear, however, the factors enunciated in Cort are not entitled to equal weight. "The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2488, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smithy, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 78, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1838 39, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245-246, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377-78, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1838-39, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982).

All too frequently the intent of Congress is quite obscure. It is seldom as apparent as it is in the present case. As originally proposed, the Act contained a substantive provision on athletes' rights that granted athletes the power to challenge in federal court the actions of any sports organization that threatened to deny them the right to compete. See S. 2036, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 304(a) (1977); Michels v. United States Olympic Committee, 741 F.2d 155, 157-58 (7th Cir.1984). The Senate Report on the final version of the Act discloses, however, that "[t]his provision met with strong resistance by the high school and college communities. Ultimately, the compromise reached was that certain substantive provisions on athletes' rights would be included in the USOC Constitution and not in the bill." Senate Report at 6. Should this compromise be construed to indicate Congress's intent to incorporate the USOC Constitution into federal law and thereby empower athletes to litigate in federal court any alleged deprivations of rights created by that document just as if the Senate had retained the provisions of the original bill? We think not. As Judge Posner recently observed, such an approach "would defeat the [legislative] compromise." Michels, 741 F.2d at 159 (Posner, J., concurring).

Oldfield narrows his attack and contends that, because the section containing the private right of action was deleted in response to pressure from high school and college organizations, we should infer that Congress intended to eliminate only the private right of action of student athletes. Such a distinction finds no support in the statute: all the provisions in the Act concerning resolution of disputes and conflicts refer to amateur athletes in general. See 36 U.S.C. Sec. 374(8) (1982) (charging the USOC with responsibility both for resolving disputes and conflicts involving "amateur athletes" and for protecting the competitive opportunities of "any amateur athlete"); id. Sec. 375(a)(5) (granting the USOC the power to facilitate the resolution of conflicts that involve "any of its members and any amateur athlete") (emphasis added); id. Sec. 382b (directing the USOC to "establish and maintain provisions for the swift and equitable resolution of disputes involving any of its members and relating to the opportunity of an amateur athlete" to participate in certain protected competitions) (emphasis added).

Also unpersuasive are Oldfield's references to the legislative history. His quotations The absence of an implied private right of action is also suggested by Congress's explicit grant to the USOC of the right to proceed in federal court against infringers of Olympic-related symbols, emblems, trademarks, and names. See 36 U.S.C. Sec. 380 (1982). When Congress wished to confer a right of action, it knew how to do so. The presence in the Act of administrative mechanisms for the resolution of disputes over an athlete's right to compete still further betokens the absence of an implied private right. See, e.g., id. Sec. 382b (directing the USOC to promulgate procedures for resolving disputes between its members and athletes); id. Sec. 395 (prescribing procedures for challenging the actions of national governing bodies for particular sports). In view of these express enforcement provisions, "it is highly improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action.' " Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S....